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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

GARY C. JACOBSON argues that the results of the 2002 congressional election were consistent with past midterm elections as referenda on the administration and the economy, although the terrorist attacks of September 11 profoundly affected the referendum's substance. The modest Republican victory was a consequence of the post-September 11 rally in support for President George W. Bush, redistricting (in the House), and higher turnout among Republican loyalists. There was no evidence of any national shift in public sentiment toward the Republican party.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS analyzes the news coverage of the September 11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. She concludes that the American press helped Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to realize their publicity objectives, while simultaneously losing some of its bite as the watchdog of government.

LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN employs an underutilized case study from the cold war to investigate the dynamics associated with confronting regional powers armed with nascent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals. This research challenges the thesis of the so-called proliferation optimists, who maintain that small WMD arsenals effectively empower the weak against the strong.

DAVID W. RIVERA analyzes whether post-Soviet Russia has pursued a hostile, imperialist course toward the other former republics of the Soviet Union and whether the West should adopt a policy of containing Russian expansionism. He concludes by assessing whether previous trends have continued into the Putin years and draws out the implications of its findings for the "Who Lost Russia?" debate and whether Russia should be invited to join NATO.

KAREN M. KAUFMANN explores the influence of minority office-holding on the political behavior, attitudes, and participation rates of Latinos and blacks living in Denver, Colorado. Using data from four mayoral elections, she finds that both Latinos and blacks experience enhanced political engagement as a result of in-group attainment, but finds little evidence of a more generalized minority empowerment effect.

JOHN PRADOS comments on two recent books in the intelligence field that focus on spies and on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organization for scientific and technical work. From the spy as con artist to the cloak and dagger uses of laboratories and drafting tables, the works recast images of intelligence or break new ground in little understood areas. Both retain relevance today, although the main problems of intelligence are shifting away from areas where the CIA is strongest.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elections

GARY C. JACOBSON

Contrary to a great deal of the postelection commentary, the results of the 2002 midterm congressional elections were neither surprising nor historically anomalous. Neither did they signal an end to the national partisan stalemate exposed by the 2000 elections.[1] Rather, the election results, summarized in Table 1, were entirely consistent with models treating midterm elections as referenda on the administration and economy, and they reflected once again the distinct, evenly-balanced partisan divisions in the electorate that solidified during the Clinton administration. Moreover, reinforced by reapportionment and redistricting, the long-term trend toward increasing partisan consistency in voting across federal offices continued unabated in 2002.

To be sure, Republicans enjoyed a modest victory, which in an era of evenly balanced legislative parties gave them control of the Senate and a slightly more comfortable House majority. And President George W. Bush and his party's operatives deserve full credit for a vigorous campaign that turned out the Republican vote, efforts essential to the victories in Minnesota, Georgia, and Missouri that led to the Senate's capture. The Republican victory was, however, much more a consequence of redistricting (in the House) and of the higher turnout among Republican loyalists than of any national shift in public sentiment toward the party. It was also the undeniable, if unintended, gift of Osama bin Laden. The Democrats' losses stemmed not so much from inferior issue

[1] Gary C. Jacobson, "A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000," *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (Spring 2001): 5–27.

GARY C. JACOBSON is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. His most recent books are *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (5th ed.) and *The Logic of American Politics* (coauthored with Samuel Kernell).

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TABLE 1

Membership Changes in the House and Senate in the 2002 Elections

	Republicans	*Democrats*	*Independents*	*Vacant*
House of Representatives				
Elected in 2000	221	212	2	
At the time of the 2002 election	223	208	1	3
Elected in 2002	229	205	1	
Incumbents reelected	196	185	1	
Incumbents defeated by challengers	2	2		
Incumbents defeated by incumbents	1	3		
Open seats retained	15	10		
Open seats lost	3	3		
New open seats	13	5		
Senate				
After the 2000 election	50	50		
At the time of the 2002 election	49	49	1	1
After the 2002 election	51	48	1	
Incumbents reelected	13	10		
Incumbents defeated	1	2		
Open seats retained	5	1		
Open seats lost		1		

Source: Compiled by author.

positions or lack of message—although the terrorist attacks of September 11 did transform the national agenda to their obvious detriment—as from structural features of the electoral system that now work to their disadvantage. Not least because of structural impediments, Democrats will face an uphill battle for control of Congress for the remainder of the decade.

The 2002 Midterm as a Referendum

In 2002, for the second midterm election in a row, the president's party gained seats in the House. Prior to 1998, this had happened only once since the Civil War,[2] and some postelection analysts read the Republicans' upset of naïve expectations based on the historical pattern as both surprising and indicative of a pro-Republican national tide.[3] But just as in 1998,[4] nothing in the 2002 results challenges our current understanding of the processes that shape midterm congressional elections.

According to the extensive literature devoted to their study, party fortunes in midterm House elections are shaped by three basic conditions: the number

[2] The Democrats added House seats in 1934 during the New Deal realignment; both parties added seats in 1902, when the House grew by twenty-nine seats, but the president's Republicans picked up fewer than the opposition Democrats and so were relatively weaker after the election.

[3] See, for example, James Carney and John Dickerson, "W. and the 'Boy Genius,'" *Time*, 11 November 2002, 41–45; Howard Fineman, "How Bush Did It," *Newsweek*, 11 November 2002, 29–31.

[4] Gary C. Jacobson, "Impeachment Politics in the 1998 Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Spring 1999): 31–51.

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of seats the president's party already holds; how well the economy is doing; and how widely the public approves of the president's performance in office. Although scholars dispute the relative importance of each condition and how they may directly or indirectly influence voters' decisions, there is compelling evidence that together they account for most of the variance in midterm House seat swings.[5] The 2002 midterm is no exception, and it is easy to find off-the-shelf statistical models employing variables measuring these conditions that predict a modest Republican pickup of House seats.[6] Yet all three of these fundamental conditions were shaped by extraordinary circumstances in 2002, and it is in these circumstances that a fuller understanding of the election must be sought.

Presidential Approval

In the final Gallup Poll taken before the 2002 election, 63 percent of the public approved of George W. Bush's performance as president.[7] While Bush's approval rating was not as high as Bill Clinton's was in November 1998 (66 percent), it tied Ronald Reagan's 1986 rating for second highest in any postwar midterm election. Bush's high public approval, like that of Clinton and Reagan before him, clearly helped his party's congressional candidates, but this was in no way unusual.[8] The unusual thing was the origin of his high ratings: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, and Bush's response to them.

The events of September 11 and their aftermath profoundly transformed the electoral context for 2002, most importantly by redefining the Bush presidency and transforming public perceptions of the president. Bush had entered the White House only after the Republican appointees on the Supreme Court had settled the fierce partisan battle over the Florida vote count in his favor. In polls taken shortly after the election, a large majority of American who had voted for his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, regarded Bush's victory as illegit-

[5] For a list of relevant citations, see ibid., 33.

[6] For example, the model reported in Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2001), 144, which estimates seat swings as a function of the president's party's current seat share, changed in real income per capita over the election year, and the president's approval rating in the Gallup Poll taken immediately prior to the election, updated to include the observation for 2000, predicted a nine-seat Republican gain in House seats for 2002. Other plausible models predict larger or smaller Republican gains or small Democratic gains. All predictions from such models have wide error bands that would include almost any plausible result. See Nathaniel Beck, "We Should Be Modest About Predicting the 1992 Election," *The Political Methodologist* (Fall 1992): 23–27.

[7] His average rating in the fourteen polls taken during the month preceding the election by Gallup (4), CBS News/*New York Times* (2), Pew Research Center (2), *Newsweek* (2), ABC News/*Washington Post* (2), NBC/*Wall Street Journal* (1), CNN/*Time* (1) was also 63 percent approving; see http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm.

[8] Democrats picked up five House seats in 1998; Reagan's Republicans lost only five seats, the best performance at the midterm for any Republican administration before 2002.

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FIGURE 1
Approval of George W. Bush's Performance (Monthly Averages)



Sources: Gallup and CBS News/*New York Times* Polls.

imate.[9] As a result, Bush never enjoyed the customary winner's honeymoon. His initial reception by the public showed the widest partisan differences for any newly elected president in polling history.[10] In the twenty-eight Gallup and CBS News/*New York Times* polls taken prior to September 11, Bush's approval ratings averaged 88 percent among self-identified Republicans but only 31 percent among Democrats.[11] This 57-point gap marked Bush as an even more polarizing figure than the former record holder, Bill Clinton (with a 52-point average partisan approval gap for the equivalent period). Among Democrats at least, Bush's competence and legitimacy remained in doubt until September 11.[12]

The shock of September 11 and the president's forceful response to the crisis rallied the entire nation to his side. The terrorist attacks radically altered the context in which people responded to the approval question; the president was now to be evaluated as the defender of American democracy against shadowy foreign enemies rather than as a partisan figure of questionable competence and legitimacy. As Figure 1 shows, Bush's approval ratings jumped to

[9] Jacobson, "A House and Senate Divided," 19.

[10] Gary C. Jacobson, "Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 August–1 September 2002).

[11] The average among independents was 50 percent approving.

[12] As late as June 2001, among Democrats, 68 percent thought Bush could not be trusted to keep his word, 59 percent thought he did not have strong leadership qualities, 78 percent doubted his ability

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record levels. The already large supportive Republican majority grew to near unanimity, but Democrats accounted for most of the change, as their approval ratings shot up by 50 percentage points.[13] Although Bush's approval among Democrats declined steadily after the beginning of the election year—with important implications I discuss below—the question of Bush's legitimacy was laid to rest in the rally inspired by his effective leadership in responding to the crisis.

The president's rise in public esteem improved the Republicans' prospects for 2002 in a variety of ways. It helped the administration escape the consequences of the financial scandals, epitomized by the collapse of Enron, involving Bush's political cronies and campaign contributors. It is easy to imagine how the Democrats would have exploited the president's vulnerability on this dimension had his status as commander-in-chief in the war on terrorism not put partisan criticism beyond the pale at the very time the scandals emerged. In the end, Democrats derived no apparent electoral benefit from scandals otherwise ideally suited to their strategy of depicting the Bush administration and the Republican party as agents of greedy corporations who are indifferent to the jobs, investments, and pensions of ordinary Americans.

Bush's popularity also scared off high-quality Democratic challengers. One important way in which national conditions affect midterm election results is by influencing strategic decisions of potential candidates. Favorable conditions for a party attract talented and ambitious challengers to its standard and make it easier to finance their campaigns; unfavorable conditions have the contrary effect. The better the relative quality of a party's challengers and the greater their financial advantage, the better the party does on election day.[14] Bush's sky high ratings during the period when potential candidates had to make decisions about running evidently discouraged politically experienced and ambitious Democrats. As a result, the cohort of Democratic House challengers fielded in 2002 was the lowest quality (in terms of prior success in winning elective public office) of any postwar election except the 1990 midterm.[15]

Other changes in the electoral environment wrought by September 11 went beyond the president's rise in public esteem and were equally beneficial to Republicans. The shift in political focus from domestic issues to national defense

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to deal wisely with an international crisis, 70 percent thought he did not have the skills needed to negotiate with world leaders, and 54 percent doubted his judgment under pressure. See "Bush and the Democratic Agenda," CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, 14–18 June 2001, at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/bushbac.pdf.

[13] The ratings of independents are usually within a percentage point or two of the president's overall ratings; thus approval by independents rose from about 50 percent before to about 85 percent after September 11, then declined gradually to about 64 percent by November 2002.

[14] Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chaps. 3–6.

[15] Only 10.8 percent of Republican incumbents were opposed in 2002 by Democrats who had ever held elective public office, a figure 1.9 standard deviations below the postwar mean of 24.9 percent. The postwar low was 10.1 percent in 1990.

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and foreign policy moved the debates from Democratic to Republican turf. Asked in preelection polls which party in Congress would do a better job dealing with health care, education, Social Security, prescription drug benefits, taxes, abortion, unemployment, the environment, and corporate corruption, most respondents chose Democrats. Asked which party would do a better job dealing with terrorism, the possibility of war with Iraq, the situation in the Middle East, and foreign affairs, most preferred Republicans.[16] Voters put terrorism and the prospect of war at the top of their list of concerns, providing a major assist to the Republican cause. Without September 11, the election would have hinged on domestic issues, and the talk of invading Iraq would have seemed like "wagging the dog," a transparent attempt to deflect attention from the economy.

The war on terrorism also helped deflect blame from the administration and its congressional allies for the return of budget deficits. The extraordinary expense of dealing with the physical and economic damage inflicted by the attacks and of tightening homeland security against future threats was unavoidable. Wars, after all, are always fought on borrowed money.

The Economy

The slow economy was potentially a much greater electoral threat to Republicans than the return of red ink, to which it also of course contributed. Had Democrats succeeded in making the economy the dominant issue, they might well be running the 108th Congress. Yet once again, September 11 and its aftermath shielded the administration and Republican congressional candidates from the full force of economic discontent. Although the president sought to blame the terrorist attacks for aborting the recovery from the mild recession of 2001, he could not escape generally negative public reviews of his economic performance. Despite less than stellar grades on the economy, however, his leadership in the war on terrorism kept his overall ratings high.

Normally, a president's overall approval rating does not differ by much from his rating on specific policy domains, and economic perceptions help determine levels of presidential approval.[17] As Figure 2 indicates, this was the case with Bush before, but not after, September 11. Prior to the attacks, his overall rating was on average only 8 percentage points higher than his rating on the economy; afterward, it ran an average of 21 points higher. The initial rally in approval on his handling of the economy after September 11 had totally dissipated by election day. Had the terrorist attacks not occurred, Bush's overall

[16] Jeffrey M. Jones, "Republicans Trail in Congressional Race Despite Advantage on Issues," Gallup News Service, 26 September 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020926.asp?Version=p; Lydia Said, "National Issues May Play Bigger-Than-Usual Role in Congressional Elections," Gallup News Service, 31 October 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr021031.asp?Version=p.

[17] Richard A. Brody, *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), chap. 5.

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FIGURE 2
Approval of George W. Bush by Policy Domain



Source: CBS News/*New York Times* Polls.

approval rating would have remained much closer to his rating on the economy, and if standard midterm referendum models are to be believed, this alone might have cost Republicans control of the House.[18]

Going by past elections, however, the economy would not have produced anything like a Democratic landslide in 2002, even if the focus had not shifted to terrorism and Iraq. By the usual measures, the economy was not in particularly bad shape during the election year. It compared favorably to the seven other postwar midterm elections under Republican administrations. (See Table 2.)[19] Only 1986 enjoyed superior economic growth; only 1970 had greater real income growth; only 1986 and 1954 had lower inflation. Unemployment, at 5.8 percent, was the economy's weakest spot, comparatively, but even that rate was better than the average for Republican midterms (6.4 percent) or for the previous two decades (6.3 percent). The economic numbers were far more typical of years with small Republican losses (1986, 1990, and 1970) than with years in which Democrats made substantial gains in the House.

[18] The model mentioned in footnote 6 would predict Republicans to lose the House if Bush's overall approval rating were less than 50 percent.

[19] Figures for 2002 are annualized averages through the third quarter.

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TABLE 2

Economic Conditions at Postwar Midterm Elections under Republican Administrations

Election year	*Consumer prices*[a]	*Unemployment*[b]	*GDP*[a]	*Real income per capita*[a]	*Republican House seats*
1954	0.7	5.3	−0.8	−0.7	−18
1958	2.8	6.8	−1.0	−0.6	−48
1970	5.8	5.0	0.1	3.0	−12
1974	11.0	5.7	−0.4	−1.6	−49
1982	6.2	9.8	−2.0	0.4	−26
1986	1.9	6.9	3.5	2.3	−5
1990	5.4	5.6	2.8	1.1	−8
2002[c]	2.0	5.8	3.0	2.9	6

[a] Percent change during the election year.

[b] Annual percentage rate.

[c] Annualized, based on data through the third quarter.

Sources: Consumer prices and unemployment data: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Real Income data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

On the other hand, the economy was probably a greater liability to Republicans than these numbers suggest, because public perceptions of economic conditions were negative and pessimistic. Only about a quarter of Gallup Poll respondents rated the economy "excellent" or "good," whereas nearly three-quarters found it only "fair" or "poor," the worst net rating of the economy since 1994. People who thought the economy was getting worse outnumbered those who though it was improving, 54 percent to 34 percent.[20] Consumer confidence was at its lowest level since 1993.[21] The readiest explanation for the public's sour view of the economy is an economic variable not usually included in election models: the performance of the stock market. With more than half the adult population now invested in equities or mutual funds, the market's steep decline since 2000 produced losses in wealth that made the economy feel worse than other indicators would suggest. All the more important, then, that Bush's approval ratings were detached from the economy and that Republicans were able to deflect attention from the domestic economy to foreign policy and defense issues.

Exposure and Redistricting

A party's fortunes at midterm depend also on how many seats it already holds, which depends in part on what happened in the previous presidential election.

[20] From four Gallup Polls taken between September and the election, reported at http://polling report.com/consumer.htm, accessed on 18 November 2002.

[21] Consumer Research Center News Release, 29 October 2002, at http://www.crc-conquest.org/consumer_confidence.

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The longer the president's coattails and the greater his party's gains, the more seats the party has at risk in the subsequent midterm. To the degree that a president lacks coattails, his party's midterm exposure is smaller, for it cannot lose seats it does not possess. Just as in 1998, low exposure helps explain why the president's party gained rather than lost seats.[22] George Bush lost the popular vote by 540,000 votes and Republicans lost a net two House seats in 2000; their majority had been shrinking by small increments since 1994. Because Bush had no discernable coattails and left House Republicans with no additional marginal House seats, Democrats had relatively few easy targets in 2002.

Redistricting diminished the number of potential Democratic targets even further. The reallocation and redrawing of House districts after 1990 had given the Republicans a substantial boost that was crucial to their takeover of the House in 1994.[23] In 2002, the Republicans were once again poised to benefit from redistricting, for the states that gained seats after 2000 were more Republican in their voting habits than were states that lost seats. Al Gore had won six of the ten states losing seats, while Bush won seven of the eight states gaining seats; 54.1 percent of the total major-party vote in the former had gone to Gore; compared with 48.3 percent in the latter. Republicans also controlled the redistricting process in several large states set to lose or gain seats.

A convenient way to assess the redistricting-induced changes in district party balances is to compare the distribution of the major-party presidential vote from 2000 in the old and new districts. The Bush-Gore vote division provides an excellent approximation of district partisanship. Short-term forces were evenly balanced in 2000, and party line voting was the highest in decades, hence both the national and district-level vote reflected the underlying partisan balance with unusual accuracy.[24] Thus districts won by Gore lean Democratic, while districts won by Bush lean Republican. By this measure, the net effect of redistricting was to give Republicans more hospitable terrain, as it increased the number of House districts where Bush won more votes than Gore by nine, from 228 to 237.

Table 3 offers further detail on these changes. The first section shows that the reduction in Gore-majority districts was concentrated in the states that lost seats. The number of Bush-majority districts actually grew in these states despite their total loss of twelve House seats. This lopsided outcome reflects successful Republican gerrymanders in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The general consequences of partisan control of redistricting are shown in the second section.[25] Plainly, both parties used control of redistricting to improve their can-

[22] Jacobson, "1998 Congressional Elections," 33.

[23] Gary C. Jacobson, "Reversal of Fortune: The Transformation of U.S. House Elections in the 1990s" in David Brady, John Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Continuity and Change in Congressional Elections* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 10–38.

[24] Jacobson, "A House and Senate Divided," 5–13.

[25] The classification is from Republican National Committee, "Redistricting Party Control," at http://www.rnc.org/images/congonly.jpg, accessed on 9 September 2002.

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TABLE 3

Effects of Redistricting on the Partisan Leanings of House Districts

	Gore-Majority Districts			*Bush-Majority Districts*		
	2000	*2002*	*Change*	*2000*	*2002*	*Change*
All Seats	207	198	−9	228	237	9
Seat Reallocations						
State lost seats	80	65	−15	63	66	3
No change	65	66	1	85	84	−1
State gained seats	62	67	5	80	87	7
Partisan Control of Redistricting						
Republicans	41	30	−11	59	68	9
Democrats	64	69	5	69	66	−3
Shared or neither party	100	97	−3	95	98	3
At-large states	2	2	0	5	5	0
Partisan Makeup–Incumbent Districts						
Democrats	147	153	6	39	33	−6
Republicans	37	24	−13	158	171	13

didates' prospects, but Republicans more so than Democrats, and Republicans also came out ahead in states where neither party had full control of the process.

The third section of Table 3 reveals another crucial consequence of redistricting: marginal incumbents of both parties got safer districts. Redistricting gave eight Democrat incumbents who had been representing Bush-majority districts new Gore-majority districts; only one suffered the contrary switch, leaving a net increase of six. All thirteen of the switches involving Republican incumbents were from Gore- to Bush-majority districts. Of the twenty-five districts Republicans had won in 2000 with less than 55 percent of the major-party vote, eighteen were strengthened by increasing the proportion of Bush voters; of the nineteen similarly marginal Democratic districts, fifteen were given a larger share of Gore voters. Thus three quarters of the marginal districts were made safer by redistricting, half of them by more than 2 percentage points (in presidential vote share). If analysis is confined to districts with marginal incumbents who sought reelection in 2002, thirty-two of their forty districts (80 percent) were made safer by redistricting.

In addition to giving Republicans more favorable terrain, redistricting also dampened competition for House seats. California, where a bipartisan gerrymander left not a single one of the state's fifty-three House districts truly competitive, led the way; but the pattern was similar in a number of other states as well.[26] Usually, the shakeup set in motion by redistricting produces a bumper crop of competitive races in years ending in "2." Not in 2002; the number of districts classified by *Congressional Quarterly* as "tossup" or "leaning" prior to the election totaled only 48, compared to 103 in 1992 and 84 in 1982.[27] Redis-

[26] Gary C. Jacobson, "All Quiet on the Western Front: Redistricting and Party Competition in California House Elections" in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., *Redistricting in the New Millenium*, forthcoming.

[27] "CQ Ratings: The House," *CQ Weekly*, 26 October 2002, 2795.

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TABLE 4

Redistricting and Election Results

	Won by Democrats			*Won by Republicans*		
	2000	*2002*	*Change*	*2000*	*2002*	*Change*
All Seats	211	205	−6	223	229	6
Seat Reallocations						
State lost seats	72	59	−13	71	72	1
No change	70	73	3	79	76	−3
State gained seats	69	73	4	73	81	8
Partisan Control of Redistricting						
Republicans	40	31	−9	60	67	7
Democrats	74	79	5	59	56	−3
Shared or neither party	96	94	−2	99	101	2
At-large states	1	1	0	5	5	0
Partisan Makeup						
Gore-majority districts	166	170	4	40	27	−13
Bush-majority districts	45	35	−10	183	202	19

Note: Independent Bernard Sanders was also reelected; for this table, districts held by Virgil Goode (VA 5), elected in 2000 as an independent but switching to Republican in 2001, and Randy Forbes (VA 4), Republican elected in 2001 to replace deceased Democrat Norm Sisisky, are treated as Republican districts.

tricting patterns are a major reason for the dearth of competitive races in 2002 and help to explain why 2002 produced the smallest number of successful House challenges (four) of any general election in U.S. history.

The Results

The pattern of House election results in 2002 reflects redistricting patterns with remarkable fidelity; the outcomes reported in Table 4 closely match the changes in district partisanship displayed in Table 3. Democrats suffered a net decline in states that lost seats (and where redistricting was controlled by Republicans) that was only partially offset by additional victories in states that gained seats. Republicans actually managed to add a seat among the states losing representation and won eight additional seats in the states gaining districts. The similarity between Tables 3 and 4 is not coincidental. Eight of the ten seats switching party control in 2002, including all four seats lost by incumbents, went to the party with the district presidential majority.[28] In eight of these districts, the incumbent party had been weakened by redistricting (by an average loss of 5.6 percentage points in their party's presidential vote share); in the remaining two, the incumbent party was already on the minority side of the presidential vote (less than 46 percent in both). Thirteen of the eighteen newly drawn districts

[28] The victories that defied this trend were those of conservative Democrats Lincoln Davis (TN 4), who won a district where Bush's share of the 2000 vote was 50.5 percent and Rodney Alexander, who won the 7 December runoff in Louisiana's 5th District, where Bush had won 58.0 percent.

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FIGURE 3
House Districts With Split Results, 1952–2002



Note: Data for 1962 and 1966 are unavailable because of redistricting.

for which an incumbent party could not be identified also went to the party enjoying a presidential majority.

By this evidence, redistricting, along with a high-level of partisan consistency in district voting patterns, is sufficient to explain the Republican House gains in 2002. The level of partisan consistency was indeed extraordinary. As the third section of Table 4 shows, the number of House districts with split preferences—different majorities for House and president—was much lower after the election than before. The change affected both parties, but again Republicans more than Democrats. The increase in district-level partisan consistency extends a long-term trend of central importance to understanding contemporary American politics. Figure 3 displays the incidence of split results since 1952.[29] Normally, the number of split results rises between a presidential election and the following midterm; the opposite occurred in 2002, which produced the fewest split districts (sixty-two) of any election in the entire half-century covered by the data.

[29] The entries for midterm elections use the vote in the previous presidential election to determine the presidential plurality in the district. Where district lines have been redrawn since the presidential election, the presidential vote has been recalculated for the new districts. The recalculated presidential vote is not available for 1962 and 1966.

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A Partisan Electorate

The district-level data imply a high degree of individual party-line voting, and the available survey evidence is entirely consistent with this interpretation. Moreover, the regional, ideological, and policy divisions expressed so clearly in 2000 emerged once again in 2002. The failure of the Voter News Service exit poll effort complicates comparisons to previous elections, but data from national polls taken immediately prior to the election provide ample evidence that 2002 followed the 2000 patterns closely. Party loyalty among survey respondents likely to vote and declaring a choice ranged from 91 to 95 percent.[30] The sharp partisan division on the House vote reflected large partisan differences on the administration and its performance. The gap between Republican and Democratic approval of Bush's performance, which had narrowed from as high as 67 to as low as 14 percentage points immediately after September 11, had by November 2002 grown back to an average of 54 percentage points (Figure 1), comparable to Clinton in 1998 (55 percentage points) if not 1994 (60 percentage points). It was even wider among likely voters, with one poll showing 95 percent of Republicans, but only 30 percent of Democrats, approving of Bush's performance.[31]

Partisans in the electorate were also sharply divided on the state of the nation. For example, 63 percent of self-identified Republicans thought the country was moving in the right direction; 67 percent of Democrats thought it was on the wrong track. (See Table 5.) Sixty-one percent of Republicans thought the economy was good or very good, 67 percent of Democrats thought it was fairly bad or very bad. Republicans were also considerably more confident that the United States and its allies were winning the war on terrorism. Perceptions of national conditions, like presidential approval, were thus distributed in a way that reinforced rather than challenged partisan inclinations.

The same tendency appears in assessments of the parties' strengths, although here each party showed some appeal to the other party's voters on its issue turf. Republicans favored their party overwhelmingly on defense and terrorism; Democrats generally preferred their own party on terrorism but conceded defense to the Republicans. Democrats favored their own party overwhelmingly on Social Security and making prescription drugs more affordable for the elderly; Republicans favored their own party on the former but gave the Democrats an advantage on the latter. Very large majorities of partisans on both sides believed their own party was more likely to make the country prosperous.

[30] In the last Gallup Poll before the election (taken 31 October–3 November), 93 percent of Republicans and 92 percent of Democrats planned to vote for their party's candidate; the same figures for the 27–31 October CBS News/*New York Times* Polls were 95 percent and 91 percent, respectively. See http://www.gallup.com.poll.releases/pr021104asp.?Version=p, accessed on 4 November 2002; and http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/c2k/election_back.pdf, accessed on 20 November 2002.

[31] Diana Pollich, "A Divided Electorate," http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/06/politics/main528295.shtml, accessed on 6 November 2002.

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TABLE 5

Opinions on National Conditions and Party Performance

	Party Identification	
	Republican	*Democrat*
1. Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction or do you feel things have gotten off on the wrong track?		
Right direction	63	27
Wrong track	29	67
2. How would you rate the condition of the national economy these days? Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?		
Very good or fairly good	61	33
Fairly bad or very bad	38	67
3. Who do you think is winning the war against terrorism—the U.S. and its allies, neither side, or the terrorists?		
U.S. and its allies	50	24
Neither side	39	51
The terrorists	9	19
4. Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party is more likely to		
a. make sure the U.S. military defenses are strong?		
Republican Party	83	46
Democratic Party	5	36
b. make the right decisions when it comes to dealing with terrorism?		
Republican Party	72	29
Democratic Party	2	46
c. make the right decisions about Social Security?		
Republican Party	64	5
Democratic Party	14	83
d. make prescription drugs for the elderly more affordable?		
Republican Party	31	5
Democratic Party	40	86
e. make sure the country is prosperous?		
Republican Party	75	9
Democratic Party	7	74

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, 27–31 October 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/c2k/election_back.pdf, accessed on 20 November 2002.

Neither party got much help from issues ceded by the opposition's voters, because partisans on both sides believed that the issues that mattered most were the ones their own party handled best. Asked in early October to specify "the single most important problem for the government . . . to address in the coming year," Democratic respondents put the economy and jobs at the top of their list; 51 percent chose a domestic economic issue, while only 28 percent mentioned terrorism, national security, or Iraq. Republican respondents inverted this pattern, with 49 percent listing terrorism, national security, or Iraq, and only 30 percent listing a domestic economic issue.[32] The economy became

[32] CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, 3–5 October 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/sc2k/pol106.pdf.

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more salient to Republican voters closer to the election, but this did not help Democratic candidates win Republican votes, because Republican voters thought their own party would be more likely to deliver prosperity.

TURNOUT

For partisans on both sides, the election's frame—what the election was thought to be about—was far more conducive to party loyalty than to defection. Aside from reapportionment, what kept the election from duplicating the 2000 stalemate was turnout. Republicans did a better job of mobilizing their core supporters. The final pre-election CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup survey accurately predicted a 53–47 Republican advantage nationally in the House vote. Although Democrats held a lead in the generic House vote among registered voters, Republicans held the lead among likely voters, because expected turnout among Republican identifiers was 43 percent, among Democratic identifiers, 36 percent.[33]

Superior mobilization was central to the victories in Minnesota, Missouri, and Georgia that gave Republicans control of the Senate as well as in several states where Republican Senate seats had been at risk. Bush's near-universal approval among Republicans, his energetic fundraising and frenzied last-minute campaigning in competitive states, combined with effective Republican grassroots drives to get out the vote, put Republicans over the top.[34] It is important to recognize, however, that Senate outcomes, like those of House contests, usually reflected the constituency's underlying partisan balance; of the thirteen Senate races rated as "tossup" or "leaning" in *CQ Weekly*'s October preelection review, ten went to the party that had won the state's presidential vote in 2000.[35] Minnesota was the only state won by Gore (barely, with 51 percent of the vote) where Republicans took a Senate seat from the Democrats.

Electoral results and polling data from 2002 recapitulated the regional and demographic divisions evident in 2000.[36] Democrats won 62.2 percent of House seats in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and West Coast regions (compared with 61.3 percent in 2000); Republicans won 63.3 percent of House seats in the South, Plains, and Mountain West regions (compared with 63.7 percent in 2000). The only notable difference was in the Midwest, where the Republicans' share of seats went from 52.1 percent to 59.3 percent.[37] Preelection polls showed

[33] The expected turnout rate among independents, who favored Democrats slightly, was 23 percent. See David W. Moore and Jeffrey M. Jones, "Late Shift Toward Republicans in Congressional Vote," Gallup News Service, 4 November 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/releases/pr021104.asp?Version=p.

[34] Mary Clare Jalonick, "Senate Changes Hands Again," *CQ Weekly*, 9 November 2002, 2907–2909; Rebecca Adams, "Georgia Republicans Energized By 'Friend to Friend' Campaign," *CQ Weekly*, 9 November 2002, 2892–2893.

[35] "Six Tossups Muddy Forecast for the Senate," *CQ Weekly*, 26 October 2002, 2792–2793; the exceptions were Minnesota, Arkansas, and South Dakota (lost by Republican challenger John Thune by 534 votes).

[36] Jacobson, "A House and Senate Divided," 14–18.

[37] Mostly because of redistricting, Democratic seats dropped from 46 to 37 in the region, while Republican seats grew from 50 to 54.

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that Republicans continued to be preferred by whites, men, married people, people living in rural areas, the devout, and the prosperous. Democrats were preferred by women, minorities, urban dwellers, the secular, and the less prosperous. The marriage gap was even larger than the 9-point gender gap, with one poll showing 68 percent of unmarried women favoring Democrats, compared with 42 percent of married women.[38] The distinct regional and cultural divide between the parties' respective electoral coalitions revealed in the 2000 election was again fully evident in 2002. There is no sign that the electorate was any less polarized along party lines in 2002 than it had been in 2000. The upsurge in national unity provoked by the war on terrorism has not so far brought Americans together on the issues that put them into opposite party camps prior to September 11.

Long-Term Trends

Voting patterns in 2002 election results reinforce the long-term trend toward increasing partisan polarization in national politics, particularly in the House. The growing consistency in aggregate voting across offices (Figure 3) has produced a widening disparity in the electoral bases of House Republicans and Democrats (Figure 4). Back in 1980, for example, the vote for Ronald Reagan was only 11.5 percentage points higher in districts won by Republicans than in districts won by Democrats. After a steep increase between 1992 and 2002, the difference is now nearly 20 percentage points. Differences in the respective parties' electoral bases are strongly related to party differences in presidential support as well as in roll-call voting,[39] so the 2002 results promise a continuation of sharp partisan polarization in the House. The elections of Tom DeLay of Texas as majority leader and Nancy Pelosi of California as minority leader are indicative; both are considerably further from the center than their party's typical member.[40]

The electoral bases of the Senate parties have also become more disparate, although in absolute terms the differences are much smaller than in the House. (See Figure 5.)[41] Membership changes in 2002 might produce a slightly less po-

[38] Jeffrey M. Jones, "Gender, Marriage Gaps Evident in Vote for Congress," Gallup News Service, 11 October 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr021011.asp?Version=p; David W. Moore and Jeffrey M. Jones, "Higher Turnout Among Republicans Key to Victory," Gallup News Service, 7 November 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr021107.asp?Version=p.

[39] Jacobson, "Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support," 8–11.

[40] As of the 106th Congress, the most recent for which Poole-Rosenthal DW Nominate scores are available, DeLay's votes put him to the right of 92 percent of House Republicans, and Pelosi's put her to the left of 87 percent of House Democrats. Both were more than one standard deviation more extreme than their party's average.

[41] This is because the state-level presidential vote has much less variance than the district-level presidential vote and because some states have one senator from each party. (Although fewer than in the recent past, in line with the increasing consistency of aggregate voting patterns, the proportion of split Senate delegations is now at its lowest level—26 percent—since 1954.)

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FIGURE 4
The Polarization of U.S. House Districts, 1952–2002



Note: Data for 1962 and 1966 are unavailable because of redistricting.

larized Senate. Its most liberal Democrat (Paul Wellstone of Minnesota) and most conservative Republican (Robert C. Smith of New Hampshire) are gone; the exit of such polarizing figures as Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Phil Gramm of Texas may reduce ideological tensions a bit. In all, six of the seven departing Republicans were more conservative than the average Republican senator.[42] With the possible exception of Norm Coleman (Wellstone's successor), however, the eight newly elected Republicans are a solidly conservative group; all four who are House veterans were to the right of their party's median in that chamber.[43] Their presence is thus unlikely to move the Senate party more than a small fraction closer to the center. One newly elected Democrat, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, is relatively conservative, but so was the defeated Max Cleland of Georgia; and Frank Lautenberg's record is more liberal than that of the Democrat he replaced in New Jersey, Robert G. Torricelli.

The congressional lineup thus portends little change in the political fault lines that divided the 107th Congress. Deep party divisions in Washington are firmly rooted in electoral politics, and they reflect divisions in popular opinion on most domestic issues. The elite and popular consensus supporting the presi-

[42] Based on their average career Poole-Rosenthal DW-Nominate scores.
[43] Based on their average career DW Nominate scores.

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FIGURE 5
The Polarization of State Constituencies, 1952–2002



dent's war on terrorism and, by extension, confrontation with Iraq remains strong but narrowly focused; it has not spread to issues that divided the parties before September 11. With the Senate now in Republican hands, the administration and its allies will of course prevail more easily and more often; but Democrats will also have more opportunities for the kind of selective, free-wheeling opposition that served Republicans so well in 1993 and 1994. They will have plenty to oppose if Republican conservatives, enjoying their strongest position since the 1920s, try to make the most of their power.

Implications

In a period of evenly balanced parties, small electoral changes can produce large policy changes by shifting partisan control of the House, Senate, or White House. This is what happened in 2000, when Bush defeated Gore and the Democrats pulled even in the Senate (and then, with James Jeffords's defection from the Republican party, took it over). And it happened again in 2002, when Republicans recovered their Senate majority. Because the political effects of electoral swings loom so large, it is tempting to assume that they reflect some substantial shift in voter sentiments. However, the 2002 results reiterate rather

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than depart from the 2000 stalemate.[44] Beyond endorsing the administration's homeland security policies and war on terrorism, the vote in 2002 was no more a mandate for the Republican agenda than had been the vote in 2000.[45] Democratic leaders were widely criticized (not least by other Democrats) for losing the election by failing to offer a compelling alternative to the administration's policies. But aside from creating the Department of Homeland Security before rather than after the election, it is unlikely that anything they could have done or said would have affected the outcome much. Insofar as the midterm election is a referendum, the focus is on the administration, not the opposition. The Republican advantages noted earlier in this article, not least the Republican identifiers' enthusiastic support for president, would have existed no matter what tack Democratic leaders took.

This analysis might be heartening to Democrats, but they actually face a much more serious problem than their leaders' alleged tactical or strategic miscalculations in 2002. As noted in Table 3, Bush outpolled Gore in 237 of the current House districts even though Gore outpolled Bush nationally. This means that Republican voters are distributed more efficiently than Democratic voters, and more so now after redistricting. As Figure 6 shows, Democratic voters are more likely to be "wasted" in lopsided districts; 53 percent of the Gore majority districts have more than 60 percent Gore voters, whereas only 41 percent of the Bush majority districts have more than 60 percent Bush voters. The Democrats' structural disadvantage is all the more telling because district-level voting for president and representative has become increasingly consistent. (Recall Figure 3.) Democrats would have to win twenty Bush-majority districts in addition to all of the Gore-majority districts to gain control of the House; Republicans would win a House majority similar to what they have now if they won only the Bush-majority districts.

The decreasing number of competitive districts makes it harder for Democrats to win back the House, although it also makes it harder for Republicans to expand their majority. The growth in the number of relatively safe House seats over the past decade has been striking, as the data in Table 6 demonstrate. The table classifies districts according to whether the district-level presidential vote for the winning House candidate's party was above, below, or near its national average.[46] Representatives whose presidential candidate ran two or more percentage points below his or her national average are considered at risk. Those whose party's presidential candidate ran two or more points ahead of

[44] In seats contested by both parties, so that all the votes are counted, the Republicans' share of the total in 2002 was only about 1.7 percentage points higher than in 2000 (Alan Abramowitz, personal note).

[45] See, for example, "The Bush Agenda and the GOP Congress," CBS News/*New York Times Poll*, 20–24 November 2002, at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/c2k/bush_back1125.pdf.

[46] The procedure assumes that the parties enjoy rough parity in the electorate and adjusts for whatever national tides may be running; however, any reasonable classification of districts as at risk, competitive, or safe would support the same substantive conclusion. The major-party presidential vote is used for the classifications in this table.

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FIGURE 6
The Republicans' Structural Advantage in House Districts, 2002



his national average are considered comparatively safe. The rest are classified as competitive.

Since 1992, the number of House seats at risk according to presidential voting patterns has fallen from eighty-one to forty-one. The change occurred in two distinct steps, the first coming in 1994, when Republicans picked up thirty-one of the Democrats' sixty-seven at-risk seats, the second in 2002, when redistricting and a party-line election reduced the number of at-risk districts held by both parties. Note that nearly the entire net decline in seats at risk over the period occurred among Democrats. The number of competitive districts also fell, with the largest drops occurring in 1996 and 2002. Both parties have added safe seats since 1992, but Republicans more than three times as many as Democrats. And even after losing most of their at-risk seats, Democrats still hold a majority of such seats. More than half are represented by moderate or conservative southern Democrats and are by recent experience likely to go Republican when the incumbent retires.[47] Despite the narrowness of the Republican House majority and despite the Democrats' continuing slim advantage in popular partisanship, Democrats face an uphill battle in trying to win control of the

[47] Although the 2002 victories of Lincoln Davis (TN 4) and Rodney Alexander (LA 5) show that conservative Democrats can still be competitive in such districts.

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TABLE 6

At-Risk and Safe House Seats, 1992-2002, by Party

Electoral risk as determined by presidential vote	*1992*	*1994*	*1996*	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*	*Change 1992-2002*
At Risk							
Democrats	67	36	40	36	36	28	−39
Republicans	14	20	22	18	24	12	−2
Total	81	56	62	54	60	40	−41
Competitive							
Democrats	49	32	27	31	26	19	−30
Republicans	23	40	29	27	27	19	−4
Total	72	72	56	58	53	38	−34
Safe							
Democrats	142	136	140	144	150	158	16
Republicans	139	170	176	178	170	198	59
Total	281	306	316	322	330	356	75

Note: "At Risk" seats are those in which the winning party's presidential candidate received at least 2 percent less than his average across all districts; "Safe" seats are those in which the winning party's presidential candidate got at least 2 percent more than his average across all districts; "Competitive" seats fall in between these ranges. The 1992 major-party presidential vote is used for 1992 and 1994; the 1996 major-party presidential vote is used for 1996 and 1998; the 2000 vote is used for 2000 and (recalculated for the new districts) 2002. The district presidential vote has been adjusted where necessary for changes in district boundaries required by court decisions after the initial post-1990 redistricting.

House. It is difficult to imagine them succeeding without the help of a sizable national tide in their favor.

Democrats also suffer a structural disadvantage in the Senate. As Alan Abramowitz has noted, the equal representation of states in the Senate now favors Republicans, because Democrats do relatively better in states with large populations, while Republicans do relatively better in states with small populations. Gore won six of the nine states with the most people, Bush won fifteen of the twenty with the fewest.[48] Bush, with less than half the national vote, took thirty states in 2000; Gore took only twenty.

As in House elections, the Democrats' problem is compounded by the trend toward greater consistency in voting across federal offices. The proportion of senators representing states where their party's presidential candidate was the most recent victor is, at 71 percent, now at its highest level in a half-century. This trend does not bode well for the Democrats in 2004; Bush carried ten of the nineteen states where Democratic Senate seats will be at stake, five by margins of more than 10 percentage points. Gore won only three of the fifteen Republican seats up in 2004, and only one by more than 10 percentage points.

The runoff elections in Louisiana on 7 December offered the Democrats a small ray of hope. Despite the all-out Republican campaign led by the president to defeat her, Mary Landrieu was reelected to the Senate by 40,000 votes. More

[48] Alan Abramowitz, personal communication, 7 November 2002.

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surprising, a Democrat, Rodney Alexander, won the runoff for an open House seat in a district that had given Bush 58 percent of the vote in 2000. The Democrats showed that they could offset the Republicans' mobilization effort by an effective one of their own. The victories also indicated that moderate (Landrieu) or conservative (Alexander) Democrats could still hold out against the long-term Republican trend in the South. Finally, the Louisiana campaign made it clear to congressional Democrats that supporting Bush's policies would not stop him from doing his utmost to defeat them (Landrieu supported the president 74 percent of the time), a lesson likely to intensify partisan conflict in the 108th Congress.

Beyond these structural disadvantages, Democrats may also be facing a long period in which national defense and homeland security issues dominate the political agenda. The first President Bush enjoyed then-record approval levels after leading the war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, but he lost the White House in 1992 when the war ended, leaving the economy as the focus of public attention and as the standard for evaluating the president's performance. Regardless of what happens in Iraq this time, continuing terrorist actions directed against Americans and their allies are a virtual certainty, and the threat of terrorism will continue for the foreseeable future. Unlike the war to free Kuwait, the war on terrorism will not end with a decisive victory; it may not end at all. Thus even if the economy continues to falter, domestic security is certain to remain high on the list of public concerns. As long as Republicans continue to receive superior marks in this domain, Democrats will find it hard to gain traction. The electoral impact of September 11, so profound in 2002, will continue to be felt for a long time to come.

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Terrorism as Breaking News: Attack on America

BRIGITTE L. NACOS

Terrorism's efficacy, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder in that those who commit political violence deliberately directed against civilians believe in the success of their deeds. In one respect, most if not all terrorists do achieve an important goal. Whenever they strike, especially if they stage so-called terrorist spectaculars, their deeds assure them massive news coverage and the attention of the general public and governmental decision makers in their particular target societies. Moreover, given the global nature of the communication system, the perpetrators of international and domestic terrorism also tap into the international media and thereby receive the attention of publics and governments beyond their immediate target countries. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once said that publicity is the oxygen of terrorism. Without publicity, terrorism would be like the proverbial tree that falls in the forest and the press is not there to report—it would be as if the incident never happened. The term "mass-mediated terrorism" signifies the centrality of media considerations in the calculus of political violence that is committed by nonstate actors against civilians.[1] While publicity is not the ultimate objective, terrorists recognize that it is the means to advertise and further their larger political ends. This article examines whether and how the architects of the horrific events of September 11 succeeded in achieving their media goals.

[1] States, too, can and do perpetrate this sort of political violence, but they are generally not eager to have their deeds publicized and typically try to prevent news coverage. For this reason, the term "mass-mediated terrorism" means in this context political violence by groups or individuals who deliberately target civilians with the immediate goal to get the attention of the mass media, the public, and government in their target societies.

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Tuesday, September 11, 2001, began as a perfect day along the American East coast. The sun was golden bright. The sky was blue and cloudless. On a clear day like this, the World Trade Center's twin towers resembled two exclamation marks above Manhattan's skyline, and they could be seen from many miles away in the surrounding counties of three states—New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. At 8:48 A.M., when the workday began for thousands of employees in the offices of the 110 stories of the Center's towers, a hijacked Boeing 767 crashed into the North Tower. Eighteen minutes later, at 9:06 A.M., another Boeing 767 crashed into the South Tower. Just before 10:00 A.M., the South Tower collapsed, and twenty-nine minutes later, its twin fell down. In between these events, at 9:40 A.M., a Boeing 757 dived into the Pentagon; at 10:10 another Boeing 757 crashed in Somerset County near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. September 11, 2001 was forever America's "Black Tuesday."

Within eighty-two minutes, the United States suffered a series of synchronized attacks that terminated in the most deadly, most damaging case of terrorism in history. More than three thousand persons were killed, and the damage to properties, to businesses, and to the economic conditions in the United States and abroad was incalculable. With the symbol of America's economic and financial power toppled in New York, the symbol of U.S. military strength partially destroyed in Washington, and a symbol of political influence—most likely the White House or Capitol—spared by courageous citizens aboard another jetliner that crashed near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the impact was cataclysmic. America after the terror attack was not the same as it was before. Although the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 demonstrated that the United States is not immune to international terrorism on its own soil, and the Y2K terrorism alert reinforced that recognition, Americans were stunned by the velocity and audacity of the 2001 strike.

Apart from the relatively small number of people who were alerted by relatives and friends via phone calls from the stricken WTC towers and those eyewitnesses who watched in horror, millions of Americans learned of the news from television, radio, or the Internet. In fact, minutes after the first kamikaze flight into Tower I, local radio and television stations as well as the networks reported first a possible explosion in the WTC, then a plane crash into one of the towers. Soon thereafter, the first pictures of the North Tower appeared on the screens, with a gaping hole in the upper floors enveloped in a huge cloud of dark smoke. As anchors, hosts of morning shows, and reporters struggled to find words to describe what was indescribable, a mighty fireball shot out of Tower II—presumably the result of a second powerful explosion. The towering inferno was eventually replaced by another horror scene: one section of the headquarters of the Department of Defense engulfed in a large plume of smoke. With the cameras again on the WTC, the South Tower collapsed in what seemed like slow motion. Switching again to the Pentagon, the camera revealed a collapsed section of the facade. Amid rumors that a fourth airliner had crashed in Pennsylvania, the cameras caught the collapse of the World Trade Center's North Tower.

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For at least part of this unfolding horror, many millions of Americans watched television stations or their related Internet sites. And, ironically, most Americans were familiar with the shocking images: the inferno in a skyscraper, the terrorist attack on a towering high rise, the total destruction of a federal building in the nation's capital by terrorists, the nuclear winter landscape in American cities, Manhattan under siege after a massive terrorist attack. In search of box office hits, Hollywood produced a steady stream of disaster movies and thrillers, often based on best-selling novels about ever more gruesome images of destruction. The entertainment industry's cavalier exploitation of violence was shockingly obvious following the terror strikes, when it was revealed that the "planned cover for a hip-hop album due to be released in November [2001] depicted an exploding World Trade Center."[2]

In a popular culture inundated with images of violence, Americans could not comprehend what was happening before their eyes and what had happened already. The horror of the quadruple hijack and suicide coup was as real as in a movie, but it was surreal in life. As Michiko Kakutani observed, "there was an initial sense of dejà vu and disbelief on the part of these spectators—the impulse to see what was happening as one of those digital special effects from the big screen."[3] The following quotations reflect the reactions of people who escaped from the World Trade Center, witnessed the disaster, or watched it on television:

> I looked over my shoulder and saw the United Airlines plane coming. It came over the Statue of Liberty. It was just like a movie. It just directly was guided into the second tower.
>
> —Laksman Achuthan, managing director of the Economic Cycle Research Institute[4]

> I think I'm going to die of smoke inhalation, because you know, in fires most people don't die of burning, they die of smoke inhalation. This cop or somebody walks by with a flashlight. It's like a strange movie. I grab the guy by the collar and walk with him.
>
> —Howard W. Lutnick, chairman of Cantor Fitzgerald[5]

> I looked up and saw this hole in the World Trade Center building. And I—I couldn't believe it. I thought, you know, this can't be happening. This is a special effect; it's a movie.
>
> —Clifton Cloud, who filmed the disaster with his video camera[6]

[2] Quoted here from Amy Harmon, "The Search for Intelligent Life on the Internet," *New York Times*, 23 September 2001.

[3] Michiko Kakutani, "Critic's Notebook: Struggling to Find Words for a Horror beyond Words," *New York Times*, 13 September 2001.

[4] "A Day of Terror: The Voices," *New York Times*, 12 September 2001.

[5] "After the Attacks: One Man's Account," *New York Times*, 15 September 2001.

[6] Cloud described his reaction as a guest on NBC's *Today* program, 12 September 2001.

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> It's insane. It's just like a movie. It's, it's actually surreal to me to see it on TV and see major buildings collapse.
> —Unidentified man in Canada[7]

> This is very surreal. Well, it's out of a bad sci-fi film, but every morning we wake up and you're like it wasn't a dream, it wasn't a movie. It actually happened.
> —Unidentified woman in New York[8]

Witnessing the calamity from a tenth-floor apartment in Brooklyn, novelist John Updike felt that "the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers had the false intimacy of television, on a day of perfect reception."[9] Many people who joined newscasts in progress thought that they were watching the promotion for one of several terrorism thrillers scheduled for release later in the month. Whether they realized it or not, and many did not, most people, even eye-witnesses at the disaster scenes, were far from sure whether movies had turned into life, or whether life was now a movie. Updike alluded to this sentiment, when he recalled the experience:

> As we watched the second tower burst into ballooning flame (an intervening building had hidden the approach of the second airplane), there persisted the notion that, as on television, this was not quite real; it could be fixed; the technocracy the towers symbolized would find a way to put out the fire and reverse the damage.[10]

In a seemingly inexplicable lapse of judgment, the German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen characterized the terror attacks on the United States as "the greatest work of art."[11] His remarks caused outrage in his country and the abrupt cancellation of two of his concerts in Hamburg. Perhaps this was a case of total confusion between the real world and the "pictures in our heads" that Walter Lippmann described long before the advent of television. In particular, Lippmann suggested that "[f]or the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see."[12] While many people initially identified the horrors of "Black Tuesday" as familiar motion picture images, Stockhausen may have processed the real life horror first as a symphonic Armageddon in his head, when he said: "That characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot dream of, that people practice madly for 10 years, completely fanatically, for a concert and then die. That is the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos." Following the uproar over his statement, Stockhausen apologized for his remarks saying, "Not for one moment have I thought or felt the

[7] The unidentified Canadian made the remark on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's program *The National*, 11 September 2001.

[8] From *CNN Money Morning*, 14 September 2001.

[9] John Updike, "Talk of the Town," *The New Yorker*, 24 September 2001, 28.

[10] Ibid., 28.

[11] Stockhausen's remarks and the reactions they caused in Germany were reported in "Attacks Called Great Art," *New York Times*, 19 September 2001, according to http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/19/arts/music/19KARL.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

[12] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press, 1949), chaps. 1, 6.

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way my words are now being interpreted in the press."[13] One can only guess that the angry reactions to his statement brought him back from the pseudo-reality in his head to the real life tragedy and its consequences.

When emotions gave way to rationality, the truth began to sink in. The most outrageous production of the terrorist genre was beyond the imagination of the best special effects creators. This was not simply two hours worth of suspense. Real terrorists had transformed Hollywood's pseudo-reality into an unbearable reality, into real life. This time there was neither a happy ending to be enjoyed nor an unhappy ending that the audience could forget quickly.

Perhaps the temporary confusion was a blessing. Perhaps the fact that reality replaced media-reality in slow motion helped people cope with the unprecedented catastrophe within America's borders. Perhaps the delayed tape in people's heads prevented citizens in the stricken areas from panicking, helped citizens all over the country to keep their bearings.

The greatest irony is that the terrorists who loathed America's pop culture as decadent and poisonous to their own beliefs and ways of life turned Hollywood-like horror fantasies into real life hell. In that respect, they outperformed Hollywood, the very symbol of their hate for western entertainment. After visiting the World Trade Center disaster site for the first time, New York's Governor George Pataki said:

> It's incredible. It's just incomprehensible to see what it was like down there. You know, I remember seeing one of these Cold War movies and after the nuclear attacks with the Hollywood portrayal of a nuclear winter. It looked worse than that in downtown Manhattan, and it wasn't some grade "B" movie. It was life. It was real.[14]

The question of whether imaginative novelists and filmmakers anticipate terrorist scenarios or whether terrorists borrow from the most horrific images of Hollywood's disaster films was no longer academic. Shortly after the events of September 11, an ongoing cooperation between filmmakers and the U.S. Army intensified in order to predict the forms of future terrorist attacks. The idea was that the writers who created Hollywood terrorism might be best equipped to conceptualize terrorists' intentions. According to Michael Macedonia, the chief scientist of the Army's Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command, "You're talking about screenwriters and producers, that's one of the things that they're paid to do every day—speculate. These are very brilliant, creative people. They can come up with fascinating insights very quickly."[15] However, it was not farfetched to suspect that the perpetrators of the September 11 terror took special delight in borrowing from some of the most horrific Hollywood images in planning and executing their terrorist scheme.

[13] Stockhausen is quoted here from Bill Carter and Felicity Barringer, "In Patriotic Times, Dissent Is Muted," *New York Times*, 28 September 2001. According to the article, the Eastman School of Music's Ossia Ensemble canceled a planned performance of Stockhausen's work "Stimmung" scheduled for early November at New York's Cooper Union.

[14] George Pataki, ABC News, *Nightline*, 14 September 2001.

[15] Quoted here from Associated Press reporter Robert Jablon, "Hollywood Think Tank Helping Army," http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011009/us/attacks_hollywood_1.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

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The Perfect "Breaking News" Production

From the terrorists' point of view, the attack on America was a perfectly choreographed production aimed at American and international audiences. In the past, terrorism has often been compared to theater. According to this explanation,

> Modern terrorism can be understood in terms of the production requirements of theatrical engagements. Terrorists pay attention to script preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role playing, and minute-by-minute stage management.[16]

While the theater metaphor remains instructive, it has given way to that of terrorism as television spectacular, as breaking news that is watched by record audiences and far transcends the boundaries of theatrical events. And unlike the most successful producers of theater, motion picture, or television hits, the perpetrators of the lethal attacks on America affected their audience in unprecedented and lasting ways. "I will never forget!" These or similar words were uttered over and over.

After President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, most Americans and many people abroad eventually saw the fatal shots and the ensuing events on television. But beyond the United States and other Western countries, far fewer people abroad owned television sets at the time. When the Palestinian "Black September" group attacked and killed members of the Israeli team during the 1972 Olympic games in Munich (using their surviving victims as human shields during their ill-fated escape), an estimated eight hundred million people around the globe watched the unfolding tragedy. At the time, satellite TV transmission facilities were in place to broadcast the competitions into most parts of the world. But nearly thirty years later, a truly global television network, CNN, existed along with competitors that televised their programs across national borders and covered large regions of the world. Thus, more people watched the made-for-television disaster production "Attack on America" live and in replays than any other terrorist incident before. It is likely that the terrorist assaults on New York and Washington and their aftermath were the most watched made-for-television production ever.

From the perspective of those who produced this unprecedented, terrorism-as-breaking-news horror show, the broadcast was as successful as it could get. Whether a relatively inconsequential arson by an amateurish environmental group or a mass destruction by a network of professional terrorists, the perpetrators' media-related goals are the same: terrorists strive for attention, for recognition, and for respectability and legitimacy in their various target pub-

[16] Gabriel Weiman and Conrad Winn, *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism* (New York: Longman, 1994).

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lics.[17] It has been argued that contemporary religious terrorists, unlike secular terrorists (such as the Marxists of the Red Brigade/Red Army or the nationalists of the Palestinian Liberation Front during the last decades of the cold war), want nothing more than to lash out at the enemy and kill and damage indiscriminately, to express their rage. But while all of these sentiments may well figure into the complex motives of group leaders and their followers, there is no doubt that their deeds are planned and executed with the mass media and their effects on the masses and governmental decision makers in mind. Unlike the typical secular terrorists, religious terrorists want to inflict the greatest possible pain, but they want a whole country, and in the case of international terrorism, the whole world, to see their act, to understand the roots of their rage, to solidify their esteem in their constituencies, and, perhaps, to win new supporters.

To be sure, publicity via the mass media is not an end in itself. Most terrorists have very specific short-term and/or long-term goals. It is not hard to determine the short-term and long-term objectives of those that planned and executed the suicide missions against the United States. Even without the benefit of a credible claim of responsibility, the mass media, decision makers, and the general public in the United States and abroad discussed the most likely motives for the unprecedented deeds. In the short-term, the architects and perpetrators wanted to demonstrate the weaknesses of the world's only remaining superpower vis-à-vis determined terrorists, to frighten the American public, and to fuel perhaps a weakening of civil liberties and domestic unrest. No doubt, the long-term schemes targeted U.S. foreign policy, especially the American influence and presence in the Middle East and other regions with large Muslim populations. More important, as communications from Osama bin Laden and his organization revealed, those who decided on these particular terror attacks regarded the anticipated strikes by the United States as the beginning of a holy war between Muslims and infidels. Bin Laden, in a fax to Qatar-based al Jazeera television, called the Muslims of Pakistan "the first line of defense . . . against the new Jewish crusader campaign [that] is led by the biggest crusader Bush under the banner of the cross." The bin Laden statement that was widely publicized in the United Sates left no doubt that he purposely characterized the confrontation as a battle between Islam and "the new Christian–Jewish crusade."[18]

Whatever else their immediate and ultimate goals were, those who planned the attacks were well aware, as are most perpetrators of political violence, that the mass media of communication is central to furthering their publicity goals

[17] Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); John O'Sullivan, "Media Publicity Causes Terrorism" in Bonnie Szumski, ed., *Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints* (St. Paul: Greenhaven, 1986).

[18] The statement was written in Arabic, but an English translation was carried by the wire services and widely publicized in the media. See, for example, http://www.msnbc.com/news/633244.asp [accessed 26 September 2001].

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and even their political and religious objectives. Without the frightening images and the shocking reportage, the impact on America and the rest of the world wouldn't have been as immediate and intense as it was.

When Terrorists Strike Hard, They Command Attention

In the past, media critics have documented and questioned the mass media's insatiable appetite for violence; they have explored the effects of this kind of media content on people who are regularly exposed to violence in the news and in entertainment.[19] While violence-as-crime and violence-as-terrorism tend to be grossly over-reported, the coverage of terrorist incidents that provide dramatic visuals is in a league of its own in terms of media attention. With few exceptions, ordinary criminals do not commit their deeds to attract cameras, microphones, and reporter's notebooks. But for terrorists, publicity is their lifeblood and their oxygen. No other medium has provided more oxygen to terrorism than television because of its ability to report the news instantly, nonstop, and in visuals and words from any place to all parts of the globe, a facility that has affected the reporting patterns of other media as well.

When commentators characterized the terrorist events of "Black Tuesday" as the Pearl Harbor of the twenty-first century or the second Pearl Harbor, they ignored one fundamental aspect that separated the surprise attack on December 7, 1941, from that on September 11, 2001: the vastly different communication technologies. Three hours passed from the time the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor and the moment when people on the U.S. mainland first learned the news from radio broadcasts. More than a week lapsed before the *New York Times* carried the first pictures of the actual damages. Sixty years later, the terror attacks had a live global TV, radio, and Internet audience and many replays in the following hours, days, and weeks.

In September 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) simultaneously hijacked four New York-bound airliners carrying more than six hundred passengers. Eventually, three of the planes landed in a remote part of Jordan, where many passengers, most of them Americans and Europeans, were held for approximately three weeks. This was high drama. The media reported extensively, but the reporting paled in comparison to the great attention devoted to equally as dramatic or far less shocking incidents in later years. The communication technology at the time did not allow live transmissions from remote locations. Satellite transmissions were in their early stages and were very expensive. For the PFLP, the multiple hijacking episode ended in disappointment. While the tense situation resulted in media, public, and government attention, no news organization covered the events in ways

[19] George Gerbner and Larry Gross, "Living with Television: The Violence Profile," *Journal of Communication* 26 (1976): 173–199; Nacos, "Terrorism and the Media"; Sissela Bok, *Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment* (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1998); Gadi Wolfsfeld, "The News Media and the Second Intifada," *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 6 (2001): 113–118.

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that might have forced President Richard Nixon and European leaders to act under pressure.[20]

But as television technology advanced further and competition among TV, radio, and print organizations became fiercer, the media became more obsessed with exploiting violence-as-crime and violence-as-terrorism in search of higher ratings and circulation. As a result, the contemporary news media, especially television, have customarily devoted huge chunks of their broadcast time and news columns to major and minor acts of political violence, supporting the media critics' argument that the mass media, as unwitting as they are, facilitate the media-centered terrorist scheme.

There was no need to count broadcast minutes or measure column length to establish the proportion of the total news that dealt with "Black Tuesday" and its aftermath. For the first five days after the terror attack, television and radio networks covered the disaster around the clock without the otherwise obligatory commercial breaks. There simply was no other news. Most sports and entertainment channels switched to crisis news, many of them carrying the coverage of one of the networks and suspending their suddenly irrelevant broadcasts. For example, Fox cable's sports channel in New York simply showed the image of the U.S. flag. Newspapers and magazines devoted all or most of their news to the crisis. Given the warlike dimension of the attacks on America, this seemed the right decision early on. Eventually one wondered whether terrorism coverage needed to be curtailed so that other important news got the attention it deserved. *Newsweek* and *TIME*, for example, devoted all cover stories in the eight weeks following the events of September 11 to terrorism and terrorism-related themes.

If not the perpetrators themselves, the architects of the terror enterprise surely anticipated the immediate media impact: blanket coverage not only in the United States but in other parts of the world as well. How could the terrorists better achieve their objective than by obtaining the attention of their targeted audiences? Opinion polls revealed that literally all Americans followed the initial news of the terrorist attacks (99 percent or 100 percent according to surveys) by watching and listening to television and radio broadcasts. While most on-line adults identified television and radio as their primary sources for crisis information, nearly two thirds also mentioned the Internet as one of their information sources.[21] This initial universal interest in terrorism news did not

[20] Eventually, the hijackers released most of their hostages. Afterwards, some European governments did free a few terrorists from prison as demanded by the PFLP and thereby resolved the standoff.

[21] According to a *Los Angeles Times* telephone poll on 13–14 September 2001, 83 percent of the respondents said they watched the news "very closely," 15 percent "closely," and 2 percent "not too closely." Nobody chose the response option "not closely at all." In a survey conducted 14–15 September 2001, the Gallup Organization found that 77 percent of the public followed the news "very closely," 20 percent "somewhat closely," 2 percent "not too closely," and 1 percent "not at all." An ABC/*Washington Post* poll on 11 September 2001, found that 99 percent of the public followed the news on television and radio. Polling on-line adults on 11–12 September 2001, Harris Interactive found that 93 percent identified television and radio as their primary news source, 64 percent mentioned the Internet as one of their primary sources.

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weaken quickly. Probably affected by the news of anthrax attacks along the U.S. East coast, more than 90 percent of the public kept on watching the news about terrorism "very closely" or "closely" nearly six weeks after the events of September 11.[22]

Political leaders as well followed the original terror news, replays, and subsequent crisis reporting. There is no doubt, then, that the terrorists behind the attack on America received the attention of all Americans, the general public, and world leaders alike. This level of media coverage was a perfect achievement as far as the "attention getting" goal in the United States was concerned. The architects of the September 11 terror were delighted. Referring to the kamikaze pilots as "vanguards of Islam," bin Laden marveled,

> Those young men (. . . inaudible . . .) said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed other speeches made everywhere else in the world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs—even Chinese.[23]

With these remarks, bin Laden revealed that he considers terrorism a vehicle to dispatch messages—speeches in his words. And since he and his circle had followed the news of September 11, they were sure that their message had been heard.

Not surprisingly, from one hour to the next, the perpetrators set America's public agenda and profoundly affected most Americans' private lives. As soon as television stations played and replayed the ghastly scenes of jetliners being deliberately flown into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, business as usual was suspended in the public and private sector. All levels of government and vast parts of the business community concentrated on the immediate rescue contingencies and on preventing further attacks that were rumored in the media. Within days, all levels of government and the business community began to implement new anti- and counterterrorist measures.

Those who were responsible for the acts of terror spread anxiety and fear in a public traumatized by their terror. Fifty-three percent of the American public across the United States, not simply those in the attacked regions in the East, changed their plans and activities for the rest of "Black Tuesday"; four of every ten employed men and women did not go to work that day or quit their jobs.[24] In the days after the assault, nine in ten Americans worried about additional terrorist events in their country, and a majority worried that they themselves,

[22] According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press on 17–21 October 2001, 78 percent of the respondents said that they watched terrorism news "very closely," 22 percent watched "closely," 5 percent "not closely," 1 percent gave no answer. This result was nearly the same level of interest as in mid-September (13–17) when 74 percent of survey respondents revealed that they watched terrorism news "very closely," 22 percent "closely." In fact, more Americans watched this kind of news very closely in the second half of October than in mid-September.

[23] The quote is taken from the translated transcript of a videotape, presumably recorded in mid-November 2001, and retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/binladentext_121301.html [accessed 13 December 2001].

[24] These figures were reported in an ABC/*Washington Post* survey on 11 September 2001.

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or somebody close to them, could become victims the next time around. Compared with the public's reaction to previous acts of terrorism, these sentiments were stronger than ever before. For example, in the days after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, one in four Americans worried that they or a member of their family could become victims of terrorism. In the days after the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, 51 percent to 58 percent of the public had such fears.[25] This is precisely what the architect of terror intended. In a videotaped message, Osama bin Laden said about the reactions of Americans to the terror of September 11, "There is America, full of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that."[26] These concerns did not evaporate as time passed. Instead, most Americans continued to be concerned about further terrorist attacks and that they or a member of their family could become a victim the next time around.[27] However, the number of those who felt depressed and/or had trouble sleeping in the days following the suicide attacks decreased quite dramatically during the following weeks.[28]

When President George W. Bush, New York's Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and other public officials urged Americans to return to quasi-normal lives, the media's crisis coverage did not reflect that public officials in Washington had returned to normalcy. There were pictures of Washington's Reagan National Airport remaining closed because of its proximity to the White House and other government buildings. There was an image of a fighter jet over Washington escorting the presidential helicopter on a flight to Camp David. There were reports explaining Vice President Richard Cheney's absence, when the president addressed a joint session of Congress and in the weeks thereafter, as a precaution, in case terrorists might strike again. And there were constant visuals of a tireless Mayor Giuliani as crisis-manager before the daunting background of ground zero in Manhattan's financial district, at the funeral of yet another police- or fireman, at a mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral, or at a prayer service in Yankee stadium.

Every public appearance by the president, New York City's mayor, New York State's Governor George Pataki, U.S. senators, U.S. representatives,

[25] These statistics are the results of surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization, 21–23 April 1995, and 14–15 September 2001. A Gallup survey conducted on 11 September 2001, reported that 58 percent of Americans expressed fears of more terrorism.

[26] See "Text: Bin Laden's Statement," http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,565069,00html [accessed 7 April 2002].

[27] According to surveys conducted by the Pew Center for the People and the Press in mid-October 2001, 52 percent of the respondents were "very" or "somewhat" worried that they or a member of their family would become a victim of terrorism. In mid-September, 53 percent had those concerns. However, the number of people who were "very concerned" actually increased from September to October. See http://people-press.org/midoct01rpt.htm [accessed 24 October 2001].

[28] Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that one in seven Americans felt depressed following the September 11 terrorist attacks, but in mid-October, only 29 percent of respondents revealed that they felt depressed. During that same time period, those having trouble sleeping decreased from 33 percent to 12 percent.

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members of the Bush administration; every hearing and floor debate in the two chambers of Congress; and every publicly announced decision was in reaction to the terrorist attack and was reported in the news. Even weeks after "Black Tuesday" and during the anthrax scare, CNN and other all-news channels interrupted their programs not only to report on President Bush's public appearances but on Mayor Giuliani's activities as well. And when the broadcast networks returned to their normal schedules, the around-the-clock news channels continued to report mostly on terrorism and counterterrorism in the form of military actions against targets in Afghanistan that began on 7 October.

When professional sports competition resumed after a moratorium of several days, watching sports broadcasts did not necessarily mean that fans could forget the horror for a while. Unwittingly, the media transmitted constant reminders: Baseball fans in Chicago displayed a "We Love New York" banner; American flags were placed on helmets and caps of competitors; a hockey game was interrupted so that players and fans could hear the presidential speech before Congress; players praised rescue workers at the terror sites and embraced members of a rival team in an expression of unity. The sports pages of newspapers captured the reactions of well-known sports stars; the American flag on the cover of Sports Illustrated signaled that the entire issue following September 11 was devoted to patriotism.

Entertainment as well was in the grasp of the horrendous acts. When David Letterman resumed his late-night show, he was unusually serious and made no attempts to be funny. Instead of offering hilarious punch lines, he found words of comfort for news anchor Dan Rather who was twice moved to tears when talking about the terror next door. *Saturday Night Live*, Comedy Central, and other entertainment shows were all less aggressive in provoking laughter at the expense of political leaders. Bill Maher of ABC's *Politically Incorrect* was the exception when he told his audience that the suicide bombers were not cowards but that the United States was cowardly by launching cruise missiles on targets thousands of miles away. Maher, who later apologized for his remarks, was criticized by White House spokesman Ari Fleischer and punished by some advertisers who withdrew their sponsorship; some local stations dropped the program. Even poking fun at bin Laden and the Taliban, as Jay Leno and the *Saturday Night Live* performers did, seemed not all that funny. Some publications suspended their weekly cartoon sections for a while. And when a star-studded cast of entertainers performed in a two-hour telethon to raise funds for the victims of terror, the celebrities told touching stories of innocent victims and real-life heroes. But nothing reminded the American audience more succinctly of the extraordinary circumstances behind the benefit than the sight of superstars Jack Nicholson, Sylvester Stallone, Meg Ryan, Whoopi Goldberg, and other show business celebrities relegated to answer telephone calls of contributors, since the producers had not found slots for them to perform in the program. Finally, even the most outrageous TV and radio talk show hosts toned

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down their personalities as they embraced the terror crisis story, albeit only for a short time.

When the television series *The West Wing* postponed its scheduled season-opener and replaced it with a special episode in which the White House dealt with the aftermath of a terrorist nightmare, the blur of fact and fiction, life and entertainment, came full circle. After Hollywood's make-believe disasters became reality, when nineteen suicide terrorists stuck America, the real-life calamity inspired a television drama and ideas for more such episodes to come.

Whether tuned to the coverage of current affairs, sports news, or even entertainment, Americans had a hard time forgetting about terrorism for a while. Although most people agreed that TV programs about the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and later the news about anthrax bioterror, were depressing and frightening, many people simply could not stop watching terrorism news. While this addiction was true for six of every ten Americans in the middle of September, only one in two Americans were still watching this sort of coverage by mid-October. At the same time, a vast majority felt that watching terrorism news was frightening. Not surprisingly, people who were hooked felt more fearful of future terrorism than those who were not addicted.[29]

Not only Americans but people abroad, too, knew quickly about the terrorist attacks on the United States and were affected by what they saw, heard, and read. The Gallup Organization found, for example, that more than 98 percent of the Hungarian public knew about the terror soon after it happened. This caused one commentator to conclude, "If there were any remaining doubts about the media's capacity to almost simultaneously disseminate global news, this poll's finding should serve to dispel it."[30] Reacting to the news, the majority of Hungarians (51.2 percent) were "very" or "somewhat" worried that they, or someone in their family, could become a victim of terrorism.[31] Equally informed, 83 percent of people in the United Kingdom and 76 percent of Russian public shared those fears.[32] Even a cursory examination of the media around the world affirmed what journalists reported from those regions: For weeks after the terror attack on the United States and before the first counterterrorist strikes against targets in Afghanistan, the event, its political, economic, and mil-

[29] A survey conducted on 13–17 September 2001, by the Pew Center for the People and the Press revealed that 63 percent of the respondents could not stop watching terrorism reports, on 17–21 October, 49 percent said that they were hooked on terrorism news. In the September poll, 77 percent of the respondents said that watching terrorism news was frightening, in the October pool, 69 percent said the same.

[30] Richard Burkholder, Jr., "Initial Reaction to the Attacks on America: Polls from Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France and Russia," The Gallup Organization, http://www.gallup.com [accessed 22 September 2001].

[31] This statistic is from surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization on 12 September 2001.

[32] These statistics are from surveys conducted by MORI (Roy Morgan International) on 14 September 2001, and by the ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion and Market Research) on 12 September 2001.

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itary implications, and the threat of a major military confrontation in the Middle East remained highest on the media, public, and elite agenda.

As media organizations, star anchors, and public officials became the targets of biological terrorism and postal workers became the most numerous victims of "collateral damage" in an unprecedented anthrax offensive by elusive terrorist(s), the news devoted to terrorism multiplied—especially in the United States but abroad as well. The aftermath of the September 11 terror—the anthrax cases, the debate of possibly more biological and chemical agents in the arsenal of terrorists, and the military actions against al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan—crowded out most other events and developments in the news. Terrorists and terrorism had set the media agenda, the public agenda, and the government agenda. To the terrorists, the attention of the mass media, the public, and governmental decision makers was a total victory.

Why Do They Hate Us?

Sixteen days after the attacks on New York and Washington, the *Christian Science Monitor* published an in-depth article addressing a question that President Bush had posed in his speech before a joint session of Congress: "Why do they hate us?" Describing a strong resentment toward America in the Arab and Islamic world, Peter Ford summarized the grievances articulated by Osama bin Laden and like-minded extremists, but also held by many less radical people in the Middle East and other Muslim regions, when he wrote that

> the buttons that Mr. bin Laden pushed in statements and interviews—the injustice done to the Palestinians, the cruelty of continued sanctions against Iraq, the presence of US troops in Saudi-Arabia, the repressive and corrupt nature of the US backed Gulf governments—win a good deal of popular sympathy.[33]

This lengthy article was but one of many similar reports and analytical background pieces tracing the roots of anti-American attitudes among Arabs and Muslims and possible causes for a new anti-American terrorism of mass destruction. Lisa Beyer offered this summary of grievances in her story in *TIME* magazine:

> The proximate source of this brand of hatred toward America is U.S. foreign policy (read: meddling) in the Middle East. On top of its own controversial history in the region, the United States inherits the weight of centuries of Muslim bitterness over the Crusades and other military campaigns, plus decades of indignation over colonialism.[34]

A former U.S. ambassador at large for counterterrorism wrote,

[33] For the full text, see Peter Ford, "Why Do They Hate Us?" *Christian Science Monitor*, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0927/p1s1-wogi.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

[34] Lisa Beyer, "Roots of Rage," *TIME*, 1 October 2001, 44–47.

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> Certainly, the U.S. should reappraise its policies concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq, which have bred deep anger against America in the Arab and Islamic world, where much terrorism originates and whose cooperation is now more critical than ever.[35]

While the print press examined the roots of the deeply seated opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Arab and Islamic world extensively, television and radio dealt with these questions as well—in some instances at considerable length and depth. Thus, in the two-and-a-half weeks that followed the terrorist attacks, the major television networks and National Public Radio broadcast thirty-three stories that addressed the roots of anti-American terrorism of the sort committed on September 11, 2001, the motives of the perpetrators, and, specifically, the question that President Bush had asked. In the more than eight months before the attacks on New York and Washington, from 1 January 2001 to "Black Tuesday," none of the same TV or radio programs addressed the causes of anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Islamic world.[36] This turnaround demonstrated the ability of terrorists to force the media's hand, to set the media's agenda. Suddenly, in the wake of terrorist violence of unprecedented proportions, the news explored and explained the grievances of those who died for their causes and how widely these grievances were shared even by the vast majority of those Arabs and Muslims who condemned violence committed in the United States. With or without referring to a *fatwa* (religious verdict) that Osama bin Laden and four other extremist leaders had issued in 1998, or to the most recent communications from these circles, the news media now dealt with the charges contained in these statements as well as with additional issues raised by Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere. The 1998 *fatwa*, posted on the Web site of the World Islamic Front, listed three points in particular:

> First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest places, the Arabian Peninsula. . . . If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post. . . .
>
> Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million . . . despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres. . . .

[35] Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., "The Terror," *New York Review of Books*, 18 October 2001, 4.

[36] To retrieve relevant transcripts from the Lexis-Nexis database, the following search words were used: "why they hate us," "roots" and "terrorism," and "motivations" and "terrorism." Each transcript was examined as to the relevancy of its content. While all transcripts retrieved for the post-attack period (11–29 September 2001) addressed the reasons for anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Muslim world, those retrieved for the pre-attack period (1 January 2001–10 September 2001) did not include a single record that dealt with this problem.

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> Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.[37]

These specific accusations were among a whole laundry list of grievances that the media explored in the wake of the terrorism in New York and Washington. And the existence of bin Laden's various declarations of hate was reported as news although the declarations were issued as far back as 1996 and 1998.

It has been argued that religious fanatics who resort to this sort of violence are not at all interested in explaining themselves to their enemies because their only conversation is with God. But it was hardly an accident that the leaders among the suicide attackers, who diligently planned every detail of their conspiracy, left behind several copies of their instructions in the hours before and during the attacks. By insuring that law enforcement agents would find the documents, the terrorists must have been confident that America and the world would learn of their cause. They were proven right when the FBI released copies of the four-page, handwritten document to the media for publication. Revealing the pseudoreligious belief that drove the hijackers to mass destruction and their own deaths, the instructional memorandum contained the following sentences:

> Remember that this is a battle for the sake of God. . . .
>
> So remember God, as He said in His book: "Oh Lord, pour your patience upon us and make our feet steadfast and give us victory over the infidels." . . .
>
> When the confrontation begins, strike like champions who do not want to go back to this world. Shout, "Allah Akbar," because this strikes fear in the hearts of the non-believers. God said: "Strike above the neck, and strike at all their extremities." Know that the gardens of paradise are waiting for you in all their beauty, and the woman of paradise are waiting, calling out, "Come hither, friend of God."[38]

The intent here is not to criticize the media for publicizing such documents, for trying to answer why terrorists hate Americans and why many nonviolent people in the Arab and Islamic world hold anti-American sentiments, but rather to point out that this coverage and the accompanying mass-mediated discourse were triggered by a deliberate act of mass-destruction terrorism. After September 11 there was a tremendous jump in the quantity of news reports about one of the other aspects of developments in the Muslim and Arab world and even

[37] For the full text of the document, visit http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

[38] The document was written in Arabic. This translation was taken from "Full Text of Notes Found after Hijackings," *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/29/national/29S/FULL-TEXT.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

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TABLE 1

Muslim(s), Arab(s), Islam in the News before and after September 11, 2001

	Muslim Period I	*Muslim Period II*	*Arab Period I*	*Arab Period II*	*Islam Period I*	*Islam Period II*
	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)
ABC News	31	163	11	99	1	31
CBS News	32	144	27	117	1	27
NBC News	9	98	5	90	–	18
CNN	23	203	43	200	1	31
Fox News	1	100	2	64	1	46
N.Y. Times	345	1,468	345	1,272	216	1,190
NPR	54	217	53	182	10	84

N = Number of news segments/articles mentioning the search words.

Source: Compiled from Lexis-Nexis and *New York Times* archives using the search words "Muslim," "Arab," and "Islam."

Note: Period I = Six months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; Period II = six months after the attacks of September 11.

more so about Islam. Television news especially paid little attention to these topics before the terror attacks in New York and Washington. But, as Table 1 shows, the switch from scarce or modest coverage before September 11 to far more news prominence thereafter occurred in radio and the print press as well. While many of these news segments and stories focused on anti-American terrorism committed by Muslim and Arab perpetrators and the role of fundamentalist Islamic teachings, there were also many stories reporting on and examining the grievances of the mass of nonviolent Muslims and Arabs as well as the teachings of mainstream Islam.

Before "Black Tuesday," the news from the Middle East and other Islamic regions was overwhelmingly episodic and focused on particular, typically violent, events. Following the Iran Hostage Crisis, one critic noted that "Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended either as oil suppliers or as potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Islamic world."[39] Given the scarcity of foreign news in the post-cold war era in the American mass media, especially television,[40] there were even fewer contextual news or thematic stories[41] from this part of the world. But it would have been precisely the thematic approach that should have addressed all along the conditions that breed anti-American attitudes in the Arab and Muslim world. It took the terror of "Black Tuesday" for

[39] Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 26.

[40] Neil Hickey, "Money Lust: How Pressure for Profit is Perverting Journalism," *Columbia Journalism Review* (July/August 1998).

[41] Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

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the media to offer a significant amount of contextual coverage along with episodic reporting. In the process, the perpetrators of violence achieved their recognition goal: By striking hard at America, the terrorists forced the mass media to explore their grievances in ways that transcended by far the quantity and narrow focus of their pre-crisis coverage.

Making the News as Villain and Hero

What about the third goal that many terrorists hope to advance—to win or increase their respectability and legitimacy? Here, the perpetrators' number one audience is not the enemy or the terrorized public, in this case Americans, but rather the population in their homelands and their regions of operation. And in this respect, again, the terror of "Black Tuesday" was beneficial from the view of the architects and the perpetrators of violence. A charismatic figure among his supporters and sympathizers to begin with, Osama bin Laden was the biggest winner in this respect. Whether he was directly or indirectly involved in the planning of the terrorist strikes did not matter. The media covered him as "America's number one public enemy"[42] and thereby bolstered his popularity, respectability, and legitimacy among millions of Muslims. The American and foreign news publicized visuals and reports of the popular support for bin Laden following the terror attack against the United States. A lengthy bin Laden profile in the *New York Times*, for example, contained the following passage: "To millions in the Islamic world who hate America for what they regard as its decadent culture and imperial government, he [Osama bin Laden] is a spiritual and political ally."[43] A page-one article in the same edition of the *New York Times* reported from Karachi, Pakistan,

> In every direction in this city of 12 million people, the largest city in a nation that has become a crucial but brittle ally in the United States' war on terrorism, there are cries and signs for Osama bin Laden, for the Taliban, for holy war.[44]

The Associated Press reported that a book about the terrorist-in-chief was a bestseller in the Middle East. The volume contained the complete transcript of an interview with bin Laden that was broadcast in abbreviated form by al Jazeera television in 1998 and rebroadcast after the terror strike against the United States in September of 2001. Sold out in most bookstores of the region, readers were reportedly borrowing the book from friends and making photocopies.[45]

[42] Quoted here from *People* magazine on CNN, 29 September 2001.

[43] Robert D. McFadden, "Bin Laden's Journey from Rich, Pious Boy to the Mask of Evil," *New York Times*, 30 September 2001.

[44] Rick Bragg, "Streets of Huge Pakistan City Seethe with Hatred for U.S.," *New York Times*, 30 September 2001.

[45] The sudden bestseller was Jamal Abdul Latif Ismail, *Bin Laden, Al-Jazeera—and I.* For more on this book, see Donna Abu-Nasr, "Bin Laden's past words revisited," http.//dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/ap/20010928/wl/bin_laden_s_words_2.html [accessed 1 April 2002].

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TABLE 2

News Stories Mentioning President Bush and bin Laden Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks

	Pres. G. W. Bush	*Osama bin Laden*
	(N)	(N)
ABC News	175	299
CBS News	210	270
NBC News	159	211
CNN	292	469
NPR	271	188
N.Y. Times	655	611
Wash. Post	684	490

N = Number of segments/stories.

Source: Compiled from Lexis-Nexis data; TV and radio broadcasts for the period 11 September 2001–6 October 2001; newspaper articles for the period 12 September 2001–7 October 2001.

Bin Laden, his al Qaeda group, and the closely related web of terror spanning from the Middle East into other parts of Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and possibly South America, were no match for the American superpower in terms of political, economic, and military power. But, as Table 2 shows, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and up to the beginning of the bombing of Afghanistan on 7 October, the U.S. television networks mentioned Osama bin Laden more frequently and the leading newspapers and National Public Radio only somewhat less frequently than President George W. Bush. A terrible act of terror turned the world's most notorious terrorist into one of the world's leading newsmakers. The fact that the American news media paid more attention to bin Laden than to the U.S. president, or nearly as much, was noteworthy, if one considers that George W. Bush made fifty-four public statements during this time period (from major addresses to shorter statements to a few words during photo opportunities) compared to bin Laden, who did not appear in public at all, did not hold news conferences, or give face-to-face interviews.[46]

Although the American media did not portray bin Laden as a sympathetic figure, he did share center stage with President Bush in the mass-mediated global crisis. Since the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the American media devoted considerable broadcast time and column inches to bin Laden. But the celebrity terrorist's ultimate ascent to the world stage was more dramatic and forceful than that of Yasir Arafat in the 1970s, the Ayatollah Khomeini and Muammar Gadhafi in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s, and bin Laden himself in the years and months preceding "Black Tuesday." And through all of this, bin Laden was in hiding, did not hold

[46] George W. Bush's fifty-four public statements during the period were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database in the political transcript category.

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news conferences or grant interviews. However, the Qatar-based Arab television network, al Jazeera, aired a videotape made available by al Qaeda immediately after President Bush told America and the world that military actions had begun in the multifaceted hunt for bin Laden and his terror organization. All U.S. networks broadcast the tape as they received the al Jazeera feed. Bin Laden's shrewdly crafted speech received the same air time as President Bush's speech. The same was true for a videotaped statement by bin Laden's lieutenant for media affairs who threatened that "Americans must know that the storm of airplanes will not stop. God willing, and there are thousands of young people who are as keen about death as Americans are about life."[47]

In the ten weeks following the attacks of September 11, *TIME* magazine depicted Osama bin Laden three times and President George W. Bush twice on its cover. During the same period, *Newsweek* carried bin Laden twice on its cover and President Bush not at all. Finally, the cover of *Newsweek*'s eleventh issue after September 11 featured President George W. and First Lady Laura Bush.

From the terrorists' point of view, it did not matter that bin Laden earned bad press in the United States and elsewhere. Singled-out, condemned, and warned by leaders, such as President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Osama bin Laden was in the news as frequently as the world's legitimate leaders, or even more frequently. This in itself was a smashing success from the perspectives of bin Laden and his associates: The mass media reflected that bin Laden and his followers preoccupied not only America and the West but literally the entire world.

In sum, then, by attacking symbolic targets in America, killing thousands of Americans, and causing tremendous damage to the American and international economy, the architects and perpetrators of this horror achieved their media-centered objectives in all respects. This propaganda coup continued in the face of American and British counterterrorist military actions in Afghanistan.

High Marks for the News Media

In the days following the attacks, when most Americans kept their televisions or radio sets tuned to the news during most of their waking hours, the public gave the media high grades for its reporting. Nearly nine in ten viewers rated the performance of the news media as either "excellent" (56 percent) or "good" (33 percent). The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (that keeps track of the relationship between the public and the news media) called

[47] This statement by al Qaeda's spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith was aired by al Jazeera TV and U.S. networks. The quote was taken from the Associated Press's version as publicized on http://daily news.yahoo and retrieved on 10 October 2001 [accessed 1 April 2002].

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this high approval rating "unprecedented."[48] This record approval came on the heels of increasing public dissatisfaction with the mass media and a number of journalistic and scholarly works that identified the degree of and reasons for the increasing disconnect between the public and the news media.[49] The terrorism catastrophe brought Americans and the press closer together, closer than in recent times of normalcy and during previous crises, in particular, the Gulf War.[50] Five aspects in particular seemed to effect these attitudinal changes: First, the public appreciated the flow of information provided by television, radio, and print either directly or via media organizations' Internet sites. In the hours and days of the greatest distress, television and radio especially helped viewers and listeners feel as if they were involved in the unfolding news. Unconsciously, people took some comfort in seeing and hearing the familiar faces and voices of news anchors and reporters as signs of the old normalcy in the midst of an incomprehensible crisis. At a time when the overwhelming majority of Americans stopped their normal activities, watching television, listening to the radio, reading the newspaper, going online gave them the feeling of doing something, of being part of a national tragedy.

Second, people credited the news media, especially local television, radio, and newspapers in the immediately affected areas in and around New York, Washington, and the crash site in Pennsylvania, with assisting crisis managers in communicating important information to the public. For crisis managers, the mass media offered the only effective means to tell the public about the immediate consequences of the crisis—what to do (for example, donate blood of certain types, where to donate and when) and what not to do (initially, for example, not trying to drive into Manhattan because all access bridges and tunnels were closed). In this respect, the media served the public interest in the best tradition of disaster coverage.

Third, Americans experienced a media—from celebrity anchors, hosts, and other stars to the foot-soldiers of the fourth estate—that abandoned cynicism, negativism, and attack journalism in favor of reporting, if not participating in, an outburst of civic spirit, unity, and patriotism. From one minute to another, media critics and pollsters recognized a reconnection between the press and public after years of growing division. As even the most seasoned news personnel couldn't help but show their emotions while struggling to inform the public during the initial hours and days of the crisis, audiences also forgot about their dissatisfaction with the media in a rare we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment.

[48] See the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, http://www.people-press.org/terrorist01rpt.htm [accessed 1 April 2002], which states: "Overwhelming support for Bush, military response, but. . . ."

[49] James M. Fallows, *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermined American Democracy* (New York: Pantheon, 1996); Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order: How the Decline of the Political Parties and the Growing Power of the News Media Undermine the American Way of Electing Presidents* (New York: Knopf, 1993).

[50] See http://www.people-press.org/terrorist01rpt.htm.

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This explains the sudden high approval ratings for the fourth estate mentioned earlier.

To be sure, there were some bones of contention. As Americans everywhere displayed the star spangled banner, images of the American flag appeared on television screens as well. Many anchors and reporters wore flag pins or red, white, and blue ribbons on their lapels. Others rejected this display of patriotism. Barbara Walters of ABC-TV, for example, declared on the air that she would not wear any version of Old Glory.[51] When the news director of a cable station on Long Island, New York, issued a memo directing his staff not to wear any form of flag reproductions, there was a firestorm of opposition from viewers and advertisers. But even this incident seemed to fade after the news director issued an apology and it became obvious that the flag was not banned from the station's coverage.[52]

Fourth, the news provided public spaces where audience members had the opportunity to converse with experts in various fields and with each other, or witness question-and-answer exchanges between others. Whether through quickly arranged electronic town hall meetings or phone-in programs, television, radio, and on-line audiences wanted to get involved in public discourse. Many news organizations facilitated the sudden thirst for dialogue. While television and radio were natural venues for these exchanges, newspapers and newsmagazines published exclusively, or mostly, letters to the editors on this topic and reflected a wide range of serious and well-articulated opinions. Seldom, however, was the value of thoughtful moderators and professional gatekeepers more obvious than in the days and weeks after the terror nightmare. The least useful, often bigoted comments were posted on Internet sites and message boards.

Fifth, news consumers were spared the exasperation of watching reporters and camera crews chasing survivors and relatives of victims, camping on front lawns, shoving microphones in front of people who wanted to be left alone. In the 1980s, when terrorists struck against Americans abroad, the media often pushed their thirst for tears, grief, tragedy, and drama to and even beyond the limits of professional journalism's ethics in their hunt for pictures and sound bites. But this time around, neither the public nor media critics had reason to complain about the fourth estate's insistence on invading people's privacy and exploiting grief-stricken relatives of victims and survivors. This time, many husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, daughters and sons of disaster victims spoke voluntarily to reporters, appeared voluntarily, and in many instances repeatedly, on local and national television to talk about their traumatic losses. Many survivors described their ordeals and their feelings in touching detail. Most of these people were born and grew up in the era of television and seemed

[51] Walters revealed her "no flag" decision on *The View*, a talk show she cohosts. See Rita Ciolli, "Flags Raise among Media," *Newsday*, 23 September 2001.

[52] The station was Long Island Cablevision. See Warren Strugatch, "Patriotism vs. Journalistic Ethics," *New York Times*, 7 October 2001.

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comfortable, in some cases even eager, to share their sorrow and their tears, their memories and their courage with anchors, hosts, correspondents—and millions of fellow Americans.

Again, this was not the result of a changed and more restrained media but of a cultural change. Expressing one's innermost feelings, showing one's despair, controlled crying or sobbing before cameras and microphones seemed natural in the communication culture of our time and in the age of so-called reality TV and talk shows with a human touch such as Oprah Winfrey or Larry King. Thus, unlike past TV audiences who were exposed to ruthless exploits of grief during and after terrorist incidents, following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, viewers participated in mass-mediated wakes, full of collective sadness and shared encouragement.

When the broadcast media played and replayed the recorded exchanges between victims in the World Trade Center and emergency police dispatchers, they exploited the unimaginable suffering of those who were trapped and soon died in the struck towers. Criticizing this practice as "primetime pornography," one commentator wrote,

> Can there be anybody on the planet who failed to immediately grasp the full horror of what went on Sept. 11 that they need to hear, over and over, the emotional mayhem of ordinary people trying to cope amidst overwhelming disbelief, fear and terror—not to mention grief? But in our show-and-tell culture there is nothing so private and sensitive that it can't be exposed and sensationalized—especially where ratings are involved.[53]

One can perfectly agree with this insistence on journalistic ethics, as I do, and still wonder whether the "show-and-tell culture" has not only desensitized broadcasters but also confused the public's distinction between private and public sphere.

Crisis News: Weaknesses, Questions, and Issues

Twelve days after the kamikaze attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, media critic Marvin Kitman, commenting on the perhaps longest continuous breaking news events in the history of television, wrote:

> They [the TV people] kept on showing those same pictures of the planes hitting, the buildings crumbling. I'm sure if I turned the TV on right now, the buildings would still be crumbling. It never got any better. One picture is worth a thousand words, except in "live" television, where people felt compelled to constantly talk even when they knew very little about what they were talking about.[54]

While the initial emergency coverage, especially in television and radio, deserved high marks, some of the infotainment habits that had increasingly made

[53] "Comment: Broadcast News," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 October 2001.

[54] Marvin Kitman, "The Nation's Painful Video Vigil," *Newsday*, 23 September 2001.

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their way into television news crept rather soon into the presentations of what screen banners called the "Attack on America" or "America Attacked." Recalling the rather trivial headlines and cover stories before September 11, one expert in the field suggested early on that "suddenly, dramatically, unalterably the world has changed. And that means journalism will also change, indeed is changing before our eyes."[55] As it turned out, this was wishful thinking. There was no longer the feeding frenzy on Congressman Gary Condit's private life, Mayor Rudy Giuliani's nasty divorce, or the meaning of Al Gore's beard for his political future, but that did not mean an end to the overkill and hype that characterized past reporting excesses, whether in the context of the O. J. Simpson murder case and trial or the accidental deaths of Princess Diana and John F. Kennedy, Jr. Immediately after September 11, when a series of unspeakable events were reported as they unfolded, and a day or two thereafter, when the enormity of the attacks and their consequences began to sink in, there was simply not enough genuine news to fill twenty-four hours per day. As a result, television networks and stations replayed the scenes of horror again and again, revisiting the suffering of people over and over, searching for emotions beyond the boundaries of good taste. In their search for family members or friends who were among the thousands of missing in New York, many people pursued reporters and camera crews with photographs of their loved ones in the hope of some good information, some good news. While highlighting these photographs could be seen as servicing a grieving community, dwelling on picture galleries of the victims was certainly not. One shocked observer recalled that "one of the yokels on Ch. 2 showed pictures she had found in the street after the explosion and cheerfully pointed out 'that these little children may now be without parents.'"[56]

The shock over the events of September 11 wore off rather quickly in the newsrooms, giving way to everyday routine. Some television anchors welcomed their audiences rather cheerfully to the "Attack on America" or "America's New War" and led into commercial breaks with the promise that they would be right back with "America's War on Terrorism" or whatever the slogan happened to be that day or week.

There were signs of bias that were especially upsetting to Arab and Muslim Americans who felt, for example, that the scenes of Palestinians rejoicing over the news of the attacks in New York and Washington were over-reported and too often replayed. In contrast to Palestinian celebrations, anti-American outbursts in Europe received little or no attention. For example, when fans of a Greek soccer team at the European Cup game in Athens jeered America during a minute of silence for the terrorism victims of September 11 and tried to burn an American flag, no television news programs and only a handful of American newspapers (publishing only a few lines in reports about the soccer

[55] Howard Kurtz, "Media Hype May No Longer Be Necessary," *Washington Post*, 16 September 2001.
[56] Kitman, "Nation's Painful Video Vigil."

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game on the sports pages) mentioned the incident.[57] But the coverage raised far more serious questions about the proper role of a free press in a crisis that began with the suicide terror in New York, Washington, and near Pittsburgh and intensified when anthrax letters were delivered in states along the U.S. east coast. Three areas, in particular, proved problematic.

The first of these issues concerned the videotapes with propaganda appeals by bin Laden and his lieutenants that al Qaeda made available to the Arab language TV network al Jazeera. On 7 October, shortly after President Bush informed the nation of the first air raids against targets in Afghanistan, five U.S. television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and Fox News) broadcast an unedited feed from al Jazeera that gave bin Laden and his associates access to the American public. Two days later, three cable channels (CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC) aired in full a statement by bin Laden's spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith. Both tapes contained threats against Americans at home and abroad. Bin Laden said, "I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him."[58] His spokesman warned that "the storms will not calm down, especially the storm of airplanes, until you see defeat in Afghanistan." He called on Muslims in the United States and Great Britain "not to travel by airplanes and not to live in high buildings or skyscrapers."[59] The Bush administration cautioned that these statements could contain coded messages that might cue bin Laden followers in the United States and elsewhere in the West to unleash more terror. But intelligence experts were unable to identify suspect parts in the spoken text or visual images at a time when Attorney General John Ashcroft, the FBI, and other government officials in Washington warned of more terrorist strikes to come. While the administrations's argument that these tapes were vehicles for hidden messages was not credible, it was certainly true that these videos and their transcripts contained terrorist propaganda, which newspapers printed in full. The most damaging effect was that these broadcasts further frightened an already traumatized American public. Students of propaganda have argued that propaganda of fear or the "fear effect" is most effective "when it scares the hell out of people."[60] But this is not what the administration argued. Prodded by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice who warned that the hateful threats from the bin Laden camp could

[57] The *New York Times*, for example, mentioned the Palestinian celebrations in nine articles following the September 11 terrorism, the anti-American incident in Athens received twenty lines of an Associated Press dispatch on its sports pages. See "Fans in Athens Try to Burn U.S. Flag," *New York Times*, 23 September 2001, sports section.

[58] Quoted here from John F. Burns, "A Nation Challenged: The Wanted Man," *New York Times*, 8 October 2001.

[59] Quoted in Susan Sachs and Bill Carter, "A Nation Challenged: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden Spokesman Threatens Westerners at Home and in the Gulf," *New York Times*, 14 October 2001.

[60] Anthony Pratkanis and Elliott Aronson, *Age of Propaganda* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992), 165.

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incite more violence against Americans abroad, all American television networks agreed to edit future tapes and eliminate "passages containing flowery rhetoric urging violence against Americans."[61] This argument was just as weak as the suggestion of hidden signs contained in the tapes. After all, al Jazeera and other television channels aired the material in the Middle East and other regions with Muslim populations. It would have been far more credible to argue that threats from bin Laden and his associates increased the public's anxiety.

The networks' joint decision was not universally applauded because it raised the question whether the networks had given in to pressure from the administration when they agreed to exercise this form of self-censorship. While the argument that the press in a democracy needs to fully inform citizens, especially in times of crisis and great danger, has most weight here, it is also true that the news media make all the decisions on whom and what to include and exclude, or whom and what to feature more or less prominently in their broadcasts. In the case of the al Qaeda tapes, after the first ones were aired excessively by some cable networks, subsequent tapes were under-covered. All of these videotapes should have been broadcast fully, and their transcripts should have been printed entirely by the press. The public should have learned of bin Laden's propaganda without being exposed to endless replays. The mistake was made initially when passages of the first bin Laden video were broadcast so many times with full screen or split screen exposure, when bin Laden and al Qaeda loomed too large in the overall news presentations compared to other news sources and developments. The second mistake was the suppression or partial suppression of the content of later videotapes by broadcast and print media.

A similar controversy arose over CNN's decision to join al Jazeera in submitting questions to Osama bin Laden following an invitation by al Qaeda and the promise that bin Laden would respond to them. While a face-to-face interview with the man who openly praised the terrorism of September 11 could have yielded valuable information—especially for U.S. decision makers, the exchange of written questions and answers was a far more questionable journalistic exercise under the circumstances (if only because the media organizations could not be sure whether bin Laden or someone else would answer their questions). Under these circumstances, it was just as well that the answers were never provided.

A second issue concerned the media's sudden obsession with endlessly reporting and debating the potential for biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare in the wake of September 11. As real and would-be experts filled the air waves, some hosts and anchors were unable to hide their preference for guests who painted doomsday scenarios. As Table 3 shows, this was common in broadcasts even before the first anthrax case in Florida made the news on 4 October 2001. It was as if anchors and news experts expected the other shoe to drop as they

[61] Bill Carter and Felicity Barringer, "A Nation Challenged: The Coverage," *New York Times*, 11 October 2001.

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TABLE 3

Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Anthrax in the News

	B/C Terror I	*B/C Terror II*	*Anthrax I*	*Anthrax II*
	(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)
ABC News	20	30	2	383
CBS News	12	30	0	267
NBC News	8	57	3	250
CNN	17	99	1	567
Fox News	23	37	0	103
NPR	11	37	8	176
N.Y. Times	76	194	27	729
Wash. Post	55	147	25	465

N = Number of segments/stories.

Source: Compiled by retrieving transcripts and newspaper content from the Lexis-Nexis archives using the search words "biological" and "chemical" and "terrorist" for biological and chemical terror and "anthrax."

Note: B/C Terror I and Anthrax I segments/stories aired/published from 11 September 2001 to 3 October 2001 for television and radio, and 12 September 2001 to 4 October 2001 for newspapers.

B/C Terror II and Anthrax II segments/stories aired/published from 4 October 2001 to 31 October 2001 for television and radio, and 5 October 2001 to 1 November 2001 for newspapers.

went out of their way to report to the public that the public health system and other agencies were ill prepared to deal with bioterrorism and other mass destruction terrorism.

When the news of a Florida man dying of anthrax and subsequent cases validated these predictions, anthrax terrorism and other forms of bioterrorism moved higher up on the agenda of TV, radio, and print news. In less than a month, from the discovery of the first case on 4 October to 31 October, the television networks covered or mentioned the anthrax terror in hundreds of segments. The leading newspapers published even more stories on anthrax and other possible threats from biological and chemical agents. (See Table 3.)

The most serious bioterrorism attacks in the United States deserved headlines and serious, regular, in-depth coverage, but the attacks did not merit an army of talking heads who beat the topic to death many times over. In the process, public officials who tried to mask their own confusion, experts who scared the public, and media stars who overplayed the anthrax card contributed to a general sentiment of uncertainty. By shrewdly targeting major news organizations and two of the most prominent television news anchors, Tom Brokaw of NBC and Dan Rather of CBS (and perhaps Peter Jennings of ABC, considering that the baby son of one ABC news producer was diagnosed with exposure to anthrax bacteria following his visit at ABC News headquarters in New York), the perpetrator(s) were assured massive attention even before the first anthrax letter hit Washington. Along the way, mass-mediated advice about whether to buy gas masks, take antibiotics, avoid public places, and speculations over the next form of bioterrorism (smallpox?) or chemical terror warfare (sarin gas at-

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tacks, such as Aum Shinrykio's attack in Tokyo's subway system?) fueled the nightmares of those citizens who could not switch off their television sets since September 11.

This concern was not lost on a few people inside the media. One political columnist identified the greatest danger of journalism—"our new obsession with terrorism will make us its unwitting accomplices. We will become (and have already partly become) merchants of fear. Case in point: the anthrax fright. Until now, anthrax has been a trivial threat to public health and safety."[62] The same columnist also warned,

> The perverse result is that we may become the terrorists' silent allies. Terrorism is not just about death and destruction. It's also about creating fear, sowing suspicion, undermining confidence in public leadership, provoking people—and governments—into doing things that they might not otherwise do. It is an assault as much on our psychology as on our bodies.[63]

Not many in the media listened. At the height of the anthrax scare, the media kept publicizing far more scary scenarios for terrorism of mass destruction. *Newsweek*'s 5 November 2001 edition was a case in point. The issue's extensive cover story, "Protecting America: What must be done," described the most vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks as "airports, chemical plants, dams, food supplies, the Internet, malls, mass transit, nuclear power plants, post offices, seaports, skyscrapers, stadiums, water supplies." Collapsed into ten priorities "to protect ourselves" in the actual cover story, the described vulnerabilities read more like a target description for terrorist planners than useful information for a nation in crisis.

Finally, in taking a softer stand vis-à-vis the president, administration officials, members of Congress, and officials at lower level governments, the news media made the right choice when encountering a crisis that presented the country with problems it had never faced before. But suspending the adversarial stance of normal times is one thing, to join the ranks of cheerleaders is another. While comparing the hands-on and very effective crisis-managing mayor of New York City with Winston Churchill during World War II was understandable under the circumstances, likening President George W. Bush (on the basis of his speech before a joint session of the U.S. Congress) to Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and Winston Churchill during WWII, as some media commentators and many cited sources did, was quite a stretch. But nothing demonstrated more clearly that some reporters and editors had lost their footing than an article about Laura Bush as "a very different" first lady after the terrorist crisis began. When Mrs. Bush visited New York in her "new role of national consoler," a reporter concluded, "As the need for a national handholder has made itself evident, Mrs. Bush's role as a kind of Florence Nightin-

[62] Robert Samuelson, "Unwitting Accomplices?" *Washington Post*, 7 November 2001.
[63] Ibid.

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gale at least comes as a natural one."[64] Even more farfetched was a comparison by presidential scholar Michael Beschloss, one of the most frequent guests on political talk TV programs, who, according to the *New York Times*, compared "the first lady's sang-froid to that of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother during World War II. (The queen mother refused to leave London, against the wishes of her advisers.)"[65] Given this kind of hyperbole, even in the most respected media, it was hardly surprising that the news media's most important role in the democratic arrangement—that of acting as a governmental watchdog—took a back seat in the weeks after the September 11 terror attacks and in the first weeks following the anthrax scare.

When the Republican-controlled House of Representatives stopped its work after anthrax spores were found in Senator Tom Daschle's office (but were not yet found in the lower chamber of Congress), the *New York Post*, a conservative, pro-Republican daily, called members "Wimps" in a huge front-page headline and chided representatives because they had "chicken[ed] out" and "headed for the hills yesterday at the first sign of anthrax in the Capitol."[66] Even for a tabloid, this choice of words was perhaps not the best; however, the substance proved on the mark in the following days, when government offices from Capitol Hill to the Supreme Court were closed while thousands of fearful postal workers in Washington, New York, and New Jersey were told to continue working because anthrax spores in their buildings and on their mail sorting machines did not pose any danger to their health. At the time, two postal workers in Washington had already died of anthrax inhalation and several others had been diagnosed with less lethal cases. Yet, by and large, the news media did not question what looked like a double standard. In the face of an ongoing terrorism crisis at home and a counterterrorism campaign abroad, the mainstream watchdog press refrained from barking in the direction of public officials.

In late October and early November, when public opinion polls signaled that the American public was far less satisfied with the Bush administration's handling of homeland defense in the face of anthrax bioterrorism than with its military campaign against bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, columnists, journalists, and editorial writers asked the questions that needed to be answered and voiced criticism that needed to be expressed. In an in-depth piece in the *New York Times*, for example, John Schwartz wrote, "[If] there's one lesson to be learned from the Bush administration's response to the anthrax threat, it's this: People in the grip of fear want information that holds up, not spin control."[67] More specifically, he wrote:

[64] Alex Kuczynski, "A Very Different Laura Bush," *New York Times*, 30 September 2001.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Deborah Orin and Brian Blomquist, "Anthrax Plays to Empty House," *New York Post*, 18 October 2001.

[67] John Schwartz, "Efforts to Calm the Nation's Fears Spin Out of Control," *New York Times*, 28 October 2001.

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> Critics of the administration say that the reasons for the lackluster response include lack of communication between agencies, a lack of preparedness on the part of the Health and Human Services Secretary, Tommy G. Thompson, a former governor of Wisconsin with little background in medicine or science, and officials' tendency to respond in the same way they would respond to a mere political problem.[68]

This piece, similar news stories, and commentary signaled that some voices in the news media began to reclaim their watchdog role with respect to September 11, the anthrax scare, and even the politics of anti- and counter-terrorist politics. But the events of September 11, 2001 changed the mindset of most Americans—including many in the media who remained reluctant to return to their more critical coverage patterns of pre-September 11 times.

Terrorists and the media are not bedfellows, they are more like partners in a marriage of convenience in that terrorists need all the news coverage they can get and the media need dramatic, shocking, sensational, tragic events to sustain and bolster their ratings or circulation. There is no doubt that the most fundamental responsibility of a free press is to inform the public of events and issues in order for citizens to make informed judgments and decisions. Therefore, it would be absurd to suggest that there should be no reporting on mass-mediated terrorism. Government censorship is not an acceptable option either. At issue is how to report on this kind of political violence in ways that are less accommodating to terrorists' mass-mediated goals and less likely to curtail the watchdog role of the press that is essential to a healthy democracy.

[68] Ibid.

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Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969

LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN

President George W. Bush's labeling of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as representing an "axis of evil" in late January 2002 seemed unwarranted and even bizarre to many Americans given that there is little evidence tying these regimes to the events of September 11. The article below offers a theoretically significant explanation for this major development. It hypothesizes that radically asymmetric weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rivalries are inherently unstable.

The instability of America's relations with the so-called rogue states has been further underlined in recent articulations of American strategy, for example in the "National Security Strategy," published in September 2002. There, it is observed, "Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking WMD and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. . . . The only path to peace and security is the path of action." The document, moreover, openly endorses "proactive counterproliferation efforts" to "prevent our enemies from threatening us. . . ."[1]

If war occurs with Iraq, as seems increasing likely, such a policy can only be described as preventive war. However, it would be a mistake to suggest that such crises with WMD proliferators are a unique feature of the world order after the September 11 attacks. One needs only to recall Clinton administration crises with North Korea in 1994, with Libya in 1996, and with Iraq in 1998 to see that this is a pattern in post-cold war world politics. In these circumstances

[1] "The National Security Strategy of the United States," September 2002, accessed on the website of the White House at http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, 18 December 2002.

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of instability, Washington is now resorting to strategic opportunism, capitalizing on the opportunities offered by the post-September 11 world to act against a threat perceived to be as or more dangerous than international terrorism.

This article uses a case study from the cold war to explore the crucial structural feature of likely future conflict between states possessing WMD: imbalance. That is to say, conflict is likely to take place between the United States and states with qualitatively and quantitatively less developed WMD arsenals.[2] The "revolution in warfare," the focus of much recent discussion among defense analysts, seems set to exaggerate these imbalances.[3] While asymmetric WMD relationships appear to be a new feature of international relations, various historical precedents exist that have been neglected by scholars. This article explores one such precedent: the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969.[4]

The importance of this crisis for the study of the role of WMD and of nuclear weapons in particular in international relations has not been widely recognized.[5] For example, a recent historical survey of the issue, *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945*, makes no mention of the crisis whatsoever. In addition to its potentially revealing structural features, there are two further reasons to pay close attention to this crisis. First, it represents one of the very few instances of combat between nuclear-armed states. Second, understanding the role of nuclear weapons in the Sino-Soviet conflict generally can help correct an understandable, though potentially dangerous, bias in the academic debate about WMD toward focusing exclusively on the U.S.–Soviet nuclear rivalry. Thus, it was recently noted in *International Security* that "the US-Soviet experience is in many ways so anomalous that scholars should not be too quick to assume its generalizability."[6] The case study method employed here conforms to the research program advocated by leaders in the field. Peter Feaver, for example, contends, "A high priority for future research should be empirical inquiries into how established nuclear states have in fact interacted with . . . emerging proliferants."[7]

[2] See, for example, Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); and more recently, Barry Schneider, *Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).

[3] On the so-called revolution in military affairs, see Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996): 37–55.

[4] John L. Gaddis, Phillip H. Gordon, Earnest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). One exception is David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996/1997): 102.

[5] I contend that conflict dynamics between nuclear dyads will be relevant to discussions of dynamics where other forms of WMD, especially biological weapons, are at issue. On the importance of distinguishing among types of WMD, see, for example, Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," *International Security* 24 (Spring 2000): 85–115.

[6] Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," 118.

[7] Peter Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists and Theories of Proliferation," *Security Studies* 4 (Summer 1995): 769.

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In this crisis, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), having only tested an atomic weapon four and a half years earlier, appears to have challenged not just the interests, but the very soil of the USSR, a power that already possessed a huge nuclear arsenal with advanced systems of reconnaissance, targeting, and delivery. Will the spread and growth of WMD programs mitigate conflict despite vast asymmetries in power, as one group of scholars, dubbed "proliferation optimists," has supposed? The Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 can be considered a "crucial case" for this body of theory.[8] Now and for the foreseeable future, the relevant archival materials will remain inaccessible, precluding a definitive understanding of the crisis. Given this impediment, the second best solution of relying on a number of recently published Russian and Chinese historical narratives, in addition to interviews among Russian and Chinese scholars and policy makers, has been adopted.[9] These sources enable tentative analysis of the following research question: given the fleeting opportunity to curb China's nuclear ambitions, why did Soviet leaders, not widely celebrated as humanists, hesitate to attack China's nuclear weapons facilities in 1969?

The discussion will proceed in four basic steps. Part I will consider relevant hypotheses concerning WMD conflict dynamics from the academic literature. Part II will review the facts of the crisis, adding new information where possible. Part III will discuss the feasibility of a Soviet preventive attack. Part IV will evaluate the strength of five alternative explanations for the Soviet reluctance to strike.

Valley of Vulnerability

Deterrence theory has dominated thinking about WMD relationships over the last half-century. The theory is built on the principle that uncertainty about the results of conflict, including wishful thinking about one's own military prowess,

[8] A "crucial case" is one in which a given theory should be easily demonstrable. If the theory fails even this relatively simple test, then its ability to explain harder cases is problematic. Two factors suggest that this is a crucial case for "proliferation optimism," the idea that proliferation is stabilizing. First, since the crisis occurred four and a half years after the first Chinese test, China's capabilities were developed to a greater degree than one might expect of other so-called recent proliferators. China had succeeded in testing missiles and thermonuclear weapons by 1969. Second, proliferation optimism is assisted by the region's geographical peculiarities, in particular the proximity of Russian cities in Siberia to China.

[9] Interviews were conducted in Moscow during March and May 2000, and in Beijing and Shanghai during July and August 2000. While some of the interview subjects were active in policy processes and so may be considered as primary sources, most should be viewed as secondary sources. These secondary sources are valuable given the paucity of information in the West about this crisis and also given that regimes in both countries grant their own scholars privileged access. One premise of this article is that the field cannot afford to await the opening of archives in order to have a debate about Russian and Chinese nuclear behavior. On the methodological difficulties of studying nuclear history, see Colin S. Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 17–19.

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is overshadowed by the simple and ghastly nature of the "absolute weapon." The stabilizing effects demonstrated during the cold war of arsenals that ensure "mutually assured destruction" are widely accepted by scholars.[10]

Kenneth Waltz carries this logic to a much more radical conclusion in suggesting that the conflict-mitigating effects of WMD could be appreciated by states other than the two superpowers. His argument is particularly pertinent here, because Waltz makes extensive allusion to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Referring to our central question concerning WMD imbalance, he writes, "Nuclear weapons can be fairly small and light. They are easy to hide and to move. . . . Lesser nuclear states might deploy, say, ten real weapons and ten dummies, while permitting other countries to infer that the numbers are larger."[11] Waltz asserts that this deterrence relationship applies to the Sino-Soviet case: "To locate . . . virtually every Chinese missile, aircraft, weapons storage area and production facility . . . is not good enough. . . . Not much is required to deter. What political-military objective is worth risking Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, and Tomsk?"[12] Waltz's theoretical construct, subsequently termed "proliferation optimism," has garnered a considerable following among academic specialists in international security.[13] If the optimists are correct, then the United States is likely to behave with extreme caution in regard to WMD-armed rogue states, even if their arsenals are small and not well developed.

Many scholars, however, have criticized Waltz's discussion of nuclear deterrence for small nuclear powers as oversimplified. Joseph Nye, for example, writes, "The country that expects to create stable deterrence in a region by introducing nuclear weapons may have to pass through a dangerous 'valley of vulnerability.'"[14] Peter Feaver, a leading contemporary "proliferation pessimist" concludes, "The enemies of the proliferators . . . will face tremendous pressure to precipitate a war early in the development cycle so as to rid the region of the nuclear competitor before the arsenal is too far along."[15]

A second and much more recent theoretical debate relevant to this study concerns the role of norms in international relations.[16] Focusing on the development of WMD nonuse norms, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald assert, "[Norms] work because of conceptions of 'who we are'—certain kinds of peo-

[10] Jack Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence" in P. E. Tetlock, J. L. Husbands, R. Jervis, P. C. Stern, and C. Tilly, eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War: vol. i* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 291.

[11] Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: Norton, 1995), 19–20.

[12] Ibid., 22.

[13] A lengthy list of academic "proliferation optimists" can be found in Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Studies* 4 (Summer 1995): 717.

[14] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1988), 90.

[15] Peter D. Feaver, "Neoptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Studies* 6 (Summer 1997): 104. See also Sagan's "More Will Be Worse" in Waltz and Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 47–92.

[16] Norms are defined here as practices around which actors' expectations converge.

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ple just do or do not do certain things . . . they can be such a taken-for-granted part of the 'context' that they are not consciously considered at all."[17] According to Price and Tannenwald, "National leaders are forced to develop [alternatives to WMD] . . . or risk being classified as acting outside the bounds of civilized international society. 'Society' and not anarchy, is the source of permissive and constraining effects." The strongest case studies that Price and Tannenwald present, however, involve only U.S. and UK decision making, raising the question of whether such norms are truly universal.

Before attempting to apply the theoretical considerations presented above in the context of the Sino-Soviet crisis, let us review the facts in light of the availability after the cold war of new Russian and Chinese sources.

Blood on the Ice

One of a number of sore points that developed between the two communist giants during the late 1950s concerned the promised Soviet transfer of nuclear weapons to China.[18] The 1996 memoirs of former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister for the Far East M. S. Kapitsa shed some light on this development. Kapitsa claims to have written the original Soviet message that attempted to explain to the Chinese why the Soviets were reneging on this commitment. According to him, the Soviets were disturbed by Mao Zedong's willingness to see the United States use nuclear weapons against Fujian province during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, believing the Chinese to be "too irresponsible for the possession of the ultimate weapon."[19] Concerning the Chinese reaction, Kapitsa quotes PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi as swearing to the Soviet ambassador, "You have left us without pants, but we will build a bomb nevertheless."[20] PRC cold war historian Shen Zhihua downplays such traditional explanations for the Sino-Soviet split as Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" or the proposed joint fleet, emphasizing instead the role of Moscow's reversal on transferring nuclear weapons.[21] Fulfilling Chen's vow, the Chinese exploded an atomic bomb in 1964 and, impressively, a thermonuclear device just two years later. A. Elizavetin, a senior Soviet diplomat, writes in a 1992 essay, "Soviet military leaders watched attentively as . . . China succeeded in exploding an atomic device . . . aware of the fact that Chinese nuclear forces could already execute certain missions."[22]

[17] Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos" in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 150.

[18] A relatively recent treatment of the Sino-Soviet conflict is Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992). The most authoritative study of Russian nuclear aid to China is R. M. Timerbaev, *Rossiya I Yadernoe Nerasprostranenie* [Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).

[19] M. S. Kapitsa, *Na Raznykh Parrallelyakh—Zapisky Diplomata* (Moscow: Kniga I Bizness, 1996), 63.

[20] Ibid., 63.

[21] Shen Zhihua (Peking University), interview with author, Beijing, 16 July 2000.

[22] A. Elizavetin, "Peregovory Kosygina i Zhou Enlai v Pekinskom Aeroporte," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 5 (1992), 46.

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Victor Gobarev, a retired officer from Soviet military intelligence, observes in a recent survey of Sino-Soviet nuclear interaction: "The fact that the confrontation escalated in the year during which the Chinese conducted their first nuclear test was no coincidence."[23] Moscow's new enthusiasm for a nuclear test ban movement, which sought to exclude China from the nuclear club, gave rise to further anti-Soviet sentiment in Beijing.

Some Soviet leaders apparently hoped that Sino-Soviet relations would improve with Khrushchev's ouster. Thus, Kapitsa relates how Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky suffered diplomatic embarrassment in confiding to Zhou Enlai, "We got rid of our fool, you get rid of yours, and relations between our states will [return to] normal."[24] Unnerved by Mao's willingness to question the sanctity of the Sino-Soviet border, however, Leonid Brezhnev undertook the buildup of armed forces in Siberia, the Far East, and also Mongolia.[25] The start of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966 and then the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 raised Sino-Soviet border tensions to a new level.

Heavy fighting occurred on the Sino-Soviet border on 2 March and subsequently on 15 March 1969 in and around Damansky (Zhenbao) Island on the Ussuri River.[26] A certain degree of revisionism has emerged in Russian accounts of this fighting. For example, one recent press account is at pains to dispel Soviet propaganda from the period, which reported that Soviet border guards had easily repulsed the Chinese probes. Rather, this article paints a picture of near-paralyzing confusion on the Soviet side, of units committed piecemeal into the fray, and of humiliating losses.[27] Another recent article criticizes the political and military leadership for seeking to defend an island that was clearly much closer to the Chinese side of the river.[28] Nevertheless, it is striking that all contemporary Russian sources continue to maintain that the events of 2 March represented a Chinese ambush.

[23] Victor Gobarev, "Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949–1969," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12 (December 1999): 33. Gobarev's article deserves special attention from scholars working on the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969, because of his unique access to Soviet archives and oral histories. Gobarev also served in military intelligence in the Far East during the 1970s and 1980s and so was privy to the war planning process in this theater.

[24] Kapitsa, *Na Raznich Parallelyach*, 75–76.

[25] Even contemporary Chinese accounts appear willing to concede that Soviet militarization of the conflict followed Mao's inflammatory statements beginning in July 1963. See Li Danhui, "1969 Nian Zhong-Su Bianjie Chongtu: Yuanqi he Jieguo" [The Causes and Consequences of the Border Conflict Between China and the Soviet Union in 1969], *Dangdai Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu* (no. 3, 1996): 42.

[26] Casualty estimates for the 2 March clash are thirty-one Soviets and twenty Chinese killed. Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication* (London: Council on East Asian Studies—Harvard University, 1980), 97; Neville Maxwell, "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao," *China Quarterly* 56 (October/December 1973): 735.

[27] Nikolai Lobodyuk, "Za Tumanami Damanskogo," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 26 March 1999.

[28] Vladislav Anikeev, "Bole Damanskogo: Posleslovie k Grustnoy Date," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 30 March 1999.

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One might be tempted to attribute this uniformity of opinion among Russian contemporary narratives to a persistent nationalist viewpoint, except that a consensus among their PRC counterparts is apparently inclined to agree. According to cold war historian Li Danhui, "Already in 1968, China began preparations to create a small war on the border."[29] She observes that on at least two separate occasions prior to March 1969, Chinese border troops tried to provoke a similar incident, "but the Soviets, feeling weak, did not accept the Chinese challenge and retreated." Another PRC cold war historian, Yang Kuisong, seconds this analysis, explaining, "There were already significant preparations in 1968, but the Russians did not come, so the planned ambush was not successful."[30] By contrast, Yang notes, "The attack of March 1969 was completely successful, because the Russians were not at all prepared." Jiang Yi, a PRC specialist on Sino-Russian relations, also maintains, "It is clear that Chinese leaders intentionally orchestrated this conflict. [Mao] did not want a war, but he did want a large-scale clash. . . . Soviet troops were completely unready."[31]

Regarding the larger clash on 15 March, Russian historian and sinologist Victor Usov relates details from an interview with Col. Alexander Konstantinov, a participant in the battle.[32] According to this account, the Soviet commander during the battle, who was killed in the action, had great difficulty securing help from regular army forces in the region and receiving orders, because the defense minister was abroad and Brezhnev was on a train to Hungary. The Soviet commander was apparently forbidden to violate the Chinese border. Therefore, he was forced to send his tanks and armored vehicles straight across the ice and directly into enemy fire, rather than presumably bringing them around the flank, and losses were taken. Only in the afternoon, when communication was established with Brezhnev, were regular army units thrown into the fray, beginning with a massive rocket and artillery attack that began around 1 P.M.[33] Various sources agree that this was the first battlefield use of the *GRAD* surface-to-surface tactical missile. According to a Soviet eyewitness account: "It was like a crematorium—several hundred Chinese died in the flames."[34]

[29] Li Danhui (Peking University), interview with author, Beijing, 16 July 2000. On Chinese motives, see Lyle Goldstein, "Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters," *China Quarterly* 68 (December 2001): 985–987.

[30] Yang Kuisong (Institute of Modern History–Beijing), interview with author, Beijing, 19 July 2000.

[31] Jiang Yi (Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies–Beijing), interview with author, Beijing, 20 July 2000. Some Western accounts continue to view the Soviets as the aggressors. For example, see Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), 87–88; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 722; Maxwell, "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao," 730–739. Many Western scholars did, however, conclude that the Chinese were the aggressors. See, for example, Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 102; and Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China* (Santa Monica: Rand R-2943-AF, August 1982), 32.

[32] Victor Usov, "Tragediya na Ussuri," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 3 (1994), 86.

[33] Ibid., 89.

[34] Andrei Vladimirov, "Bolshaya Voina za Malenky Ostrov," *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 10 March 1999, 13. Estimates of casualties (including wounded) during the second engagement are about 50–60 on the

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It should be noted that on 8 March, the Soviets made the first nuclear threat of the crisis with an article in the military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda.*[35] However, conciliatory gestures followed the 15 March clash, including Alexei Kosygin's 21 March telephone appeal to the Chinese leadership (which was rebuffed by the Chinese), and the Soviet note of 29 March, which according to Elizavetin, demonstrated to the Chinese that the Soviet side wanted to avoid escalation.[36]

April and May witnessed sporadic fighting but of lower intensity. Brezhnev made a number of ominous statements at a June conference of world communist parties in Moscow, portraying China as a threat to international security: "Peking's combining of political adventurism with the atmosphere of sustained war hysteria introduced new elements into the international situation, elements which we have no right to ignore."[37] Melting ice may have decreased tensions slightly on the river borders of the northeast (though incidents with casualties continued), but clashes began to erupt along the Sino-Soviet border in Central Asia.

The crisis reached new heights between August and October, with the Soviets directing ominous threats to the Chinese through a number of conspicuous channels. Early in the month, the new commander of Soviet forces in the Far East, Col. General V. Tolubko, an officer who had made his career in the Strategic Rocket Forces, wrote an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* commemorating the success of Soviet troops in resisting Chinese incursions during the late 1920s. August 13 witnessed the most intense clash of arms since the battles of March, this time on the Xinjiang border. According to Kapitsa, Zhou and the Chinese leadership viewed this incident as extremely provocative, because the Chinese felt especially vulnerable in this region. In the September negotiations with Kosygin, Zhou is said to have noted, "You surrounded a Chinese formation with tanks and destroyed 20 soldiers. . . . The Soviet side has gone a long way down [the] path [of war]."[38]

There were a number of indications in late August that the Soviets were contemplating striking Chinese nuclear facilities. First, a mid-level Soviet diplomat in Washington, DC asked an American diplomat on 13 August how the Americans would react to a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Second, the CIA director announced to journalists on 27 August that the Soviets appeared to be sounding out East European officials on the subject of a Soviet preventive attack on China. Third, American intelligence detected prepara-

Soviet side and as many 800 on the Chinese side. Thomas Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers" in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., *Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Part 2* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 261.

[35] Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 105–06.

[36] Elizavetin, "Peregovory," 50.

[37] Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 149.

[38] Kapitsa, *Na Raznich Parellelyach*, 86.

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tions consistent with a preventive strike at Soviet air bases in Siberia and the Far East during late August.[39] Finally, a *Pravda* editorial of 28 August made the first explicit reference to the challenge posed by Chinese nuclear weapons: "Chinese arsenals [are] being filled with ever more new weapons . . . a war would involve lethal weapons and modern delivery systems. . . ."[40] On 5 September, the United States conveyed a warning to the Soviets that "We could not fail to be deeply concerned" by any escalation of the crisis.

Emergency negotiations between Zhou and Kosygin took place on 11 September at Beijing's airport. Since the best Western surveys of the crisis give only sparse details of this important meeting, this article will review in some detail the narrative presented in the Elizavetin article.[41] He neatly divides his description into the accounts agreed upon by both sides—the Soviet version and the Chinese version.

Elizavetin claims both Soviet and Chinese versions agree that Zhou addressed the question of a Soviet preventive strike from the outset of the meeting, seeking a pledge of restraint from Kosygin himself. They also apparently agree that Zhou went to great lengths to explain that China had no aggressive intentions or potential—especially given the Cultural Revolution and that its nuclear program did not threaten the USSR. Therefore, the Soviets had no pretext for preventive war.[42] Elizavetin then elaborates those elements of the Soviet version that are missing from the Chinese version of the meeting: Kosygin reportedly emphasized that the Soviet Union had no plans for war against China and did not believe that China was preparing for war. This version claims Zhou made two references to absolute Soviet superiority in the air. Kosygin also apparently asserted that the United States wanted to see a Sino-Soviet war, and Zhou is said to have agreed with this formulation.

Finally, Elizavetin spells out a Chinese perspective on the negotiations. The Chinese apparently maintain that Zhou said party disagreements should not interfere with good government relations and that China had plenty of resources and therefore did not seek territorial aggrandizement. Somewhat surprisingly, Zhou, according to this version, conceded that China was incapable of fighting a nuclear war because of the weakness of its arsenal. Elizavetin writes that Zhou "especially emphasized that in the event of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear bases, his nation would consider itself to be in a war 'to the end' with the USSR." According to this version, Zhou also asserted, "Even in the event of the technical realization of this preventive strike, that the USSR would create for itself colossal political problems for the decades ahead."[43] This view of the critical part of the negotiation is buttressed by the testimony of Li Jingjie, director of Beijing's Institute of East European, Russian, and Central

[39] Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), 183–84.
[40] Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 190.
[41] Ibid.; Gelman, *Soviet Far East Buildup.*
[42] Elizavetin, "Peregovory," 55.
[43] Ibid., 56.

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Asian Studies. Li explains, "Zhou threatened Kosygin . . . 'you can destroy my nuclear bases [but] I can still launch a [conventional] attack and weaken the Soviet Union.'" According to Li, Zhou's reference point was the long war of resistance against Japan.[44]

Tentative and ambiguous agreements reached by the two leaders in Beijing seemed to have played some role in diffusing the crisis. Kapitsa, for example, claims that following the meeting, orders were immediately transmitted to Soviet military units to hold their fire in confrontations and cease all violations of the border, on land and in the air.[45] The weakness of the "understanding," however, was illustrated by tensions that continued for more than a decade.

Moscow's Plan for a Splendid First Strike

It is plausible that the Soviets never entertained the possibility of striking at China's nuclear facilities, but rather orchestrated the rumors as part of an elaborate sham aimed at coercing the Chinese.[46] Recall that Kosygin apparently reassured Zhou during the September 1969 airport meeting that the Soviet Union "had no plans for war against China." However, it is quite probable that the Soviet envoy was merely engaged in diplomatic pleasantries. There are strong deductive reasons why such a strike would be considered, including Mao's stated radical views on nuclear weapons, the traditional vulnerability of the Soviet Far East, and the shocking nature of the Chinese attack on Damansky. Moreover, post-cold war testimony by Russian experts also suggests that the Soviets did seriously consider such a preventive blow.

There is substantial reason to believe that Moscow's extensive experience with Mao's paper tiger philosophy concerning nuclear weapons may have exaggerated Soviet concerns. Khrushchev's disagreements with Mao about the potential use of nuclear weapons are well known. I have already cited Kapitsa's belief that the Chinese were irresponsible in their discussions about nuclear weapons during the 1950s. Ilya Gaiduk, a Russian historian of the cold war in Asia, explains Soviet perceptions during this period: "Considering the on-going Cultural Revolution, Moscow feared that China was becoming more and more unpredictable, and thus it was impossible to say how they would behave with the atomic bomb."[47]

[44] Li Jingjie (Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies–Beijing), interview with author, Beijing, 17 July 2000.

[45] Kapitsa, *Na Raznich Parellelyach*, 92.

[46] This is the position, for example, taken by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky in *The KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 494. One reason for regarding this conclusion with skepticism concerns whether or not states, and in particular nuclear-armed superpowers, have the freedom to bluff. Formerly classified U.S. documents reveal that American nuclear warnings during the 1950s were consistently not bluffs. See Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1986), 37–40, 56–57, 70.

[47] Ilya Gaiduk (Institute of General History–Moscow), interview with author, Moscow, 20 March 2000. Gaiduk is author of *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1996).

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Such fears were likely compounded by an awareness of the traditionally precarious vulnerability of Russia's Far Eastern possessions. This awareness springs from Russia's great humiliation in the Russo-Japanese war, when the region's isolation from Russia's European base of power became painfully clear. These lessons were reinforced by the Allied occupation of Vladivostok during the Russian Civil War. Successes against the Japanese in the region just prior to World War II depended to a very large extent on whether or not the European flank (always the priority) was secure. This part of Russia in not only remote and relatively underpopulated, but the major cities from Novosibirsk to Vladivostok lie strung out from west to east along the Trans-Siberian railroad, which runs next to the Chinese border. The Soviets would have been hard pressed to develop a strategy for protecting such a vulnerable supply line from an enemy that possessed vast superiority in numbers.

Finally and most importantly, such fears were exaggerated by the shocking nature of the Chinese challenge, which it is now clear from the testimony of a number of PRC specialists, came in the form of an ambush. Recall that cold war historians Yang and Li confirm the premeditated nature of the Chinese attack and that Chinese Sovietologists like Jiang note, "Soviet troops were completely unready."[48] Li even describes the Soviet leadership's reaction as *mudeng koudai*, literally "eyes wide, mouth gaping" or dumbstruck.[49] Russian scholars concur: for example, Gobarev observes, "Senior Soviet leaders were caught off guard as much as Stalin had been by the Germans in 1941."[50] Valentin Karymov, a sinologist who served on the staff of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee recalled, "Damansky was a very dangerous precedent. . . . Nothing like this had ever occurred in the US-Soviet rivalry . . . they attacked the island and killed our soldiers. . . ."[51] Likewise, Lev Deluisin, another sinologist with access to ranking Soviet diplomatic and military officials, describes the mood in Moscow following the initial attack: "There was a kind of terror. . . . Among the leadership, there was a feeling that the Chinese would return to the attack."[52] Moreover, a study of German Democratic Republic documents from this period yields the conclusion that "the Soviets were nothing less than stunned" by the Chinese attack.[53] Thus, Rand analyst Harry Gelman was correct in concluding, "Much of the alarm in 1969 that seemed to some Soviets in later years to have been exaggerated and unnecessary derived from this sense of dangerous uncertainty; if Chinese behavior was open-ended, then anything was possible."[54]

[48] Li Danhui, Yang Kuisong, and Jiang Yi, interviews with author, Beijing, 16–20 July 2000.

[49] Li Danhui, "1969 Nian Zhong-Su," *Dangday Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu*, 47.

[50] Gobarev, "Soviet Policy Toward China," 43.

[51] Valentin Karymov, interview with author, Moscow, 30 May 2000.

[52] Lev Deluisin (Institute of Oriental Studies–Moscow), interview with author, Moscow, 14 March 2000.

[53] Christian Ostermann, "East German Documents on the Border Conflict, 1969" on the website of the *Cold War International History Project*, at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/snarchive/, accessed spring 1998. It can be argued that the GDR documents only reflect the propaganda efforts of the Soviet regime, and so shed little additional light on Soviet perceptions.

[54] Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup*, 33.

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The prospect of Chinese nuclear weapons changing the balance of power, the historical vulnerability of the Soviet eastern flank, and the shocking nature of the Chinese attack on Damansky appear to have set in motion serious consideration of options for preventive war. The most explicit account of decision making during the crisis comes from Arkady Shevchenko, a high ranking Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978:

> The events at Damansky had the effect of an electric shock on Moscow. The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory which China claimed. . . . From others I heard that the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China. A [Foreign] Ministry colleague who had been present at the Politburo discussion told me that Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Defense Minister, advocated a plan to "once and for all get rid of the Chinese threat." He called for unrestricted use of multi-megaton bombs. . . . Fortunately, not many military men shared Grechko's mad, bellicose stance. . . . I talked with one of Grechko's colleagues, [General] Nikolai Ogarkov . . . [who] took a more realist view of the prospect of war with China . . . [He proposed] the alternative . . . to use a limited number of nuclear weapons in a kind of "surgical operation" to intimidate the Chinese and destroy their nuclear facilities. . . . Disagreements about bombing China stalemated the Politburo . . . for several months.[55]

While Shevchenko's status as a defector may call into question his credibility, Russian specialists close to the Brezhnev leadership concede that such plans were most likely developed and considered. Thus, Karymov testifies, "Every kind of contingency plan was considered, including preventive strikes and limited attacks."[56] Anatoly Bolyatko, a retired general in the Strategic Rocket Forces and specialist in Asian security, explains, "All variants of plans are fully developed. . . . Knowing Grechko personally, I can say that it is conceivable that he favored a full strike."[57] Confronted with Shevchenko's testimony, Deluisin made no denial: "Discussions occurred about whether to carry out a preventive strike against all of China's nuclear complexes so as to resolve the problem . . . fortunately, the government rejected these options, but these opinions were expressed." Moreover, according to Deluisin, these were not simply the opinions of military planners. He adds, "Among [various] civilian diplomats, there was the opinion that while we have the power, we should use it."[58]

[55] Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 165. Shevchenko's testimony must be treated with particular caution, given that he defected to the United States during the early 1980s. One could speculate, for example, that he had an incentive to exaggerate Moscow's dire intentions in order to increase interest in his book or to ingratiate himself with the U.S. government.

[56] Valentin Karymov, interview with author, Moscow, 30 May 2000. On Soviet training exercises for this operation, see Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), 209.

[57] Gen. Anatoly Bolyatko (ret.) (Institute of the Far East–Moscow), interview with author, Moscow, 31 May 2000.

[58] Lev Deluisin, interview with author, Moscow, 14 March 2000.

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New research by Victor Gobarev, an ex-Soviet military officer, suggests that the main thrust of Russian military preparations was in the direction of delivering a conventional preemptive blow rather than a nuclear first strike. According to Gobarev, such plans were developed and approved by the chief of staff and the defense minister. He asserts, "The Russian military was very concerned in case China was losing the war . . . that Mao and his group of leaders would approve the use of several atomic bombs."[59] As to whether such a Soviet strike, executed with missiles and bombers, would be sufficient to entirely destroy the Chinese arsenal, Gobarev claims: "According to my own estimates and those of the General Staff, [such a preemptive strike] surely could have succeeded. . . . The major role here was played by Russian military intelligence. . . . They knew all too well where [the Chinese nuclear weapons and facilities] were."[60]

As archives remain closed for the indefinite future, we will not have definitive proof that the Soviets seriously contemplated a strike against China. Some experts continue to doubt this proposition. Nevertheless, the recent testimony of Karymov and Deluisin, and the research by Gobarev, all buttress the older testimony of Shevchenko. Moreover, this testimony suggests that these plans to strike the Chinese nuclear arsenal did not simply lie in an obscure drawer of an obscure office in the Soviet Ministry of Defense, but rather were considered by senior military and even civilian officials. Given such persistent, if admittedly tentative, evidence that such options were likely explored, we may then proceed to an analysis of why such drastic options were not implemented.

Why the Soviets Did Not Strike

Norms

A first possible explanation for Soviet decision making holds that Soviet leaders were constrained by norms. As noted previously, Price and Tannenwald theorize that a "taboo" has formed around the use of nuclear weapons, so that the first use of such weapons is not even an option among leaders who consider themselves "civilized." Absent in their work is empirical evidence on Soviet views of nuclear weapons. Their conclusion that Soviet nonuse of nuclear weapons in the Afghan War demonstrates the universality of nonuse norms is not very persuasive.[61] The 1969 crisis is a much more important case to consider. Some observers have cited the attitudes of Soviet leaders, the Soviet people, or world opinion as a restraint on the use of nuclear weapons against China. Harrison Salisbury wrote at the time of the crisis: "No Russian government could face such a possibility; the prospect would bring the Soviet people up in arms against Moscow."[62]

[59] Col. Victor Gobarev (ret.), interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 1999.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," 149.
[62] Harrison Salisbury, *War Between China and Russia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 172.

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It seems clear that Soviet leaders sought to distance their own views on nuclear weapons from the "irresponsible" views of Mao. But this differentiation had a certain propaganda value that should naturally make us suspicious. More tangibly, Gobarev's research offers some support for the role of nonuse norms in the 1969 crisis. In his recent article, he observes that Brezhnev and other senior Soviet leaders were committed to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons.[63] Pressed on this point, he asserts that this conclusion is based on his review of Soviet war plans and also oral histories and explains: "I understand that you in the United States look at these things differently. . . . Despite being 'animals,' [Soviet leaders] always rejected first use."[64] Pavel Podvig, a Russian expert on nuclear weapons, offers further evidence for norms. According to him, Soviet leaders during the late 1960s were faced with a choice between developing a MIRV for the existing SS-11 missile or designing a new missile to fit into new specially hardened silos. Either solution would have improved deterrence, but the ultimate decision to focus on hardening silos and associated missile designs indicates that the Soviets wanted the option of riding out a first strike. They were seeking to move away from a first strike or "launch on warning" posture. Increased interest in early warning and limited missile defenses illustrates that at this time "everything was moving in [the] direction [of no first-use]."[65]

This evidence, however, is rather fragile. General Anatoly Bolyatko, who served out his entire career in the Strategic Rocket Forces, is skeptical of the importance of no-first-use (NFU) norms. He explains, "The NFU policy is declaratory politics . . . countries do what is needed. . . . Now, we have a more honest policy."[66] We should treat this statement, however, with caution, made as it was in the context of a defense of contemporary Russian nuclear doctrine. It is not clear whether this is a definitive judgment on the policy's history. Moreover, Gobarev's finding that the option of a conventional strike was fully developed is consistent with a recognition that norms were a constraint on Soviet leaders.[67] Both Podvig and Raymond Garthoff conclude that the Soviets would have employed conventional weapons instead of nuclear weapons to strike Chinese nuclear facilities, if it were feasible.[68] Difficult as it is to prove the role of norms, we can acknowledge based on the above testimony that nonuse norms likely did play some role in the crisis of 1969.

[63] Gobarev, "Soviet Policy Toward China," 40, n. 22.

[64] Victor Gobarev, interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 1999.

[65] Pavel Podvig (Center for Arms Control Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology), interview with author, Moscow, 14 March 2000. Also see his *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.)

[66] Anatoly Bolyatko, interview with author, Moscow, 31 May 2000.

[67] Development of conventional options could conceivably be driven by motives other than norms. But this would have been a problematic method, for example, of reducing risk, because of the so-called use'm or lose'm problem.

[68] Pavel Podvig, interview with author, Moscow, 14 March 2000; Raymond Garthoff, interview with author, Washington, DC, 7 January 2000.

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TABLE 1

Chinese Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, 1969–1973

Year	*ICBM*	*MRBM*	*IRBM*	*SLBM*	*Il-28*	*Tu-16*	*Total*
1969–1970	0	0	0	0	150	0	150
1970–1971	0	0	0	0	150	10–20	160–170
1971–1972	0	c.20	0	0	150	c.30	200
1972–1973	0	20–30	15–20	0	200	c.100	335–350

Source: Thomas Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union," *Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15, The People's Republic Part 2: Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution 1966–1982* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 300.

Minimal Deterrence

In the discussion of theory that began this article, we noted Waltz's controversial contention that small arsenals would induce caution and would not invite preventive attack. Are Waltz and the so-called proliferation optimists justified in using the Sino-Soviet case as an example of a situation where the mere possession of nuclear weapons by both sides prevented the outbreak of war?

With the test of an atomic device in 1964 and a thermonuclear device two years later, the Chinese had developed some form of deterrent, but the achievement was incomplete without demonstrating survivable systems for delivery. John Lewis and Xue Litai provide some details about Chinese missile capabilities. The DF-2 with a range of 1450 km was flight tested with a live 20 kiloton warhead in the fall of 1966. According to their data, the DF-3, with a range of 2,800 km, first flew successfully in December of that year.[69] While the latter system certainly was not yet deployed in 1969, the status of the DF-2 during this crisis remains unclear.[70] The estimates presented in the *Cambridge History of China*, for example, place China's first deployments of nuclear-tipped missiles in 1971–1972. (See Table 1.) Even if some DF-2's were deployed, their liquid

[69] John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 212–13.

[70] Charles Murphy asserts that such deployments occurred in the summer of 1970 and not before, because China lacked a suitable thermonuclear warhead. Charles H. Murphy, "Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 28 (January 1972): 31. Gelman says that the DF-3 was certainly not deployed. Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup*, 43. See also Sagan in Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 71. The *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, however, gives the Chinese 20 DF-2's in 1969. Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Weapons Databook: Vol. V–British, French and Chinese Nuclear Forces* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 359. According to Lewis and Xue, DF-2s were first deployed in 1966, but they were sited in Northeast China to target U.S. bases in Japan. They do note redeployments to cope with the Soviet threat, but not before 1971. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 212–213. A subsequent study by John Lewis and Hua Di reports that the DF-2 "entered the arsenal" in September 1966, but still lacked its nuclear warhead. John Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," *International Security* 17 (Fall 1992): 15.

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fuel ensured cumbersome and time-consuming preparation."[71] The Chinese may have possessed twenty-four nuclear-capable medium-range bombers, though many were considered obsolete.[72] Chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution seems to have slowed progress in China's strategic weapons program during this period.[73] Given that the Chinese launched their first satellite only in 1970, one would have to appraise Chinese early-warning and command-and-control capabilities as primitive during the 1969 crisis.

The CIA appears to have taken a stand close to the proliferation optimists during the crisis, arguing that "There was a low probability that the Soviet Union would attack China's nuclear weapons complex because Soviet forces could not preclude the possibility that China would be able to hide a sufficient number of [nuclear] weapons. . . ."[74] However, the tenuous nature of the CIA's analysis becomes clear when their original estimate of the chance of a Soviet assault at 10 percent, based on their proliferation optimism, was upgraded to 50 percent during August 1969.[75] The strongest single piece of evidence for proliferation optimism in the 1969 crisis emerges from journalist Patrick Tyler's recent discussion of the crisis. He asserts that Mao dared not only to carry out a thermonuclear test during the crisis, but additionally notes that "Two [nuclear] tests were conducted within six days of each other. China had never conducted two nuclear tests in such rapid succession, and Mao's act carried an unmistakable political message for the Soviet divisions massed across the border."[76]

[71] Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Weapons Databook: Vol. 5*, 359, 366–68; Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," 22.

[72] Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup*, 43. During the June 1967 test of an air-dropped hydrogen bomb, "The pilot found it difficult to operate the aircraft normally," suggesting that this aircraft was not optimal for the mission. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 206.

[73] Ibid., 201–205. See, for example, Chen Xiaodong, *Shen Huo Zhi Guang* [The Lustre of the Magic Fire] (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dang Xiao Chubanshe, 1995), 185–188.

[74] Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 434–35, n. 42. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Gen. Daniel O. Graham, by contrast, held that a Soviet attack "was imminent."

[75] Ibid., 68. Tyler gathered this information from interviews with former CIA officials. Few strategists have concurred with the proliferation optimist's interpretation of the 1969 crisis. In the scholarly literature, only Harvey Nelsen expressed confidence in the survivability of Chinese missiles. See Harvey Nelsen, "Continuity and Change in Chinese Strategic Deterrence" in June T. Dreyer and Ipyong J. Kim, eds., *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 257. Nelsen rightly identifies Soviet satellite imaging technology as a crucial factor in the crisis. Soviet weakness in this area may explain the large number of overflights apparently conducted by the Soviets over the summer of 1969. However, it is important to note that neither Waltz nor Nelsen examined the crisis in 1969 specifically, but rather were generalizing about Chinese prospects during the 1970s as a whole, and, therefore, their appraisals should be treated with caution.

[76] Tyler, *A Great Wall*, 73. Tyler's interpretation of the accelerated testing schedule as Chinese crisis diplomacy is not definitive. Examining the history of Chinese nuclear testing, one notes that the last Chinese test had occurred in December 1968, indicating that a "normal" testing schedule would have called for at least one test in late 1969. Moreover, the year that witnessed the greatest frequency in Chinese nuclear tests, four in 1976 (including three in three months), does not correlate with any particular political-military crisis. For a schedule of Chinese nuclear testing to 1978, see Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 244–45.

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Despite the increased pace of Chinese testing during the crisis, a consensus among American, Russian, and Chinese scholars and strategists is deeply skeptical of the proliferation optimist interpretation—that is, of the conflict-mitigating effects of China's nuclear weapons. The weaknesses in China's nuclear weapons program were all too apparent. Two American scholars appraising the crisis, for example, concluded, "The PRC [lacked] a delivery system for nuclear warheads and [remained] highly vulnerable to preemptive attacks by either the US or the Soviet Union."[77] Edward Luttwak concluded in 1982, "In the West there has been intermittent talk of a supposed 'point of no return' in regard to Soviet military action against the PRC—or rather against its nuclear arsenal. In fact there was no such time in the past, though there may be one in the future."[78] On the significance of China's bomber force, two more analysts asked in the same volume: "Could a significant number of the surviving Chinese bombers . . . penetrate the most sophisticated electronic warfare and air defense system in the world?"[79] Cold war historian Raymond Garthoff, looking back on the crisis, observes, "[The Soviets] had the feeling that they could deal with the very small Chinese [arsenal]."[80]

Naturally, Soviet (and Russian) views on China's nuclear potential are more important than American appraisals.[81] Available evidence seems to confirm American opinions, however. Neither Shevchenko, Kapitsa, nor Elizavetin mention Chinese nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the crisis. Consistent with the valley of vulnerability hypothesis, Shevchenko does not even broach the question of Chinese nuclear potential, except in closing his narrative: "[The crisis] was no joke to the Soviet leadership. The Chinese nuclear arsenal was growing. . . ."[82] Elizavetin offers some insight into Soviet military thinking: "Soviet military analysts definitely did not overestimate the capability and ambitions for China's atomic weapons. A number of these analysts believed that China was completely incapable of mounting a retaliatory blow, that her existing forces were too vulnerable."[83] Another of Elizavetin's observations is worth emphasizing here. He notes: "The Soviet military leadership was at this time extremely well-acquainted with the capabilities of the Chinese armed forces, because . . . they were built with their indispensable participation."[84] Soviet ad-

[77] Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics and Strategy of Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1980), 201; Similar viewpoints include Gelman, *Soviet Risk Taking*, 43; and Murphy, "Mainland China's Evolving . . ." 34.

[78] Edward Luttwak, "The PRC in Soviet Grand Strategy" in Douglas Stuart and William Tow, eds., *China, the Soviet Union and the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), 267.

[79] Green and Yost, "Soviet Military Options Regarding China" in ibid., 138.

[80] Raymond Garthoff, interview with author, Washington, DC, 7 January 2000.

[81] American analyses may be biased by the habit of maintaining extremely conservative requirement for "assured destruction." See Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies–Adelphi Papers 106–7, 1974), 2.

[82] Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow*, 166.

[83] Elizavetin, "Peregovory," 46.

[84] Ibid., 46.

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visers had familiarity with the most intricate details of the key elements in China's nuclear weapons infrastructure.[85] In addition, these key elements, such as the Lanzhou gas diffusion plant or the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Design Academy in Qinghai province, were all sited, with the American threat in mind, in China's remote northwest. These facilities lay perilously close to the Soviet border.

Research conducted during the 1980s reveals that the Soviets continued to discount Chinese nuclear capabilities, even more than a decade after the 1969 crisis. For example, one Soviet military strategist offered, "We don't have to fear China's nuclear capability until the end of the century."[86] While statements from the 1980s could perhaps be interpreted as cold war bravado, post-cold war appraisals come to similar conclusions, at least regarding 1969. Thus, one of Moscow's preeminent experts on Chinese nuclear forces emphasizes that "substantial" Chinese strategic rocket forces were only created in 1974. Before that, even the Chinese admitted that their program represented a paper tiger.[87] Likewise, Vitaly Shlykov, a former colonel in military intelligence who oversaw intelligence estimates during the 1970s, recollected, "I do not think that we feared China's nuclear potential during this period."[88] Alexei Voskressenski, a specialist on Sino-Russian relations, contends that in the Sino-Soviet context, nuclear weapons never came to play the deterrent role that they did in the European context.[89] Bolyatko explains, "The development of Chinese nuclear weapons was quite slow in this period—they did not have sufficient stocks of [nuclear] weapons."[90] Gobarev's research led him to the conclusion that Soviet intelligence possessed the requisite targeting information to carry out a disarming first strike.[91] Deluisin concludes, "[Nuclear] weapons may induce caution in some circumstances, but when they are in the hands of leaders who feel no responsibility, then they do not play a stabilizing, but rather a destabilizing role."[92]

Chinese specialists largely agree with the analyses of their Russian and American colleagues cited above. Shen Dingli, an expert on Chinese nuclear

[85] See Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 89, 97, 99, 115, 143.

[86] Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, *War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 27.

[87] V. Stefashin, "Evolyutsiya Voennoy Strategii Kitaya" [The Evolution of China's Military Strategy], *Voennaya Mysl* 3 (March 1994): 73.

[88] Col. Vitaly Shlykov (ret.) (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy–Moscow), interview with author, Moscow, 16 March 2000. Shlykov oversaw the development of annual reviews of foreign military strength during the early 1970s.

[89] Alexei Voskressenski (Moscow State Institute for International Relations), interview with author, Moscow, 20 March 2000. Among eleven Russian specialists interviewed, only Gaiduk approached the position of the proliferation optimists.

[90] Gen. Anatoly Bolyatko, interview with author, Moscow, 31 May 2000. Bolyatko sees the nuclear factor as one of several factors that deterred the Soviets, but ranked other factors, particularly demographic and poor prospects for conventional war, as much more decisive.

[91] Victor Gobarev, interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 2000.

[92] Lev Deluisin, interview with author, Moscow, 14 March 2000.

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forces, contends, "Since Russia was far advanced and China had just started, the relationship experienced a period of nuclear instability, in which Russia had incentive to attack . . . but after that period, China . . . paid more attention to accelerate its development of nuclear weapons."[93] Likewise, cold war historian Yang notes, "The Russians did not fear Chinese nuclear weapons. They knew where they were, and felt that it would be easy to knock them out in a first strike. Moreover, Chinese missiles were not advanced at that time. Without effective aircraft or missiles, the nuclear weapons could not be delivered. They didn't have the capability."[94] Sources suggest that intensive Chinese efforts aimed at establishing the survivability of its nuclear weapons systems began only during the 1970s.[95]

Recently declassified Chinese documents are revealing of substantial insecurities in this regard. Mao confided to a visitor just a few months prior to the Ussuri crisis, "Our country, in a sense, is still a non-nuclear power. With this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear country. If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons."[96] In addition, the secret report prepared for Mao by four marshals in September 1969 appears to view China's nuclear arsenal as a liability: ". . . our nuclear weapons are still under development. . . . A group of adventurers in the Soviet revisionist leadership want to seize this opportunity. . . ."[97] In tense negotiations with Kosygin at the Beijing airport in September 1969, Zhou apparently did not threaten a possible Chinese nuclear counterblow to a Soviet attack as the proliferation optimists might predict, but rather emphasized the likelihood that a Sino-Soviet war would be protracted.[98]

The case for a proliferation optimist interpretation of this crisis cannot be entirely dismissed, especially given the fact that archival materials remain inaccessible. But this new testimony by Russian sinologists, military, and intelli-

[93] Shen Dingli (Fudan University), interview with author, Shanghai, 27 July 2000.

[94] Yang Kuisong, interview with author, Beijing, 19 July 2000. Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui, and Li Jingjie all discounted any deterrent role for nuclear weapons in the 1969 crisis. Among Chinese specialists, only Jiang Yi inclined toward the proliferation optimist position. And even he said that the nuclear factor was minor. Jiang Yi, interview with author, Beijing, 20 July 2000.

[95] The concept of in-cave storage/preparation and out-cave erection/filling/firing was not approved by the Central Military Commission until 1978. Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," 24; Li Bin (Qinghua University–Beijing), interview with author, Beijing, 18 December 2000.

[96] "Conversation Between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill" in "*All Under Heaven is Great Chaos*"—*Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69* on the web site of *The Cold War International History Project* at http://www.cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/1...7f2a28525677c00686a69, 8.

[97] "Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian—to the CCP Central Committee, 'Our Views about the Current Situation,' 17 September 1969" in ibid., 25. The four marshals do make one rather cryptic reference to China's minimal deterrent, but apparently unsatisfied with this security, they conclude, "Even the use of nuclear weapons cannot conquer an unbending people. In the final analysis, the outcome of a war will be determined by the continuous fighting of the ground forces." Ibid., 21.

[98] Elizavetin, "Pregovory," 56.

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gence officials, in addition to Gobarev's research, offer extensive counterevidence to the idea that China's nuclear weapons attenuated the 1969 crisis. When added to the fact that emerging Chinese evidence also undercuts proliferation optimism, we have reason to doubt the applicability of Waltz's theorizing to this case.

People's War

A compelling explanation for the Soviet decision not to attack China in the 1969 crisis concerns China's unique characteristics that would make it a continuing and perhaps more dangerous threat in the wake of a Soviet attack. These unique characteristics include the country's large rural population, the Chinese people's thorough familiarity with adverse material conditions, and their widespread experience in the rigors of guerrilla warfare or people's war.

In Shevchenko's account of his conversations with Ogarkov, these factors are of decisive importance. According to Shevchenko's narrative, Ogarkov had discussed the possibility of a "surgical operation," as opposed to Grechko's all-out attack. Apparently, Ogarkov viewed the surgical strike as "too risky. A bomb or two would hardly annihilate a country like China, and the Chinese, with their vast population and deep knowledge of guerrilla warfare, would fight unrelentingly. The Soviet Union would be mired in an endless war. . . ."[99]

A Soviet military officer told researchers in 1981: "Neither the US, nor the Soviet Union studies the post-nuclear phase of a general war, [but] the Chinese are studying this, because among Chinese strategists, in closed circles, they think they can tolerate a large number of casualties."[100] Today, Russian strategists and sinologists emphasize the same factors in analyzing the 1969 crisis. General Bolyatko offers: "Nuclear weapons [only] have an important effect if you have concentrated kinds of targets . . . and when there's not so much space. . . . But the factor of numbers, . . . [the possibility of] partisan war . . . [this] was important."[101]

The Chinese seemed to realize that the possibility of a people's war was their strongest deterrent against a Soviet attack, and so they took every opportunity to advertise the salience of this factor. According to both Russian sources such as Kapitsa and Elizavetin, and Chinese authorities such as Li Jingjie, Zhou was at pains to make clear to Kosygin during their airport meeting that a Soviet attack would be treated by the Chinese as general war and that the Chinese would fight "to the end." More than simple bluster, these factors appear to have been paramount in Mao's strategic calculations at this time. A recently declassified version of Mao's speech to the Central Committee in late April 1969 reveals his focus on China's demographic advantage: "It is easy for us to fight an

[99] Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow*, 165.
[100] Garrett and Glaser, *War and Peace*, 28.
[101] Anatoly Bolyatko, interview with author, Moscow, 31 May 2000.

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invading enemy since he will fall into the people's encirclement. . . . In order to achieve victory, we must have more people."[102]

Contemporary Chinese specialists also emphasize the deterrent value of people's war in the 1969 crisis. Yang suggests, "Russia could not conquer China, it's simply too large, there is no way to solve such a strategic problem."[103] Li Danhui explains, "If there was such a war, it would have been like the Vietnam War for the United States . . . very difficult to win. It would have been a huge drain on resources and Russia would not have power left to exert in Europe."[104]

Limited nuclear strikes against China would neither have subdued the Chinese nor created conditions under which the countries could reach some accommodation. A conventional strike would offer only slightly less bleak prospects for advantageous war termination from the Soviet perspective for the same basic reason. Demographic, geographic, and historical factors form a potent explanation for Soviet caution.

America to the Rescue

American warnings to the Soviets late in the crisis raise the question of whether the position of the United States might have persuaded Soviet leaders against preventive war with China. The strategic "triangle" had begun to emerge during the crisis, but the opening of U.S.–Chinese contact came slowly and tentatively. When on a trip to Asia, President Richard Nixon announced his plan on 25 July for "Vietnamization," which called for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam. The plan was denounced by Beijing as a plot to "use Asians to fight Asians."[105] A Chinese statement of 5 August reviewing the Nixon trip referred to the American president as the "notorious god of war."[106] Nixon did not appear to take this insult personally, as, according to Kissinger, he was explaining to his National Security Council (NSC) only a week later that the United States had a stake in China. Kissinger describes the 14 August NSC meeting as follows: "The President startled his Cabinet colleagues by this revolutionary thesis . . . that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and that it was against our interests to let China be 'smashed' in a Sino-Soviet war."[107] Some have taken the U.S. warning of deep concern on 5 September as evidence that the United States, indicating its opposition to a preventive war,

[102] "Mao Zedong's Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP's Ninth Central Committee, 28 April 1969" on the web site of *The Cold War International History Project* at http://www.cwihp.si.edu/shihplib.nsf/1...7f2a28525677c0066a69, 16.

[103] Yang Kuisong, interview with author, Beijing, 19 July 2000.

[104] Li Danhui, interview with author, Beijing, 16 July 2000.

[105] Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 180–81.

[106] Ibid., 181.

[107] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 182.

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effectively vetoed Soviet plans.[108] For example, Shevchenko concludes, "Of the factors that dissuaded the Politburo from approving the attack upon China, the important one was undoubtedly the warning that the U.S. would rebuff it vigorously."[109]

Upon further examination, however, this argument does not appear to be very plausible. The weakest part of the argument is the notion that the United States would have joined China in a war against the Soviet Union. The United States would not have joined such a war for four reasons. First, the American people would have been opposed to the expenditure of blood or much treasure for the defense of one communist country against another. Second, frustrations with the Vietnam War were running high during 1969, causing leaders and public alike to lean against greater commitments in Asia. Third, the United States lacked the kind of conventional capabilities necessary to effect a major land war in Asia. Fourth, American leaders would have had little credibility in making nuclear threats against the USSR in this situation.

Henry Kissinger admits that direct U.S. involvement was beyond the realm of possibility. He writes, "A Soviet attack on China could not be ignored by us. . . . But a direct American challenge would not be supported by our public opinion and might even accelerate what we sought to prevent." Similarly, Peter Rodman, a member of Kissinger's staff at this time, recalls, "We had no contact with China, so the idea of coordinating military policy was out of the question. . . . The American public would have been completely mystified. . . . We'd [have made] a big fuss [but] intervening militarily would not have been feasible."[110] As regards the American nuclear deterrent, the Soviets must have been aware that if the alliance was wrangling over whether the Americans would sacrifice New York for Berlin, it was most unlikely to consider sacrificing (or even threatening to sacrifice) New York for the Chinese test center at Lop Nor.[111]

If the United States was extremely unlikely to intervene directly on behalf of the Chinese, there were, nevertheless, various indirect options. Certainly, stern U.S. criticism of Soviet actions would exact a political price, especially during a period in which Soviet leaders were seeking trade and technology ben-

[108] See for example Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism," 103; Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, "Proliferation and the Problem of War: Global and Regional Issues" in Brito, Intriligator, and Adele E. Wick, eds., *Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), 136; and recently, Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain and France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 107.

[109] Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow*, 166.

[110] Peter Rodman (Nixon Center), interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 1999.

[111] U.S. strategic forces do appear to have gone on alert during October 1969. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that this alert affected Soviet calculations. Tyler actually suggests that U.S. leaders were weighing the possibility of cooperating with a Soviet attack against China, hoping for Soviet cooperation with the Vietnam problem. Tyler, *A Great Wall*, 62, 67. It is also possible that the alert was completely unrelated to the Sino-Soviet crisis. See Bruce Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 180, 339.

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efits from détente. The possibility of aid to the Chinese was probably also a concern. But this kind of American aid would have taken time to establish supply networks and to familiarize the Chinese with American weapons or tactics. More persuasive is the argument that war with China would have so drained the USSR of military resources that it would lose its ability to effectively balance U.S. power.[112] It is likely that the United States did play a role in Soviet calculations. However, this role was of secondary importance in that direct U.S. intervention was never a significant possibility. America's role in the crisis has been overestimated.

Conventional Superiority

A final explanation holds that the Soviets were ready and willing to strike Chinese nuclear facilities if necessary, but because of their conventional superiority they could afford to wait and see how the situation developed. When the Chinese made concessions in October, the Soviets did not need to escalate further.

According to the most detailed data currently available, twenty-two Soviet divisions confronted forty-seven Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) divisions along the border in early 1969. (See Table 2.) Numbers for tanks, aircraft, and artillery are unavailable. Great Soviet technological advantages in each of these categories of weapons must be assumed. The question of logistics and supply, however, is an open one. The Trans-Siberian railroad would allow the Soviets to reinforce effectively and concentrate troops quickly at various points, while most Chinese units would be moving by foot.[113] On the other hand, the Chinese would clearly enjoy shorter lines of supply (except in Central Asia), and the Trans-Siberian railroad would have been extremely vulnerable to interdiction.

Most Western analyses give the Soviets an advantage, because of their technological edge and also the pernicious effects of the Cultural Revolution on the PLA.[114] Perception of such an advantage is reflected to some degree in Russian appraisals. Elizavetin relates: "The general level of ability in the Chinese army was not very high, in part because the leadership's focus on acquiring nuclear weapons necessarily took resources away from investment in armor, artillery, transport and communications, and thus drastically lowered the fighting potential of the Chinese army."[115]

Nevertheless, none of the available Russian sources stress that conventional superiority obviated the necessity of considering preventive war. Gobarev explains that the position taken by the KGB Main Intelligence Director-

[112] Jiang Yi, interview with author, Beijing, 20 July 2000. See also Luttwak, "PRC in Soviet Grand Strategy," *China, the Soviet Union, and the West*, 268.

[113] Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the March 1969 Clashes," *The American Political Science Review* 116 (December 1972): 1185.

[114] See, for example, Michael Pillsbury, "Future Sino-American Security Ties," *International Security* 1 (Spring 1977): 136. Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, 187.

[115] Elizavetin, "Peregovory," 46; Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 188.

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TABLE 2

Soviet and Chinese force dispositions, 1969–1976 (divisions)

Year	*Eastern Europe*	*European USSR*	*Central USSR*	*South USSR*	*Soviet Far East*
1968–69					22
1969–70	32	60	8	19	28
1970–71	31	60	8	21	37
1971–72	31	60	8	21	40
1972–73	31	60	8	21	44
1973–74	31	60	5	23	45
1974–75	31	63	5	23	45
1975–76	31	63	6	23	43

Year	*Fujian*	*Wuhan*	*Hainan*	*Southwest*	*Tibet*	*Northeast*	*Lanzhou*	*Xinjiang*	*Sino-Soviet border total*
1969–70	28	25	3	12	3	32	11	4	47
1970–71	28	25	3	12	3	32	11	4	47
1971–72	28	25	3	12	3	33	11	5	49
1972–73	25	17	3	12	8	40	15	10	65
1973–74	20	17	3	12	8	45	15	10	70
1974–75	25	17	3	12	6	50	15	8	73
1975–76	25	18	3	12	6	55	15	8	78

Source: Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union," 299. The crucial Soviet figure of twenty-two divisions for 1968–1969 includes fifteen divisions in the Soviet Far East and seven divisions in Central Asia. Data for China in 1968–1969 is not available. The important Chinese figure "Sino-Soviet border total" adds the Northeast, Lanzhou, and Xinjiang regions together.

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ate during the crisis was that "There was no adequate defense against a large scale Chinese land invasion other than the use of Soviet nuclear weapons."[116] The fifteen divisions defending the Soviet Far East in 1969 are also estimated to have been "understrength."[117] Gobarev, moreover, observes, "[Soviet] troop levels only reached the capacity needed to repulse the Chinese on a conventional level during the mid-1970s. In 1969, the Soviets were not ready. . . ."[118] Another Russian ex-military intelligence officer familiar with the Sino-Soviet military balance in this period confirms this conclusion.[119]

Chinese analysts also give China the edge in conventional forces during the 1969 crisis. Yang explains, "Because China has many more soldiers, it was felt that if they broke through that the Russians would not be able to rectify the situation."[120] Jiang Yi suggests, "[Mao] made very exact calculations that the USSR did not have adequate preparation, numbers, or experience to carry out a serious war with China."[121]

No consensus emerges on whether the Soviets controlled the lower rungs of the escalation ladder in 1969. However, the evidence offered by these new sources calls into question the orthodoxy of Soviet conventional superiority, which may explain why plans for preventive attack against China's nuclear weapons and infrastructure were so carefully studied.

Explaining the Axis of Evil

This article has aimed at a clearer understanding of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 in the hopes of contributing to the theoretical debate about the impact of WMD proliferation on international affairs. While archives remain closed precluding definitive conclusions at this point and for the foreseeable future, I have attempted to employ second-best sources: the testimony of both Russian and Chinese scholars and policy makers. After suggesting that Soviet leaders appear to have seriously considered a preventive strike against China's nuclear facilities, this article has investigated five hypotheses for explaining why the Soviets ultimately opted against such an attack.

The testimony presented here challenges the conventional explanation for Soviet restraint.[122] While the proliferation optimist explanation of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 cannot be ruled out entirely, available evidence suggests that scholars should be cautious about accepting the optimist interpretation

[116] Gobarev, "Soviet Policy Toward China," 28.

[117] Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union," 292.

[118] Victor Gobarev, interview with author, Washington, DC, 4 November 1999.

[119] Col. Vasily Shlykov (ret.), interview with author, Moscow, 16 March 2000. See also Luttwak, "The PRC in Soviet Grand Strategy," *China, the Soviet Union, and the West*, 268–69.

[120] Yang Kuisong, interview with author, Beijing, 19 July 2000.

[121] Jiang Yi, interview with author, Beijing, 20 July 2000.

[122] Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994): 85.

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that nuclear weapons restrained the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969. Recall that in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, scholars and policy makers on both sides tended to reify the role of nuclear weapons, hoping that nuclear balance could undergird cold war stability. In this case, however, both Russian and Chinese specialists deny that nuclear weapons played a stabilizing role in the crisis. Rather, the leading authorities in both countries—Russia's Lev Deluisin and Victor Gobarev, in addition to China's Li Danhui and Yang Kuisong—say that China's nascent nuclear arsenal was vulnerable and destabilizing. As with China's minimal nuclear deterrent, the role of the United States also appears to have been exaggerated. The United States had neither the capability nor the will to directly participate in such a conflict.

The evidence for a norms-based explanation is slender, but it remains plausible. In a situation where nuclear weapons appeared to offer the most efficient solution for destroying China's nuclear infrastructure, the suggestion that Soviet plans for a conventional attack reached the advanced planning stages may have significant theoretical meaning. One could hypothesize, based on this case, that proliferation may indeed spur conflict, but it is likely to follow the pattern of the Israeli attack on Osirak in 1981, that is to say, preventive attacks will likely be conventional because of norms that restrict nuclear first use. Regarding the impact of the conventional balance, the evidence remains indeterminate. However, there is sufficient evidence for Chinese strength to question the hypothesis that Soviet conventional superiority obviated the necessity for considering preventive war.

China's unique resilience to attack, established by its large, hardy rural population and extensive experience with prolonged guerrilla warfare, is the singularly most persuasive explanation. Thus, we recall how General Bolyatko asserts, "[War with China] would have been disastrous . . . the factor of numbers . . . [the prospect of] partisan war . . . that was important."[123] Gaiduk offers, "What good would it have done to strike China with its vast population and territory? . . . The Chinese did not even fear it."[124] Moreover, Kapitsa's, Elizavetin's, and Li Jinjie's descriptions of the Kosygin-Zhou negotiations suggest that China's most decisive card to play during the crisis was not China's nascent nuclear arsenal, but rather the threat to "fight to the end."

Despite presenting some tentative support for the strength of nonuse norms, the overall conclusion of this study is rather alarming. During the crisis of 1969, China does appear to have passed through an extremely volatile valley of vulnerability. For China, it was the second crossing of this dangerous valley: serious tensions with the United States developed over the Chinese nuclear weapons program during the early and mid-1960s.[125] Nor is China the only state to have made such a crossing.[126]

[123] Gen. Anatoly Bolyatko (ret.), interview with author, Moscow, 31 May 2000.

[124] Ilya Gaiduk, interview with author, Moscow, 20 March 2000.

[125] See Lyle Goldstein, "When China Was a Rogue State: The Impact of Chinese Nuclear Weapons on U.S.–China Relations in the 1960s," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12 (August 2003).

[126] While Iraq apparently failed to cross successfully, the Soviet Union in the early 1950s appears to have been in an analogous position to China in the 1960s. President Eisenhower seems to have

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This reevaluation of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 has been undertaken in the hopes of reaching a deeper understanding of potential conflict dynamics between asymmetric WMD powers. Consistent with the hypotheses of the proliferation pessimists, the evidence presented here suggests that states possessing small arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, but which lack China's peculiar strengths, have cause to fear.

From a purely structural standpoint (capabilities), the Soviet relationship with the "rogue" China of the 1960s is analogous to America's relationship with rogue proliferators today. Both sets of relationships are characterized by radical WMD asymmetries. But today's rogue proliferators are considerably weaker than China was in 1969, and the United States is also much stronger than was the Soviet Union in 1969. Thus, in present circumstances, the asymmetries are even more radical. The pattern of U.S. confrontation with rogue WMD proliferators during the 1990s appears to be the result of instability that is inherent to the structural condition of radical WMD asymmetry.

With reference to rogue proliferators, the present administration has argued that the "United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."[127] However, the underlying structural conditions of this new environment were aptly described in the early 1990s by a senior Defense Department official of the Clinton administration: "The United States now needs to take a fresh look at the feasibility and desirability of both the preventive war and preemption options against new nuclear weapon states. Their nuclear programs or arsenals will certainly be smaller than those of the former Soviet Union. . . . They may be more vulnerable to attack."[128]

Observers watching simultaneous proliferation crises unfold in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula have perhaps been too hasty in suggesting that Pyongyang's alleged nascent nuclear capability explains the Administration's softer approach to that problem. A variety of factors restrain current U.S. action against North Korea, but surely the best explanation is tactical: no country would choose to fight two wars at the same time. When the Persian Gulf is quiet, Pyongyang's day of reckoning may well have come. The President's "axis of evil" doctrine illustrates that the U.S. is willing to bear substantial risks in order to neutralize the threat posed by rogue proliferators.*

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seriously considered preventive war against the USSR during 1953–1954. See Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 139–40.

[127] The National Security Strategy of the United States," September 2002, available on the website of the White House at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html, accessed on 18 December 2002.

[128] Michele A. Flournoy, "Implications for U.S. Military Strategy" in Robert Blackwell and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 135–61.

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

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

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

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Engagement, Containment, and the International Politics of Eurasia

DAVID W. RIVERA

Notwithstanding the end of the cold war, Russia continued to occupy a prominent place in some of the most divisive debates in American foreign policy in the 1990s and promises to do so in this decade as well. One of these debates concerns the impact of Western economic advice and aid to Russia. While some have blamed Russia's poor economic performance and rampant corruption on the economic prescriptions of the "Washington consensus" and American support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin against his domestic rivals, others have attributed Russia's problems to Moscow's half-hearted implementation of the reform program recommended by Western governments and international organizations. The debate over expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that raged in the mid-1990s also centered on Russia. While many advocates of expansion raised the prospect of resurgent Russian imperialism in the future, opponents universally stressed the reality of Moscow's hostile reaction in the present. One round of NATO expansion is complete, yet two even more momentous decisions remain: whether to expand the alliance to include one or more of the non-Russian former Soviet republics, as is strongly advocated by the Bush administration, and whether to invite Russia itself to become a member, as was advocated by Bill Clinton during his final presidential trip to Europe and has been raised as a possibility by President Bush as well.[1] Finally, the most basic debate among American policy makers is whether to give priority to cultivating relations with Russia—in effect, a con-

[1] Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton Urges United Europe to Include Russia," *New York Times*, 3 June 2000; and "Bush's Vision: 'We Will Not Trade Away the Fate of Free European Peoples,'" *New York Times*, 16 June 2001.

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tinuation of the Clinton administration's policy of engagement—or to give priority to bolstering the independence of the newly independent states (NIS) and to promote human rights in places such as Chechnya at the expense of trust and cooperation with Moscow—in short, renewed containment.

Resolution of each of these debates demands that attention be paid to Russian foreign policy and, in particular, the turbulent history of Moscow's relations with the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union. In December 1991, the leaders of eleven of the Soviet Union's fifteen constituent republics dissolved what was left of the union and replaced it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). When the Russian parliament ratified these agreements, it signified nothing less than Moscow's peaceful acquiescence to the loss of most of its centuries-old empire. Little more than a year later, however, many analysts were commenting on a rise of Russian assertiveness and a more pronounced role for the use of military force in what Russians somewhat proprietarily refer to as the "near abroad." For many, these changes marked the Kremlin's return to the imperialist ways of its past.

Whether Russia has returned to its old ways is a central question in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward the region for several reasons. First, debates over Russia's inclusion in NATO must address whether Moscow has been actively engaged in territorial revisionism or undermining the independence of its neighbors. If this is the case, NATO membership should be foreclosed until such policies have ceased. Second, any decision regarding whether to include the Baltic states or Ukraine in NATO should be informed by an accurate assessment of the severity of the Russian threat to these states. Third, the debate over whether Russia was "lost" in the 1990s will remain woefully incomplete until the positive and negative aspects of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin are considered, yet few analysts have approached it from this angle. This is especially the case given that the promotion of economic growth and honest business practices in Russia are secondary goals of U.S. foreign policy compared with the avoidance of violent conflict throughout the vast expanse of Eurasia. And fourth, Washington's choice between engagement and containment most centrally depends on the record of post-Soviet Russia's behavior toward the NIS. This is the ultimate realm in which to pass judgment on either the success of engagement or the need for containment.

For these reasons, this article will examine post-Soviet Russia's relations with the NIS during the 1990s. First, it reviews debates over Russian imperialism and Western policy toward the region that have occurred in academic and policy circles. Second, it documents and analyzes the attitudes toward the NIS held by Russian policy makers and foreign policy elites as well as the policies pursued by Moscow in regard to patronage of the Russian diaspora and national security. By focusing on the substantive content and purposes of Russian foreign policy, this article adopts the in-depth, inductive approach that has been

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recommended by several other analysts of state interests and identity.[2] Third, it considers the implications of its findings for the various academic and policy debates discussed above. And fourth, it concludes with an assessment of whether previous trends have continued under Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, and analyzes the implications of its findings for the debate over whether Russia should be invited to join NATO.

A Return to Imperialism?

Throughout the 1990s, many of Moscow's actions and policies toward its near abroad were interpreted on both sides of the Atlantic as evidence of Russia's return to the imperialist ways of its past.[3] These charges contained two core components. The first is that soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian government actively adopted the goal of restoring its political and military hegemony over the rest of the former Soviet Union. As Zbigniew Brzezinski sums it up, "Within months of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a series of spontaneous initiatives originated from Moscow, designed to flesh out and to deepen the scope of CIS cooperation, to enhance its status, to create conditions in which the CIS would, at the very outset, be more than the British Commonwealth, then approximate the European Union, then move beyond a confederation or even a federation to eventually become perhaps again just a multinational state dominated by its largest nation."[4] The second component is that Moscow systematically used its military in support of separatist movements in the NIS as a means of pressuring the latter to return to the Russian fold. As Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett note, "In each of the conflicts [in the republics of the former Soviet Union], there is evidence to suggest that Russia

[2] Such recommendations have been made by Kjell Goldman, "International Relations: An Overview" and David Sanders, "International Relations: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism" in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 416–417 and 432–433, respectively; Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 (Autumn 1997): 513–553; and Masato Kimura and David Welch, "Specifying 'Interests': Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (June 1998): 213–244.

[3] Examples include Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand," *Foreign Policy* 92 (Fall 1993): 92–116; John P. Hannah, "The (Russian) Empire Strikes Back," *New York Times*, 27 October 1993; Melor Sturua, "Yeltsin's Newest Proconsul," *New York Times*, 27 October 1993; Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform Is Dead" and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership" in *Foreign Affairs* 73 (March/April 1994): 21–26 and 67–82, respectively; Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad,'" *The Washington Quarterly* 17 (Summer 1994): 75–90; William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus* (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995), esp. 89–108; and Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997): 65–78.

[4] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Introduction: Last Gasp or Renewal?" in Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paige Sullivan, eds., *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 6–7.

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has intervened in such a way as to promote their escalation and/or continuation instead of their cessation."[5]

Other observers, however, painted a very different picture of post-Soviet Russia and defended the Kremlin against the imperialist charge. Explicitly taking issue with many of the aforementioned authors, Stephen Sestanovich argued in 1994 that "the dominant interest now guiding Russian policy is [not intimidation or destabilization but] stability. For now, the picture of an expansionist juggernaut is—at the very least—far ahead of the facts."[6] U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering similarly maintained that "charges of resurgent Russian imperialism have been overstated. . . . After the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow pursued policies—such as drastically cutting military spending—that severely limited its ability to rebuild the empire, even if it had wanted to."[7] In an overview of points of agreement and contention in U.S.–Russian relations given just prior to Bill Clinton's participation in the Moscow summit of May 1995, Pickering went even further by describing Russia's relations with its CIS neighbors as containing "some positive trends which we strongly support." In particular, the Ambassador praised Russia for its policies toward Ukraine, the Baltics, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh.[8] Most dramatically, Leon Aron put the "Yeltsin revolution" in historical perspective by asserting that "not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors and the world than the Russia we see today."[9]

This debate over the nature of Russian policy also served as the backdrop for a parallel debate over Western policy. Given the prevalence of Clinton ad-

[5] Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "*Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 1994), 2.

[6] Stephen Sestanovich, "Giving Russia Its Due," *The National Interest* 36 (Summer 1994): 6. Sestanovich elaborates on his views in his more recent "Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours," *The National Interest* 45 (Fall 1996): 3–13.

[7] Thomas Pickering, "Russia and America at Mid-Transition," *SAIS Review* 15 (Winter–Spring 1995): 85.

[8] Thomas Pickering, "Amerikano-Rossiiskie otnosheniya na nyneshnem etape: vzglyad iz SShA" [American-Russian relations at the present stage: The American perspective] in Eugene P. Bazhanov and David W. Rivera, eds., *Rossiya i SShA v menyayushchemsya mire: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii* [Russia and the United States in a changing world: Papers presented at a multinational conference] (Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga, 1995), 24–25.

[9] Leon Aron, "A Different Dance: From Tango to Minuet," *The National Interest*, 39 (Spring 1995): 28. Other analysts expressing similar views include Dmitri Simes, "The Return of Russian History," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (January/February 1994): 67–82; Karen Dawisha, "Imperialism, Dependence, and Interdependence in the Eurasia Space" in Aweed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 340–346; Bruce Parrott, "State-Building and Post-Soviet Military Affairs: From the Past to the Future" in Bruce Parrott, ed., *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 276–306; and Strobe Talbott, "Russia's True Interests," *New York Times*, 30 March 1999.

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ministration officials mentioned in the previous paragraph, it should come as no surprise that those analyses were frequently marshaled in defense of partnership and engagement with Russia.[10] In contrast, analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist generally argued that the primary restraints on even greater bellicosity were Russian weakness and efforts by outside powers to deter Russian encroachments. Hence, they were critical of the Clinton administration's approach to the region and advocated instead that Washington bolster the non-Russian states' tenuous independence and contain Russian expansion. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, "Russia is more likely to make a break with its imperial past if the newly independent post-Soviet states are vital and stable. . . . Political and economic support for the new states must be an integral part of a broader strategy for integrating Russia into a cooperative transcontinental system."[11] Some also opposed Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, predicting that "without nuclear weapons, Ukraine . . . will be vulnerable to an expansionist Russian power. Once the nuclear weapons are gone Russia will interpret the economic grievances of ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine as violations of human rights."[12]

To provide a basis for evaluating these competing viewpoints, the following sections examine Moscow's goals and policies toward the other former Soviet republics from their emergence as independent states through the end of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. I focus on elite attitudes and policy in two separate issue areas—patronage of the Russian diaspora and security policy—and conclude each section with an assessment of whether Russian attitudes or policies constituted a return to imperialist ways.

Russia and the Newly Independent States, 1992–1994

Elite Attitudes

The leadership of the Russian Federation entered the post-Soviet period seeking to preserve extremely close cooperation and integration among the states of the former Soviet Union. Formation of the CIS was seen as the best available means to accomplish this goal while simultaneously avoiding bloodshed and fratricidal war with the other republics.[13] In his memoirs, the first and last com-

[10] See Jack Matlock, Jr., "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (May/June 1996): 38–51. For a defense of engagement from the perspective of democratic peace theory, see Michael McFaul and Sarah Mendelson, "Russian Democracy—A U.S. National Security Interest," *Demokratizatsiya* 8 (Summer 2000): 330–353.

[11] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997): 79. Other examples include Hill and Jewett, "*Back in the USSR,*" 88–90; William Cohen, "The Empire Strikes Back," *Problems of Post-Communism* 42 (January/February 1995): 13–18; and Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Winter 1999–2000): 547–568.

[12] Hill and Jewett, "*Back in the USSR,*" 89.

[13] For accounts of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, see David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia* (New York: Random House, 1997), chap. 1; Boris Yeltsin, *Zapiski prezidenta* [Diary of the president] (Moscow: Ogonyok, 1994); and Evgenii Shaposhnikov, *Vybor* [Choice], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Nezavisimoe izdatel'stvo PIK, 1995), chaps. 1–3.

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mander-in-chief of CIS Armed Forces, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, expressed the hopes held by the Yeltsin administration at the time when he wrote, "I believe in the viability of the Commonwealth and hope that with time it will become stronger, fully reach its potential, and serve as the basis for a qualitatively new, equal, democratic union of independent states which meets the fundamental, long-term interests of its peoples."[14] In his address to the Russian people on 30 December 1991, Yeltsin optimistically expressed the view that the Soviet Union had been replaced by "a unification of nations and states" which "has the potential to become even more solid than was the Union which was held together by commands, compulsion, and the twisting of arms."[15] Four months later in an address before parliament, Yeltsin further expressed his hopes and fears when he stated, "The Commonwealth is at an early stage of development; that development is proceeding very painfully and with many contradictions. But its fate and future development will determine whether our peoples will in the future be divided by high walls or whether the borders between them will be only symbolic and their brotherly ties even more solid."[16]

Not long after the formation of the CIS, Russian elites across the political spectrum came to feel a deep nostalgia for a Russian state encompassing much if not all of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the extreme, the nationalists and communists who supported Vladimir Zhirinovsky's quasi-fascist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Gennadii Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) openly castigated Yeltsin for dissolving the union and campaigned on platforms of recreating either the Russian Empire of the tsars or some kind of "renewed union state."[17] Yet displeasure over the break-up of the Soviet Union was also great among the liberals and centrists who dominated policy making, as is revealed by an opinion survey of the Russian foreign policy elite conducted in June 1993.[18] Exactly half of those interviewed concurred with the statement that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the product of "irresponsible actions by politicians who did not compre-

[14] Shaposhnikov, *Vybor* [Choice], 134.

[15] Reprinted in *El'tsin-Khasbulatov: edinstvo, kompromiss, bor'ba* [Yeltsin-Khasbulatov: unity, compromise, struggle] (Moscow: Terra-Terra, 1994), 110.

[16] Ibid., 149–150.

[17] Regarding the December 1993 parliamentary elections, see *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Daily Report*, 21 September 1993. For further discussion of the views held by Russia's "imperial nationalists," see Astrid Tuminez, "Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy" in Celeste A. Wallander, ed., *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 41–68.

[18] The survey interviewed "113 representatives of various organizations and groups which participate in the formulation and implementation of Russia's foreign policy." Twenty-eight percent of its respondents consisted of high-level officials in Russia's executive branch, including the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Security Council; 26 percent were deputies in Russia's Supreme Soviet; 13 percent were leaders of political parties; 18 percent were heads of academic institutes; and 14 percent were foreign affairs correspondents from various media outlets. All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, *Vneshnaya politika Rossii—1993: Analiz politikov i ekspertov* [Russia's foreign policy—1993: An analysis of politicians and specialists] (Moscow, 1993), 6–7.

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hend that we are strong only in unity." Six percent felt more strongly that it was the "product of criminal actions" and that the break-up "should have been stopped by whatever means necessary, including military force." And 39 percent agreed with the opposing viewpoint that "the empire was doomed, the majority of its peoples were striving to achieve sovereignty."[19] In sum, disapproval outweighed acceptance (the expression of approval was not an option) by close to a 3:2 ratio. Moreover, 70 percent of the respondents hoped for the recreation of a single state on the territory of the CIS.[20] By way of contrast, attitudes regarding the "external" Soviet empire differed markedly. Fifty-five percent of those interviewed regarded the break-up of the Warsaw Pact positively as movement by its peoples "towards freedom." Twenty-six percent agreed with the opposite opinion that its dissolution "weakened the position of our country." In sum, approval outweighed disapproval by better than 2:1.[21]

Given these sentiments, it is not surprising that feelings of regret over the dissolution of the union were a regular part of the top leadership's public discourse. For instance, in January 1992, just three weeks after voting to ratify the documents founding the CIS, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov stated, "It goes without saying that I do not get any pleasure from the dissolution of the USSR. After all, no matter how awful the memories we each have of the past are, it nevertheless was our country. Regardless of nationality, we regarded it as our Motherland."[22] In that same month, Vice President Alexander Rutskoi wrote in the communist newspaper *Pravda*: "The destruction of Russia as a single state will raise in the acutest form not only the question of its so-called 'new' inner borders, but also its historical 'outer' borders. . . . The historical consciousness of Russians will not permit anyone to mechanically bring the borders of Russia in line with [the borders of] the Russian Federation and, in the process, repudiate that which constituted the glorious pages of Russian history."[23] The chairman of parliament's Committee on International Affairs, Evgenii Ambartsumov, similarly expressed the view that "Russia is something larger than the Russian Federation in its present borders. Therefore, one must see its geopolitical interests much more broadly than what is currently defined by the map. Precisely from this starting point do we intend to develop our formulation of mutual relations with the near abroad." He then elaborated on one of the ominous implications of this "starting point": "I was the author of a draft resolution which proposed the annulment of Khrushchev's 1954 decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine on the basis of its unconstitionality. In my

[19] Ibid., 35. Five percent refused to answer.

[20] Ibid., 36–37. For evidence that roughly similar sentiments existed at the mass level, see Richard Dobson, "Is Russia Turning the Corner? Changing Russian Public Opinion, 1991–1996," *U.S.I.A. Research Report* (September 1996), 32.

[21] Ibid., 34. Nineteen percent refused to answer.

[22] Reprinted in *El'tsin-Khasbulatov* [Yeltsin-Khasbulatov], 111.

[23] Quoted in Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9 (October–December 1993): 346.

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view, the disputed peninsula is both historically and psychologically a part of Russia. . . . And if a referendum should demonstrate that Crimeans desire the creation of an independent republic, well then. . . ."[24]

While never initiating comparable legislation, Ambartsumov's successor, Vladimir Lukin, admitted the following in an interview with a leading Russian paper: "Many in my generation cannot but consider Ukraine their second homeland. This does not mean that I favor an immediate march on Kiev with troops. But I cannot pretend that Kiev is for me the same kind of city as Baden-Baden or Montevideo. That will never be the situation in my soul."[25] Finally, even though he had been a champion of the union republics' right to self-determination during the final years of the Soviet Union's existence, President Yeltsin himself occasionally engaged in emotional and paternalistic references to his CIS neighbors. For instance, while at a summit in the United States, he stated, "yesterday we all lived in the same house, the Soviet Union. There is no Soviet Union any more but these republics [sic] are our blood."[26]

In sum, the statements of Russian policy makers and the attitudes they reflected clearly gave grounds for alarm among those who valued the newly acquired independence and territorial integrity of the former Soviet republics. The following sections will investigate the extent to which these attitudes were translated into policy.

Policy toward the Diaspora

One of the issues occupying the attention of Russian leaders in their dealings with the former Soviet republics was the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the twenty-five million ethnic Russians who after the dissolution of the Soviet Union found themselves living outside of the Russian state. As early as February 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev identified "the protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in other CIS states" as one of Russia's four national interests;[27] that August the foreign minister more explicitly listed "the defense of human rights, especially those of the Russian-speaking populations of neighboring republics" as one of the five main priorities of Russia's foreign policy.[28] The most significant manifestation of this concern appeared in the spring of 1992, when war broke out between the Moldovan state

[24] Evgenii Ambartsumov, "Interesy Rossii ne znayut granits" [Russian interests know no boundaries], *Megapolis ekspress*, 6 May 1992.

[25] Natal'ya Konstantinova, "Vladimir Lukin: Ubezhdyon, chto Kiev zainteresovan v integratsii ob'ektivno" [Vladimir Lukin: I am convinced that Kiev has an objective interest in integration], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 October 1995.

[26] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 30 September 1994.

[27] "Weekly Review: 26 February–3 March 1992," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, 13 March 1992, 68.

[28] Andrei Kozyrev, "Preobrazhenie ili kafkianskaya metamorfoza: Demokraticheskaya vneshnaya politika Rossii i ee prioritety" [Transfiguration or Kafkaesque metamorphosis: Russia's democratic foreign policy and its priorities], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 August 1992.

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and Slavic secessionists based in Moldova's Transdneister region. The war quickly drew in the intervention of the locally based Russian 14th Army under the command of General Aleksandr Lebed', who used the overwhelming firepower at his disposal in defense of his coethnics. While the 14th Army operated quasi-independently, the Yeltsin administration displayed a significant degree of support for its activities.[29]

In contrast, other regions of the former Soviet Union in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan possessed many of the objective conditions necessary to share the fate of the Transdneister, yet avoided doing so. In the two Baltic states, citizenship was restricted largely to citizens of interwar Estonia and Latvia and their descendants, thereby disenfranchising the vast majority of Slavic residents.[30] Moscow responded to this treatment of its coethnics with a great deal of harsh rhetoric as well as periodic suspensions of the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in those countries.[31] Yet the Yeltsin administration eventually resumed those withdrawals even without having achieved any substantial modifications of those states' citizenship policies. Moreover, full compliance with Moscow's commitments to withdraw its troops from both countries was achieved in August 1994.[32]

On the Crimean peninsula, a campaign to secede from Ukraine and unite with Russia was launched as early as the fall of 1991 and enjoyed overwhelming electoral success. However, as Anatol Lieven observes on the basis of interviews with leading Crimean officials, "When Crimea's President Yuri Meshkov went to Moscow in June 1994 soon after his election . . . to seek help against Ukraine, he was not officially received. In private he was told very firmly to act with restraint and not to hope for Russian support for any moves that would risk conflict with Kiev."[33] Kazakhstan too possessed "a variety of Russian nationalist groups, including the legally sanctioned LAD and Slava groups, as well as the unsanctioned Edinstvo movement. All three enjoy[ed] wide support in northern Kazakhstan, where they have mobilized large public demonstrations in favor of dual citizenship and more funding for Russian schools, and against Kazakh remaining the sole official language."[34] Notwithstanding appeals by

[29] The background to and details of various aspects of this conflict can be found in Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 108–138.

[30] Muiznieks, "Latvia: Restoring a State, Rebuilding a Nation" and Toivo Raun, "Estonia: Independence Redefined" in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 391–392 and 417, respectively.

[31] A representative sample of bellicose statements by Russian policy makers in response to Baltic citizenship policies can be found in Ted Hopf, "Managing the Post-Soviet Security Space: A Continuing Demand for Behavioral Regimes," *Security Studies* 4 (Winter 1994/95): 249–250. The first of several suspensions of Russian troop withdrawals is discussed in Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin Suspends Baltic Troop Pullout," *New York Times*, 30 October 1992.

[32] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 1 September 1994.

[33] Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41 (Summer 1999): 59.

[34] Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 68.

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these groups for kin-state support and protection, steps taken by the Kazakh government to undercut the political power of the country's Russian and Cossack communities met with little protest from the Kremlin.[35]

In sum, Russian policy in regard to patronage of the Russian diaspora little conforms to the image of an overtly and actively imperialist state. Military action to advance the interests of disgruntled ethnic Russians was undertaken in only one of five potential arenas for such violence. Moscow pursued its concerns relating to minority rights overwhelmingly by peaceful means.[36]

Security Policy

In the eyes of Russian decision makers, the institutions of the CIS—the Councils of Heads of State and of Government, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Foreign Ministers Council, the Defense Ministers Council, the Council of Border Troop Commanders, the Economic Court, and the Commission on Human Rights—primarily represented vehicles for the promotion of cooperation and integration between Russia and the former republics in the realms of economics and military security.[37] Regarding economics, in the Alma-Ata Declaration founding the CIS, the republics pledged their "allegiance to cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space."[38] In subsequent years, Moscow advanced various proposals to further economic integration and achieved some formal success in this area. For example, in May 1993 the CIS Council of Heads of State agreed to form an Economic Union to be modeled after the European Union. The Union's founding treaty listed among its goals the "gradual formation of a single economic space on the basis of market relations" and envisaged the "free movement of goods and services, capital and labor."[39]

Moscow had considerably greater interest in achieving cooperation and integration with the NIS in military and security affairs. In fact, maintenance of what Russian decision makers called a "common defense space" encompassing as much of the territory of the former Soviet Union as possible was their utmost goal in regard to the CIS. Foreign Minister Kozyrev described one of the core

[35] Ibid., 69.

[36] Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman Garnett largely concur, adding that "Russia preferred to apply pressure on states that it considered to be violating the rights of local ethnic Russians through international bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. . . ." *Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 21.

[37] A comprehensive discussion of Russian economic policy toward the NIS can be found in Olcott et al., *Getting It Wrong*, chap. 2. For an analysis of this subject that reaches conclusions consistent with those reached here in regard to patronage of the diaspora and security policy, see Henry Hale, "The Rise of Russian Anti-Imperialism," *Orbis* 43 (Winter 1999): 111–125.

[38] The text of the agreement can be found in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 47–48.

[39] The text of the treaty, formally adopted at the summit of CIS heads of state in September 1993, can be found in ibid., 518–522.

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components of democratic Russia's conception of its national interests as "guaranteeing the security of Russia and its neighbors on a collective basis and through the preservation of a common defense space within the framework of the CIS."[40] In an extensive elaboration of Russia's military doctrine, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev similarly wrote, "A priority for us is represented by cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, with its participating states, for the purpose of solving problems of collective defense and security and of coordinating military policy and defensive structures."[41]

Russian efforts to preserve a common defense space took three main directions. The first was the creation of Joint CIS Armed Forces on the basis of the preexisting Soviet military. Both during and immediately after the Soviet Union's disintegration, Yeltsin lobbied for the preservation of a unified military.[42] In February 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev similarly named preserving a "unified army" first among a list of Russian national interests.[43] Their efforts were undermined, however, by the governments of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and most significantly Ukraine.[44] As Defense Minister Shaposhnikov comments in his memoirs, "the Ukrainian leadership consistently served as the initiator and catalyst of destructive processes in the realm of defense. This began right after the events of August [1991]."[45] After the formation of the CIS, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk became an outspoken opponent of joint CIS armed forces, arguing that "they could be used to strangle the democratic movements in all Commonwealth states."[46] On 3 January 1992, Ukraine began the dismemberment of the Soviet military. All Soviet officers on Ukrainian territory were immediately required to take an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state or leave its territory. At the CIS summit the following February, Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov announced that the Ukrainian Army already existed with over 350,000 servicemen having sworn allegiance to Kiev.[47]

The Yeltsin administration begrudgingly acquiesced to Ukrainian nationalization of all ground forces on its territory, yet the entire Russian political establishment vocally and unequivocally resisted Ukraine's claim to ownership of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Specifically, the Yeltsin administration demanded ownership of the bulk of the fleet's ships as well as sole use of the fleet's main port facilities in Sevastopol, whereas Kiev similarly demanded the bulk of the

[40] Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* [Transfiguration] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995), 49.

[41] Pavel Grachev, "Voennaya doktrina i bezopasnost' Rossii" [Russia's military doctrine and security], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 June 1994.

[42] "Deputies' Debate: 'We've Thrown Too Many Stones at Gorbachev,'" *New York Times*, 4 September 1991; Shaposhnikov, *Vybor* [Choice], 126.

[43] "Weekly Review: 26 February–3 March, 1992," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 13 March 1992, 68.

[44] Francis Clines, "Rift Over Military Widens at Meeting of Ex-Soviet Lands," *New York Times*, 15 February 1992.

[45] Shaposhnikov, *Vybor* [Choice], 144.

[46] Quoted in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 450.

[47] Ibid., 449.

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fleet's ships and a substantial, if not complete, Russian evacuation of that city.[48] Russia maintained operational control of the bulk of the fleet and its facilities, yet Kiev refused to acquiesce formally to the status quo even though its stance impeded other aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship. For instance, after reaching an agreement with Belarus in May 1995 on the elimination of customs barriers, Yeltsin commented: "It is more difficult with Ukraine. We are seeking contacts with Ukraine but of course until we solve the question of the Black Sea Fleet, we cannot sign such an agreement."[49]

Moscow achieved some initial success in preserving the Soviet military intact with the remaining CIS states. At the February CIS summit, eight of its member states reached agreements on the retention and operation of CIS Strategic as well as General Purpose Forces.[50] In March, however, four of these states withdrew from the latter agreement.[51] By April, Yeltsin was forced to make the following announcement before parliament: "About the army: you know that for a long time Russia made no decision about setting up its own army, trying to preserve the single Commonwealth Army. Well, that did not work. A state commission has now been set up . . . to carry out the primary work on establishing a Russian Army and Navy."[52] The following month, Yeltsin appointed Pavel Grachev to head a newly formed Russian army, signifying Russia's overall failure to convince the former republics to accept unified armed forces.[53] In December 1993 at a summit of CIS defense ministers, the CIS Joint Armed Forces Command was abolished.[54]

The second main direction of Russia's efforts to preserve a common defense space consisted of efforts to form a defensive alliance among former Soviet republics. This alliance was embodied in the CIS Treaty on Collective Security approved at the CIS summit in Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Article One of the treaty expresses one of Russia's central objectives regarding the post-Soviet states: "The participating states will not enter into military alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another participating state."[55] In return for accepting Article One's commitment to exclude foreign powers from their security arrangements, in Article Four the non-Russian states received the promise that Russia would render "the necessary assistance including military assistance" to any other treaty participant con-

[48] Details on Russia's handling of these issues can be found in Hill and Jewett, "*Back in the USSR,*" 66–85.

[49] Quoted in "Yeltsin Seeks Closer Integration at Summit," *The Moscow Tribune*, 26 May 1995.

[50] The texts of those agreements can be found in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 532–538; elaboration on the distinctions between these two types of forces can be found on 445–446.

[51] Odom and Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire?* 23.

[52] Quoted in ibid., 113.

[53] Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin Acts to Create a Separate Army for Russia," *New York Times*, 8 May 1992.

[54] Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 464.

[55] The text of the treaty can be found in ibid., 541–542.

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fronted by external aggression. In July 1994, a session of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers adopted a provision to the treaty specifying that "the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces are assigned the functions of providing a deterrent to potential aggressive intentions directed against states party to the treaty."[56]

The importance of the Tashkent Treaty to Russian decision makers was revealed in a public interview with Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Fyodor Shelov-Kovedyaev in which he termed its signatories "our allies."[57] High importance was attached to the treaty because of its perceived usefulness in promoting Moscow's general goal of preventing the intrusion of outside powers into the territory of former Soviet republics.[58] This concern was expressed in the "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" approved by Yeltsin's Security Council on 2 November 1993. That doctrine lists "the introduction of foreign troops onto the soil of a neighboring country" under its most serious heading of "direct military threats to Russia."[59] This policy goal was regarded across the political spectrum as a core national interest. For instance, one of the Yeltsin administration's hawkish critics recommended and predicted that Russian policy would be occupied with securing this interest in Central Asia: "Russia's long-term strategy will obviously be to prevent the advance into the region of outside countries seeking to become the dominating force. Russia will also hinder any attempts to involve these countries in military-political or economic unions with any other of the region's great powers, whether it be Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, or some other state."[60]

Pursuit of this goal drew Moscow into a prolonged military engagement at the southernmost tip of Central Asia—Tajikistan. After being catapulted into an independence that they did not seek, that country's Communist party elite continued to pursue close ties with Moscow. Over the course of 1992, however, their hold on power was challenged as civil war broke out, pitting the government against a united democratic and Islamic opposition. In November, Russia began its intervention into that conflict on the side of the pro-Moscow government. After driving the opposition's armies into neighboring Afghanistan, the Russian army (with the participation of forces from the remaining states of Central Asia) took up defense of Tajikistan's border against military incursions by the opposition's forces.[61]

[56] Quoted in ibid., 470.

[57] Aleksandr Gagua, "V kritike vneshnei politiki Rossii my stalkivaemsya s opasnym neprofessionalizmom" [Criticism of Russian foreign policy contains a dangerous lack of professionalism], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 July 1992.

[58] Andrei Kozyrev writes: "Our interest in making sure that neighboring states do not present any military threats to Russia, including those stemming from the presence of foreign troops on their territory, has not disappeared but rather has grown." *Preobrazhenie* [Transfiguration], 49.

[59] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 18 November 1993.

[60] Andranik Migranyan, "Rossiya i blizhnee zarubezh'e: Stanovleniye novogo vneshnepoliticheskogo kursa RF (vvodnye zamechaniya)" [Russia and the Near Abroad: Creating a new foreign policy course for the Russian Federation (Introductory Remarks)], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 12 January 1994.

[61] For further details on these events, see Muriel Atkin, "Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction, Civil War" in Bremmer and Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, 602–633.

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The third manifestation of Moscow's desire to preserve a common defense space consisted of efforts to conclude bilateral agreements with former Soviet republics on the basing of Russian troops on their territory. Defense Minister Grachev justified such basing in the following terms: "The need for military bases outside of Russia's territory is dictated above all by the interests of maintaining stability in individual regions. The initiators of these deployments are first and foremost those states that stand in need of additional stability factors."[62] Even more significant from Moscow's point of view was that the establishment of Russian bases was seen as a means of keeping foreign powers out of the CIS. In January 1994, Andrei Kozyrev told a meeting of Russian ambassadors to the post-Soviet states that complete withdrawal of Russian troops from those countries should be opposed since "it would be dangerous to create a vacuum, because it might be filled with unfriendly forces."[63] Moreover, some Russian military officers even believed that "the more Russian military bases are located on their [former union republics'] territory, the quicker a single economic and military union will be restored."[64]

Fortunately from this perspective, Moscow's efforts to create a post-Soviet alliance system and station troops abroad enjoyed greater success than did the preservation of a unified CIS military. In particular, seven of the NIS—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—either adhered to the Tashkent Treaty or pursued substantial bilateral military cooperation with Russia. In contrast, the remaining seven—Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine—sought to cut their ties with the Russian military and, more generally, reduce the official Russian presence in their countries.[65]

The resistance of this latter group of states to Moscow's plans to create an integrated security system naturally generated considerable displeasure and anger among Russian elites. Moreover, Russian efforts to overcome their resistance came to include semicovert, hostile military interventions into conflicts raging on the territory of two of the uncooperative former republics. The first of these involved the war for secession from Azerbaijan waged by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh with the undeclared yet poorly concealed assistance of their neighboring kin-state. In that prolonged conflict, the Russian military consistently manifested a strong tilt in favor of the Armenians—a stance interpreted by Azeri elites, including President Ayaz Mutalibov, as punishment for Baku's resistance to CIS integration.[66] The second of Russia's covert mili-

[62] Grachev, "Voennaya doktrina i bezopasnost' Rossii" [Russia's military doctrine and security], 5.

[63] Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Russian Impasse Sets Off a Ruble Panic," *New York Times*, 19 January 1994.

[64] Quoted in Brzezinski and Sullivan, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, 458.

[65] David W. Rivera, "Conquest and Retreat in Soviet and Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy: Explaining the Wax and Wane of Empire" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1999), chap. iv.

[66] See Thomas Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), chaps. 7–8, 14.

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tary interventions occurred in Azerbaijan's neighbor to the northeast, Georgia, where an ethnically based secessionist movement broke out in the country's northwest region of Abkhazia. Moscow responded to Georgia's history of anti-CIS policies by providing military assistance to the Abkhaz separatists. With sophisticated Russian equipment and even air power on their side, in September 1993 Abkhaz forces managed to evict Georgian troops from their territory. After Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to join the CIS, lease Black Sea ports to Russia, and permit a Russian troop presence on an indefinite basis, Russia switched to a policy of support and military assistance for his beleaguered government.[67]

The central question remaining to be answered is, where do these two partisan military interventions, combined with Moscow's military support for the government of Tajikistan, place post-Soviet Russia on a continuum of imperialism? Even in regard to this top priority issue of preserving military integration on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Russian behavior more closely resembled peaceful respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors than bellicose imperialism for three reasons. First, of the seven states that resisted Moscow's plans for military integration, only Azerbaijan and Georgia were punished with hostile military interventions as a result. (As discussed earlier, the Russian military's intervention in Moldova's civil war occurred for other reasons, although its orientation toward the CIS may have played a contributing role.) In particular, hostile action was not undertaken against Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine, even though there resided in the latter three states millions of ethnic Russians whose grievances could have provided a convenient pretext for the insertion of military forces or the pursuit of the kind of divide and conquer strategies that achieved compliance with Russian wishes in Azerbaijan and Georgia.[68] Moreover, the Yeltsin administration not only abstained from attempting to exploit these opportunities but instead offered Ukraine guarantees

[67] These events are discussed at some length in Hill and Jewett, "*Back in the USSR*," 45–60. I am intentionally ignoring the debate over whether Russia's covert support for the Abkhaz resulted from the initiative of troops stationed in the area rather than central direction from Moscow. Analysts expressing the former position include Dmitri Simes "The Return of Russian History," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1994); Oleg Blotskii, "Rossiiskie bazi—kozyrnaya karta" [Russian bases are a trump card], *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 28 November 1996; and Nodari Simonia, "Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy and the Way It Works" in Dawisha and Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 31. The evidence necessary for a conclusive resolution of this debate does not appear to be currently available. I am assuming central direction, since such an assumption is *less* supportive of my central theses.

[68] Ethnopolitical tensions in Ukraine were discussed earlier. In regard to Latvia and Estonia, Elaine Holoboff concludes, "The capacity for bringing about the downfall of any one of the Baltic states certainly exists, and it would be relatively easy for Russian intelligence forces to inflame and manipulate the dissatisfaction of the ethnic Russian population in order to destabilize these small countries." "National Security in the Baltic States: Rolling Back the Bridgehead" in Parrott, *State Building and Military Power*, 122.

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of its territorial integrity in exchange for elimination of the nuclear weapons on its territory.[69]

Second, none of these interventions involved the use of Russian military power at anywhere near the levels generally associated with international war. The most substantial of Moscow's military operations in a former Soviet republic was its involvement in the Tajik civil war, yet in that conflict Russian casualties numbered less than one hundred.[70] Furthermore, Russian military operations in Azerbaijan and Georgia consisted largely of the supply of arms. The participation of Russian personnel in both of these conflicts was small enough to be semicovert.

Third and most important, Moscow's efforts to keep former republics in its strategic orbit never came to involve the pursuit or even threat of the ultimate sanction—invasion and complete loss of independence. Notwithstanding the fact that Russian elites felt a deep nostalgia for a Russian state encompassing its pre-1991 borders, the Kremlin under Yeltsin rejected the imperialist goals and tactics employed by the Communist party from Lenin through Brezhnev.

Russia and the Newly Independent States, 1995–1999

In the second half of the 1990s, the Yeltsin administration's interest in economic and military cooperation and integration with CIS states remained strong. Upon replacing Kozyrev as foreign minister in January 1996, Evgenii Primakov highlighted the CIS as a realm in which he would distinguish himself from his predecessor. At his inaugural press conference, the new foreign minister identified "reinforcing centripetal tendencies on the territory of the former USSR" as a central priority of Russian foreign policy, second only to strengthening Russia's territorial integrity. In implicit criticism of Kozyrev's alleged lack of interest in close ties with the states of the near abroad, Primakov went on to say, "Relations with Ukraine and other CIS countries will be a top priority. If the appropriate agreements are reached, I intend to take my first trips abroad to several of the capitals of these states, and then only later will I give thought to the far abroad."[71] As was the case earlier in the decade, such sentiments were felt even more strongly in parliament. The communists and nationalists who triumphed in the parliamentary elections of 1995 continued to dispute the right of the former republics to exist as sovereign states and to advocate redrawing Russia's borders with them.[72] In fulfillment of their cam-

[69] See Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Offering Ukraine Guarantees on Security," *New York Times*, 18 June 1993; *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 17 November 1994.

[70] Atkin, "Tajikistan," 624.

[71] "Primakov nachinaet s SNG" [Primakov starts with the CIS], *Moskovskie novosti*, 14–21 January 1996, 13.

[72] Treatment of related issues in the electoral platforms of Russia's major parties is discussed in Vladimir Mukomel', "Kto-to predpochitaet Sovetsky Soyuz, a kto-to Rossiiskuyu imperiyu" [Some prefer the Soviet Union, and some the Russian Empire], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 December 1995.

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paign promises, in March 1996 they took the radical and provocative step of pushing a law through the State Duma abrogating the agreements founding the CIS and thus de jure reestablishing the Soviet Union.[73]

While Yeltsin vociferously denounced this action, his government began to pursue integration by supplementing the CIS with additional institutional arrangements. As Sherman Garnett and Dmitri Trenin observe, "Since 1995 Russian policy makers have come to recognize that progress on integration is unlikely to come through giant steps taken by the CIS as a whole, but rather through smaller steps made by individual CIS member states or groups of them."[74] This approach bore fruit on 29 March 1996, when Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan signed the Treaty on the Intensification of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Areas. According to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the treaty committed its signatory states to the formation of a customs union, greater coordination of economic reforms, standardization of national legislation, increased cultural and educational exchanges, and the creation of "favorable conditions for a common market in goods, services, capital, and labor."[75]

Several days later, Yeltsin and Belarussian President Aleksandr Lukashenko signed a separate, bilateral treaty committing their two states to even closer economic and political integration. Yeltsin had earlier commented on the treaty in the following terms: "We can say more definitely [after talks with Lukashenko] that our goal is maybe unity, after deep integration. This goal is possible. . . . We hope that it will happen not only in our lifetimes but during our presidencies."[76] On 2 April 1997 and 8 December 1999, Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed additional treaties ostensibly laying the groundwork for a full merger of the two countries.[77]

Russo-Ukrainian relations improved considerably in the second half of the decade. A major stumbling block of the early 1990s was the Ukrainian parliament's decision to retain possession of over half of the nuclear warheads inherited from Soviet arsenals—a move opposed by Moscow, Washington, and President Kravchuk himself.[78] In November 1994, however, newly elected President Leonid Kuchma convinced parliament to reverse course and ratify Ukraine's

[73] "Sevodnya" [Today], Independent Television Network, Russian Federation, 15 March 1996.

[74] Sherman Garnett and Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Its Nearest Neighbors" in Anders Åslund and Martha Brill Olcott, eds., *Russia After Communism* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 144.

[75] Nursultan Nazarbayev, "K obshchei tseli—s raznoi skorost'yu" [Towards a common goal—at a different pace], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 March 1996; and Patrick Henry, "Four-Nation Treaty Integrates Economic Bloc," *The Moscow Times*, 30 March 1996.

[76] Carlotta Gall, "Lukashenko, Yeltsin Talk Unity," *The Moscow Times*, 29 February 1996.

[77] Alessandra Stanley, "Russia Dilutes a Treaty with Belarus, Then Signs," *New York Times*, 3 April 1997; and Michael Wines, "Russia and Belarus Agree to Join in a Confederation," *New York Times*, 9 December 1999.

[78] Steven Erlanger, "Ukraine's Hedging on A-Arms Angers Russia," *New York Times*, 22 November 1993.

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accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state notwithstanding the failure of Ukrainian efforts to receive Western alliance commitments.[79]

Since he had run on a platform of closer ties and integration with Russia, Kuchma's election also raised hopes in Moscow that Ukraine's resistance to economic and military cooperation with Moscow and constructive participation in CIS institutions would become a thing of the past. However, these hopes proved unfounded as Ukraine's orientation failed to change. Just as it was Kiev's insistence on complete independence in 1991 that doomed Gorbachev and Yeltsin's negotiations with the republics on transforming the Soviet Union into a genuinely federal but still unified state, so it was this second most populous of post-Soviet states that was primarily responsible for torpedoing Russian efforts to give the CIS institutional substance throughout the decade as well.[80] At the end of the decade, the CIS had failed to become "a serious security organization" with the ability to play an independent role in the international politics of Eurasia.[81] As the Belarussian ambassador to the United States lamented, "The CIS . . . does little beyond bringing leaders from 12 of the former republics together to talk. Of the more than 700 agreements reached within the CIS framework, none seems to work."[82]

Ukraine's policies aroused special anger among Russians interested in strengthening the bonds among CIS states, perhaps because of the central place held by Kiev in ancient Russian history. For instance, the nationalist head of the Committee on CIS Affairs in Russia's Fifth State Duma wrote, "There is no friendship, cooperation, or partnership between Russia and Ukraine—not in intergovernmental practice, nor in the document [on Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation] which is portrayed as being so wonderful. There is—on one side—a five year history of double-dealing, weakness and deceit, as well as undeclared economic and political sanctions against Russia, the Russian language, and any Russian influence in Ukraine. On the other side there is an absence of understanding of one's own interests and goals, confusion between departments and parties, and as a result, a policy of appeasement, forestalling concessions, and vulnerability to blackmail."[83] Notwithstanding the predominance of such views among the Russian elite, the Yeltsin administration persisted with concessions to Kiev that succeeded in resolving the long-festering dispute over the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet. In the accord

[79] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 17 November 1994. Ukrainian denuclearization was completed in 1996.

[80] Such judgments are expressed by Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 14 February 1992, 1; Odom and Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire?* 28–29; and Sherman Garnett, "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands" in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 73 and 88.

[81] Such is the judgment reached by Olcott et al., *Getting it Wrong*, 79 and 96.

[82] Valery Tsepkalo, "The Remaking of Eurasia," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (March/April 1998): 109–110.

[83] Konstantin Zatulin, "Ispitanie Ukrainoi: Ekzamen na obshchenatsional'nuyu vneshnuyu politiku" [Trial by Ukraine: An examination in national foreign policy], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 May 1996.

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reached in June 1997, Moscow recognized Ukrainian sovereignty over all of Crimea and agreed to pay $100 million per year for twenty years in rent for the use of Sevastopol's central port facilities.[84] With the nuclear weapons removed and the fleet divided on the basis of compromise, the way was at last paved for the signing of the Friendship Treaty.[85] In October 1999, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov summed up the two countries' bilateral relations as "fraternal" and characterized by "a different atmosphere" than was the case earlier in the decade.[86]

Russian policy toward the diaspora also mellowed in the second half of the decade. The ceasefire reached between Chisinau and Moldova's Slavic separatists in 1992 held without interruption for the remainder of the decade. Moreover, in the summer of 1994 the Yeltsin administration signed bilateral accords pledging the complete withdrawal of Russian forces within three years.[87] At the close of the decade, that commitment had been partially fulfilled as the 14th Army's original complement of roughly 5,000 troops had been reduced to 2,500.[88] In Kazakhstan, restless ethnic Russians continued to receive little more than benign neglect. For instance, after twenty-two such individuals—twelve of whom were Russian citizens and veterans of the Soviet or Russian armed forces—were arrested for plotting to establish an "Independent Republic of Russian Altai" in northern Kazakhstan, then Prime Minister Putin responded by affirming that Russo-Kazakh relations would not be affected. The spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry added that Russia "does not meddle in Kazakhstan's internal affairs."[89] Ten months after Yeltsin's resignation of the presidency, a leader of the Kazakhstan's Russian community complained that the former president had taken no interest in the plight of his coethnics.[90]

Other Eurasian "hot spots" experienced notable reductions in conflict and tensions in the second half of the 1990s as well. In the early part of the decade, Azerbaijan had been wracked by ethnic civil war, self-interested meddling by the Russian military, and a patently unconstitutional yet successful putsch against a democratically elected president. It was "a classic example of a 'failed state,' a place marked by such an appalling level of chaos, confusion, and self-

[84] Alexander Cooley, "Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet Space," *International Security* 25 (Winter 2000/2001): 119. Cooley provides an excellent discussion of Russia's general approach to the maintenance of access to former Soviet military infrastructure throughout the NIS.

[85] See James Sherr, "Russia-Ukraine *Rapprochement*? The Black Sea Fleet Accords," *Survival* 39 (Autumn 1997): 33–50. Sherman Garnett comments that both the fleet agreement and the Friendship Treaty "by and large favor stated Ukrainian positions, which Moscow long resisted." "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands" in Mandelbaum, *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, 87.

[86] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 11 October 1999.

[87] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 2 August 1994.

[88] Olcott et al., *Getting It Wrong*, 86.

[89] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 24 November 1999.

[90] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 11 October 2000.

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destruction that it almost did not deserve to exist."[91] However, the country subsequently entered a period of political stability made possible by a cessation of hostilities with its Armenian inhabitants and neighbors. As Rajan Menon observes, "It was because of Russian mediation that a cease-fire was negotiated among the leaders of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan in May 1994. The cease-fire has held and saved an untold number of lives."[92] Moreover, after the return to power of former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, Baku concluded numerous multi-billion dollar oil deals that set the country on the road to economic prosperity.[93] In fact, between 1996 and 2000 Azerbaijan experienced the highest economic growth of any of the more than two dozen postcommunist states.[94] Thomas Goltz sums up the pendulum swing of Azeri fortunes as follows: "The change in the title of this edition of the book [from 'Requiem for a Would-be Republic'] should speak volumes. No longer a dirge for a dead country, it is now a diary account of the rebirth, in blood and agony, of a post-Soviet republic with a future."[95]

An eerily parallel story can be told about Georgia, Azerbaijan's neighbor to the northwest, where internal peace, political stability, and relative prosperity were restored under the presidency—this time, largely democratic—of former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.[96] In Central Asia as well, Moscow mediated a peace settlement between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition, ending five years of civil war in June 1997.[97] At the end of the decade, Ron Suny could characterize Russia as "a relatively benign hegemon in relationship to the Southern Tier [of the former Soviet Union] rather than a neo-imperialist threat."[98]

In sum, Russian policy toward the NIS in the second half of the decade has been characterized as "less confrontational" and reflective of a "gradual shift away from promoting integration through coercion and geopolitical pressure, to integration through voluntary and economy-driven processes."[99] While there is definitely truth to this characterization, the continuities with the early 1990s are as pronounced as the discontinuities. In both periods, peaceful acceptance

[91] Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary*, ix.

[92] Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad'" in Mandelbaum, *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, 132.

[93] Goltz, *Azerbaijan Diary*, 452–458.

[94] Anders Åslund, *Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), tab. 4.1.

[95] Ibid., ix.

[96] Georgia's economic growth between 1996 and 2000 was the third highest among postcommunist states. Ibid., tab. 4.1.

[97] Menon, "After Empire," 147–148.

[98] Ron Suny, "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *International Security* 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 151.

[99] Roland Dannreuther, "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999–2000): 149. Suny similarly observes that "Russian foreign policy, notably toward the Southern Tier, tended to moderate over time." Ibid., 150.

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of the status quo was in greater evidence than coercive imperialism. Hence, those occupying the Kremlin deserve credit for suppressing their dissatisfaction with the status quo in Eurasia rather than manifesting it in violent action.

Conclusions

Analysts of postcommunist Eurasia have offered very different perspectives on the international politics of the region. Whereas some have viewed post-communist Russia as an aggressive bear throwing its weight around the Eurasian forest, others have portrayed Moscow as a reformed cub pursuing a policy of stability or even neglect toward its former empire. Did post-Soviet Russia quickly revert to its imperialist ways of the past? Resolving this debate is more difficult than might be expected because Russian policy contained many contradictory elements that make it difficult to characterize as a whole. For instance, all segments of Russia's ideologically diverse political spectrum regarded the failure to maintain a union among the former Soviet republics negatively as the loss of a part of Russia itself. In addition, Moscow engaged in several military interventions in conflicts on the territory of former Soviet republics for the purpose of keeping those states in Russia's strategic orbit.

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence more strongly supports those who defended Moscow against the imperialist charge. For every former republic that fell victim to Russian intervention, an equal number successfully rid themselves of a Russian military presence without falling victim to such intervention. The military interventions that did occur were all small-scale operations. Discontented ethnic Russians received military protection in only one of the fourteen non-Russian states, and the Yeltsin administration did not pursue territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any former Soviet republics. In addition, the second half of the 1990s witnessed heightened Russian conciliation and peacemaking as well as the consolidation of the tenuous independence of several of Eurasia's previously "failed states." Why Russia's neighbors so strongly supported Yeltsin during his campaign for reelection in 1996 and throughout his presidency is now apparent.[100] Consideration of the policies that Moscow did *and did not* pursue makes clear that Russia was, at most, selectively imperialist and that charges of Russian imperialism are exaggerated.

The predominance of a nonimperialist orientation of Russian foreign policy is further shown by the fact that a central prediction made by analysts who viewed Russian policy as imperialist did not come to pass. The Yeltsin administration continued to ignore Crimea's ethnic Russian insurgents even after Ukraine denuclearized. Zbigniew Brzezinski similarly had warned that "Ukraine

[100] At the May 1996 CIS summit, every CIS head of state without exception gave a speech in strong support of Yeltsin's candidacy. For coverage of the summit, see Viktor Timoshenko, "SNG stanovitsya vliyatel'noi organizatsiei" [The CIS is becoming an influential organization], *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 May 1996 and *OMRI Daily Digest*, 20 May 1996. For support in subsequent years, see Olcott et al., *Getting It Wrong*, 26.

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is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework."[101] Now that the decade has closed it is evident that Russia under Yeltsin was not interested in exploiting such opportunities. The Kremlin thereby passed what was widely regarded as "the test case of whether Russia will remain a nation-state or seek to become again a multinational empire."[102]

These findings contain two implications for Western policy debates of the 1990s. Regarding the "Who Lost Russia?" debate, the extent to which Russia's rulers respected the territory and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics supports the view that Western governments and international institutions were correct to provide financial assistance to the Russian government and political support to Yeltsin. Moreover, the overall thrust of such policies should be regarded as having been correct no matter how much foreign aid was misspent or how corrupt Russia's leaders subsequently prove to have been. Both the journalists and scholars who seek to portray the spread of markets in as negative a light as possible[103] and the politicians who found their criticisms of the Clinton administration to be useful in an election year[104] need to bear in mind that international peace in Eurasia was not foreordained; the main contenders to replace Yeltsin—Aleksandr Rutskoi, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Gennadii Zyuganov—all longed for a restoration of empire to a far greater extent than did Russia's president.[105] Moreover, if the international politics of Eurasia had been characterized by rampant warfare between Russia and its neighbors, then Russia's economy would surely be in even worse shape today and its problems with capital flight and corruption even further aggravated.[106]

Regarding the debate over whether to pursue containment or engagement, with the benefit of hindsight we know that the Yeltsin administration did not act aggressively in the face of Ukrainian and Kazakh denuclearization or the West's failure to provide any of the NIS with firm security commitments.

[101] Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," 80.

[102] Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction: Russian Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective" in Mandelbaum, *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, 9.

[103] For the premier example, see Stephen Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). Most noteworthy in regard to the conclusions reached in this study is the fact that Cohen's sweeping indictment of the "Yeltsin regime" and its American accomplices contains virtually no complaints about Yeltsin's policies toward any of the NIS.

[104] For example, see Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, U.S. House of Representatives, *Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People* (http://policy.house.gov/russia/index.html), accessed September 2000.

[105] As Duma deputy Alexei Arbatov observed in 1993, "[Russia's neo-communists and nationalists] are prepared to reinstate the Soviet Union by military force, and advocate tough policies toward Ukraine and open intervention on the side of separatists in the Baltics, the Crimea, Moldova, and Georgia." Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security* 18 (Fall 1993): 14.

[106] For the classic statement on the severely deleterious impact of war and insecurity on a society's economic well-being, see Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, chap. 13.

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Hence, the Clinton administration was correct to accept Russia as a responsible member of the international community and reject a policy of renewed containment. Moreover, many Russians have come to believe that the United States was actively attempting to weaken Russia's ties and influence with the NIS, notwithstanding Washington's largely unintrusive approach to the region.[107] Russian anti-Americanism and paranoia would have undoubtedly taken on more dangerous proportions had such perceptions been accurate.[108]

Postscript: The West's Policy toward Putin's Russia

Future policy toward Eurasia needs to be constantly reevaluated, and the West's approach to the region should not become complacent. The Russian diaspora still exists and, if past is prologue, Russian policy makers will remain committed to preventing the intrusion of foreign powers into the security arrangements of CIS states. In 1994, when Putin served as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, he sternly informed visiting Western officials, "Russians in the NIS must not be subjected to any form of discrimination." He then added, "in the interests of the preservation of peace, the world community should also respect the interests of the Russian state and Russian nation which, notwithstanding everything, is a great nation."[109] As president, Putin has instructed Russian diplomats to regard the expansion of ties with CIS states as "our absolute priority," adding, "We obviously do not do enough to protect our diaspora, to protect Russian culture and the Russian language."[110]

As might be expected in light of such sentiments, some analysts have reported an upsurge in Russian imperialism since Yeltsin's resignation. Echoing past debates, Brzezinski has warned that "Putin's central goal [is] the restoration of a powerful Russian state. To the present rulers, the appearance of a dozen or so newly independent states following the Soviet Union's collapse is an historical aberration that should be gradually corrected as Russia recovers its power."[111] Top U.S. government officials have also issued worrisome reports

[107] For an anger-laden example by a senior Russian scholar, see Sergo Mikoyan, "Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia," *Survival* 40 (Autumn 1998): 112–126.

[108] Examples of Russian anti-Americanism abound. For instance, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev once informed an audience of Russian generals, "The United States' national interests require that the military conflict in the north Caucasus, fanned from the outside, keeps constantly smoldering." Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Chechnya Challenge: War Threatens U.S. Strategic Goals," *New York Times*, 15 November 1999. Further documentation of the Russian elite's extreme distrust of NATO and its leading member-states is provided by Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999–2000): 124–144.

[109] Quoted in Aleksandr Rar, *Vladimir Putin: "Nemets" v Kremle* [Vladimir Putin: A "German" in the Kremlin] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), 7.

[110] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 29 January 2001.

[111] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with Russia," *The National Interest* 61 (Fall 2000): 9. See also Vladimir Socor, "There's a Bear in the Woods," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 2000.

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on this score.[112] Moreover, Putin's fall from power would represent an even more alarming development since his main political opponents have clearly not reconciled themselves to Russia's truncated borders. During the campaign for the presidency in 2000, CPRF candidate Gennadi Zyuganov stated that Russia's communists "regard the disintegration of the Soviet Union as the worst tragedy for all the peoples involved, and so we are going to make our best effort to strengthen integration policy with former Soviet territories."[113] More ominously, the party's program states that for Russia to come out of its current crisis, "it is necessary: . . . to preserve the state integrity of Russia, to resurrect a renewed Union of the Soviet peoples, to guarantee the national unity of the Russian people."[114] In sum, Washington's worries of the 1990s that the former Soviet lands might become a nuclear Yugoslavia are still relevant in this decade.

However, there are grounds for optimism that a pacific, nonimperialist orientation will continue during Putin's reign. In response to Brzezinski, Sestanovich points out that when Putin speaks of "strengthening the Russian state," the language he uses indicates that he primarily has the domestic, not international, dimensions of state power in mind.[115] More generally, Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency in December 1999 in the expectation that his prime minister and favored successor would continue his international policies.[116] This expectation has so far been fulfilled as Putin's Kremlin has retained Foreign Minister Ivanov and, most important, has not undertaken the use of military force against any of the NIS. In fact, Putin's policies have been sufficiently moderate that even Brzezinski has begun to conclude that "the Russian elite is gradually shedding its imperial nostalgia."[117] This moderation and restraint might be merely a function of preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, but it might also be more fundamentally rooted in lessons Putin has drawn from history. For instance, when asked whether the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Hungary and Czechoslovakia were mistakes, Putin replied, "In my opinion, those were huge mistakes. And the Russophobia which confronts us in Eastern Europe today stems precisely from those mistakes."[118] He has also appealed to his compatriots to "abandon imperial ambitions."[119] Hence, Washington should continue to give

[112] Secretary of Defense William Cohen on *The Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, 10 January 2001; James Risen, "C.I.A. Chief Sees Russia Trying to Revive Its Challenge to U.S.," *New York Times*, 8 February 2001.

[113] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 18 February 2000.

[114] The CPRF party program can be found at http://www.kprf.ru/ofdok/progr.htm, 8 June 2000.

[115] Stephen Sestanovich, "Where Does Russia Belong?" *The National Interest* 62 (Winter 2000/2001): 13.

[116] The following February, Yeltsin observed that "[Putin] has chosen the right path, a path that was already determined during my office, and he is sticking to it." *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 24 February 2000.

[117] *The Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, 15 November 2001.

[118] *Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory c Vladimirom Putinym* [From the first person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 160.

[119] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 27 December 2000.

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more weight to engagement over containment until the optimistic assumptions underlying such an approach are convincingly disproved by Russian actions.

The conclusions reached in this article bear upon the future of North Atlantic security arrangements as well. On the one hand, arguments against the inclusion of the Russian Federation in an expanded NATO are numerous and serious. First and foremost among them concerns the increased risk of war that would come from the very commitment to defend the Russian Federation's extensive southern and eastern borders from all potential attackers. Equally worrisome is the cost of converting a successful military alliance into something that might more closely resemble an ineffective collective security system.[120] Not least among such arguments, deep-seated anti-Americanism persists among the Russian elite and clearly presents an obstacle to genuine and enduring trust and cooperation between Moscow and Washington.[121] This is especially true of Russia's military establishment whose head of the International Defense Cooperation Department publicly describes NATO's Partnership for Peace program as a "mere backdrop to the rehearsing of military actions against Russia."[122]

On the other hand, Russian membership in NATO might serve to reinforce and consolidate positive tendencies in Russian foreign policy, such as the absence of a military response to NATO's 1999 expansion and the Yeltsin administration's important cooperation in the implementation of NATO's peace plan in Kosovo.[123] In addition, NATO membership would serve to slow, if not reverse, Moscow's almost decade-long movement in the direction of an alliance with the People's Republic of China, a state likely to equal if not surpass the United States in economic and military power in this century and thus the world's most likely candidate to ignite a global "hegemonic war."[124]

The same can be said regarding Moscow's highly profitable military and nuclear cooperation with Iran. Most basically, Russian membership "would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO and increase the overall power base of the alliance."[125] It would also promote the continuation of Russian cooperation and assistance in future American actions against terrorist networks and rogue states. Such cooperation and assistance will be even more beneficial should pessimistic predictions of enduring conflict between the West

[120] See Robert Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Fall 1998): 383–404.

[121] For an example, see *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 28 June 2000. Also making this point is William Odom, "Realism about Russia," *The National Interest* 65 (Fall 2001): 62.

[122] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 22 June 2000.

[123] See Michael Gordon, "Moscow Says Its Envoy was a Key to Success," *New York Times*, 4 June 1999.

[124] In the opinion of Bruce Russett and Alan Stam, "The need to prevent [a Russian-Chinese alliance] should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO." "Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Fall 1998): 361. For recent manifestations of Russo-Chinese cooperation, see Patrick Tyler, "Russia and China Sign 'Friendship Pact,'" *New York Times*, 17 July 2001.

[125] Russett and Stam, "Courting Disaster," 380.

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and the Islamic world as a whole come true.[126] In this regard, Russia is, behind Saudi Arabia, the world's second largest exporter of oil.[127] Finally, whatever the relative merits of these arguments, this study has shown that the record of post-Soviet Russia's behavior toward its newly independent neighbors cannot be legitimately construed as providing grounds for Russia's exclusion from NATO.

It is arguably the case that the paramount objective of Russian policy toward the West in the 1990s was peaceful integration into its economic and political institutions.[128] As is obvious since September 11, this is equally true of Russian policy under Putin. As Russia's vice minister for foreign affairs declared to a European audience, "Moscow feels that Greater Europe must not exist without Russia, but also that Russia is an inalienable part of Europe."[129] Similar calls for "a much deeper union" with Europe have been issued by the chairman and deputy chairman of the Russian parliament's International Relations Committee.[130] More significant, Russian requests for some kind of de facto NATO membership have been increasing in frequency, and President Putin regards the creation of the NATO-Russia Council that they produced as "only a beginning."[131] Moscow's orientation will continue to put the ball in the West's court, thereby igniting a policy debate that should be informed by recognition of some of the positive developments of the last decade. The ultimate wisdom of extending European and American defense commitments all the way to Vladivostok may be questionable, but in regard to the most important issues—giving victory to the more pro-Western candidate in all of its presidential elections, preserving peace on the vast majority of its borders, and ensuring the survival of an independent Ukraine and even such tiny, internally fractured polities as Azerbaijan and Georgia—postcommunist Russia has done its part to eliminate political and military dividing lines in Europe and bring about the country's long-delayed unification with the West.*

[126] Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[127] For a discussion of Russia's potential to enhance American energy security, see Leon Aron, "Russian Oil and U.S. Security," *New York Times*, 5 May 2002.

[128] This argument is advanced by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul in "The Liberal Core and the Realist Periphery in Europe," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 1 (May 2001): 1–26.

[129] Quoted in Donald McNeil, "Putin in Paris, Where Talk is Mainly of Business," *New York Times*, 2 November 2000.

[130] *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, 11 April 2001.

[131] David Sanger, "Out at the Ranch, Guests from Russia," *New York Times*, 15 November 2001; "NATO to Confer with Russia on Closer Ties," *New York Times*, 22 November 2001; and David Sanger, "NATO Formally Welcomes Russia as a Partner," *New York Times*, 29 May 2002.

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Black and Latino Voters in Denver: Responses to Each Other's Political Leadership

KAREN M. KAUFMANN

Over the past forty years, the demographic makeup of the largest American cities has shifted toward greater numbers of minority residents and proportionately fewer whites. In part this development reflects several decades of white flight from urban centers, but increasingly this trend also reflects the growing number of Latinos that reside in many American cities. Rising numbers of cities with minorities in the majority suggest important consequences for urban politics and in particular point to heightened possibilities for minority empowerment and governance. But this outcome is far from certain. Blacks and Latinos may form electoral alliances in joint support of minority candidates, yet recent mayoral elections in Miami, Houston, and Los Angeles, for example, suggest that these coalitions are not inevitable. It is safe to say that among the most pressing research questions facing students of urban politics in the present era are understanding the likelihood of Latino/black minority alliances and identifying the potential obstacles to these minority coalitions.

Latino and black citizens increasingly share large urban centers, and yet the political relationship between these two groups has not been adequately explored. Traditional notions of the rainbow coalition would suggest that blacks and Latinos are natural political allies; however, competition over power and resources between these two groups can lead to fractious and uncooperative relationships. This article in particular studies the condition of minority empowerment and how the election of black and Latino mayors affects the political mobilization, political attitudes, and voting behavior of these two groups.

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I focus on four mayoral elections in Denver, Colorado that featured the electoral success of Denver's first Latino mayor (Federico Peña from 1983 to 1991) and the subsequent election of Denver's first black mayor (Wellington Webb from 1991 to present). I examine the psychological and behavioral implications of minority empowerment over this period, and explore the extent to which the effects of minority empowerment are shared among blacks and Latinos.

The increasing numbers of minority elected officials have generated substantial research into the question of what it takes to build and sustain minority electoral coalitions. Important studies from the civil rights era and beyond point to the significance of black and Latino voter reciprocity in the quest for greater minority incorporation.[1] Underlying much of this early research is the notion that blacks and Latinos have shared interests, in that they are both economically disadvantaged and often share the status of political outsiders. Thus the primary supposition is that Latinos and blacks will support one another at the ballot box. Another line of research, however, points to the potential for political and economic competition between Latinos and blacks. The general argument is that blacks and Latinos often cooccupy the lower rungs of the economic ladder, and this may incite competition for jobs, housing, and certainly political influence. To the extent that intergroup competition ensues, this conflict may impede the future formation of biracial and multiracial coalitions.[2]

The majority of research on black and Latino political relationships has centered on coalitions and context—how elites successfully forge biracial and multiracial coalitions and the contextual factors that tend to promote these alliances. What has been left largely unexplored, however, are the feelings that black and Latino voters have about each other and their respective candidates.[3] Do black and Latino voters typically support each other's candidates? Do black and Latino voters mobilize for one another? Are the empowerment by-products typically associated with minority office-holding—enhanced political efficacy, increased political interest, and increased voter turnout—shared broadly among all minority groups, or are they limited to in-group members only?

This article explores two hypotheses regarding the reciprocity of empowerment effects between blacks and Latinos. The first centers on the symbolic power of in-group attainment. The second is an interest-based account of political attitudes and behavior. Drawing from the existing minority politics litera-

[1] Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, "Minorities and Urban Electoral Change: A Longitudinal Study," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 15 (December 1979): 206–227; Rafael J. Sonenshein, *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[2] Paula D. McClain and A. K. Karnig, "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 535–545; Paula D. McClain and S. C. Tauber, "Black and Latino Socioeconomic and Political Competition: Has a Decade Made a Difference?" *American Politics Quarterly* 26 (April 1998): 237–252.

[3] But see Lawrence Bobo, C. L. Zubrinsky, J. H. Johnson, Jr., and M. L. Oliver, "Public Opinion Before and After a Spring of Discontent" in Mark Baldassare, ed., *The Los Angeles Riots: Lessons for the Urban Future* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

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ture, the first part of this article details a set of theoretical expectations regarding the psychological and behavioral responses that may result from black and Latino empowerment. The remaining empirical analyses combine aggregate voting data and public opinion surveys to analyze empowerment effects from four mayoral elections in Denver, Colorado. I compare the political attitudes, voting behavior, and rates of voter turnout for Latino and black voters during the Latino led regime of Peña (1983–1991) and then during the African-American-led administration of Webb (1991–1995).

Expectations for Minority Opinion and Political Behavior

The Empowerment Hypothesis

It has been widely demonstrated that minority empowerment, in particular black office-holding in city councils and the mayoralty, often results in desired policy outcomes for the black community. In particular, blacks living in empowered cities have enhanced opportunities for municipal employment and government contracts.[4] In addition to the material rewards that often result from political incorporation, there are substantial psychological benefits that result from black empowerment as well. Visible descriptive representation sends a message of inclusion to group members and has been shown to heighten individual levels of political engagement within empowered groups. In particular, black empowerment is shown to effect higher levels of political knowledge, greater trust in local government, and higher levels of political efficacy among voters.[5] Furthermore, recent research concludes that the psychological boost of black empowerment increases levels of black voter turnout when blacks hold the mayoralty.[6]

In general, the empowerment literature concludes that enhanced sociopolitical engagement of black voters results when blacks wield significant power in the city. The empowerment thesis is a social-psychological theory of group behavior and maintains that group cohesiveness and a heightened degree of group consciousness makes blacks, in particular, likely to experience a psychological response from their in-group empowerment. Presumably, other racial and ethnic groups with less internal cohesiveness, less homogeneity, and/or lower levels of group consciousness would manifest a smaller reaction to the respective political attainment of their group members. Given obvious variability in the relative strength of in-group consciousness, especially among non-

[4] Rufus P. Browning, Dale Marshall, and David Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in City Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Kenneth D. Mladenka, "Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics," *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989): 165–192; Sonenshein, *Politics in Black and White.*

[5] Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 377–393.

[6] Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. and Karen M. Kaufmann, "Is There an Empowerment Lifecyle? Long-term African-American Empowerment and Its Influence on Voter Participation," *Urban Affairs Review* 33 (July 1998): 741–766.

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blacks, the question of whether or not other racial and ethnic groups experience similar levels of heightened political engagement as a result of minority empowerment is an empirical one. The extent to which Latino incorporation evokes an empowerment response comparable to blacks is an important focus of this research.

While there is substantial economic and cultural heterogeneity within the black community, the voting behavior and political attitudes of blacks, relative to whites in particular, are often perceived as homogenous.[7] In interracial political contests, black voters overwhelmingly support black candidates and typically vote for Democrats in elections without racial cues. Presumably, black group interests are better served by Democrats than by Republicans; and thus for many black voters, issues of race and party are clearly linked. Furthermore, as has been pointed out by a variety of scholars, the black American experience is unique relative to the immigration/cultural assimilation process that often typifies other minority groups.[8] Thus the historical foundation for black politics coupled with the continuing salience of race in American life sets black Americans apart from other minority groups in the United States.

Latinos are, in a sense, a socially constructed minority that comprise a range of nationalities and are linked by native language primarily and cultural similarities in some instances. Many Latinos, like blacks, live in residentially segregated neighborhoods, face ethnic discrimination, and suffer from economic disadvantages relative to whites. Latino activists, like their black counterparts, continue to push for enhanced educational opportunities, economic advancement, and improved civil rights protection. Nonetheless, there is much greater political heterogeneity within the Latino community and more variance in the degree of group consciousness of its electorate.[9] Furthermore, questions of legal immigration status, language proficiency, and citizenship status often create obstacles for full Latino participation and incorporation into American political life.[10] The trajectory of Latino political development, however, mirrors earlier European immigrant experiences to a much greater degree than does the black American experience.[11] In accord with this similarity, there is every reason to believe that Latinos see value in political participation and will show

[7] Michael C. Dawson, *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[8] Douglas Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); David O. Sears, Jack Citrin, and Collette van Laar, "Black Exceptionalism in a Multicultural Society" (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago).

[9] Sharmaine Vidanage, Collette van Laar, and David O. Sears, "Becoming an American: The Political Socialization of Latinos" (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago).

[10] S. G. Baker, "Su Voto es Su Voz: Latino Political Empowerment and the Immigration Challenge," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29 (September 1996): 465–468; Henry Pachon and Louis DeSipio, "Latino Elected Officials in the 1990s," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 25 (June 1992): 212–217.

[11] Sears, Citrin, and van Laar "Black Exceptionalism in a Multicultural Society."

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increased political engagement as a result of empowerment. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which Latinos and blacks will see any material link in their respective political fates. Does black empowerment enhance the political interest and engagement of Latinos? Does Latino empowerment similarly inspire increased black political activity?

From an empowerment perspective, it seems unlikely that the psychological boost of empowerment is shared much beyond the empowered group. The notion of group identification and group consciousness refers to individual-level attachments and is typically characterized as narrowly group specific. In other words, black consciousness refers to the politicization of black identity and does not have the same psychological importance as a more general minority group identification.[12] Similarly, for Latinos, an empowerment thesis would anticipate increased engagement and political interest among voters that identify themselves as Latino. Black and Latinos voters, however, are not expected to respond to the others' empowerment with the same intensity that accompanies their own incorporation.

The Shared Interest Hypothesis

The empowerment hypothesis maintains that in-group members reap the psychological and behavioral rewards of empowerment and that these effects are not generalizeable to other minority groups. The shared interest hypothesis focuses on the common political agenda of blacks and Latinos, the track-record of conjoined benefits between blacks and Latinos in empowered cities, and thus the inherent rationality for Latinos and blacks to mobilize for, vote for, and generally support each other's candidates and elected leaders.

In part, the basis for this argument comes from Michael Dawson's research on the persistence of racial voting within the black community. Dawson explores the rationality of black political behavior and suggests that for blacks race functions as a utility heuristic. In this vein, he maintains that "as long as African-Americans' life chances are powerfully shaped by race, it is efficient for individual African Americans to use their perceptions of the interests of African Americans as a group as a proxy for their own interests."[13] Therefore, even for middle class blacks, the extent to which their fates are linked to poor blacks continues to make racial interests politically important. If one extends Dawson's rationality argument to minority groups more broadly, it seems reasonable that blacks and Latinos would find it to be in their respective group interests to support minority candidates generally, especially in instances where minorities are competing against whites for political power.

There are several reasons that this may be so. First, the political agendas of minority candidates often focus on similar items such as enhanced educational

[12] Arthur Miller, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk, "Group Consciousness and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 494–511.

[13] Dawson, *Behind the Mule*, 61.

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opportunities for poor minority communities, economic investment in languishing inner-city neighborhoods, greater oversight of local police, and greater fairness in the hiring and letting of government contracts. Second, in many communities neither Latinos nor blacks comprise sufficient numbers to capture important political offices without the other as coalition partners. Finally, there is empirical evidence that the material benefits of minority empowerment—especially economic uplift and increased government jobs—are shared among blacks and Latinos.[14] These findings suggest that the material gains of minority empowerment are not narrowly restricted to in-group members only, thus supporting an interest-based impetus among minority groups to build political coalitions. From the shared interest perspective, blacks and Latinos should support each other at the polls, should mobilize at roughly similar levels, and should exhibit above-normal levels of regime approval when minority officials run the city.

The shared interest hypothesis is certainly not mutually exclusive from the empowerment hypothesis. It is plausible that some minority voters will experience in-group empowerment effects only, while among others, shared interests may be particularly salient. Nonetheless, these two perspectives do predict rather distinctive patterns of behavior. The empowerment perspective anticipates disproportionately large responses from empowered in-groups, while the shared interest hypothesis anticipates similar responses from both groups. The extent to which the findings from this study conform to one set of expectations better than the other implies a prevalent, if not exclusive, response to minority empowerment.

Data and Research Methods

The data for this project come from four mayoral elections in Denver from 1983 to 1995. There are a number of reasons why these elections offer a particularly excellent basis for analysis. First, Denver has been governed by both Latino and black mayoral administrations over the past nineteen years. The city elected its first minority mayor, Federico Peña, in 1983, and he was reelected in 1987. Peña decided not to run again in 1991, and his successor was a black Democrat, Wellington Webb. Webb was reelected in 1995 and again in 1999. Thus the initial eight years of minority empowerment in Denver featured a Latino administration followed by black leadership in the subsequent years. The shift in minority empowerment from a Latino mayor to an African American allows a particularly interesting comparison of group responses to both candidates and a nice test of empowerment effects focused on two minority groups that reside within the same electorate.

[14] McClain and Karnig, "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition"; McClain and Tauber, "Black and Latino Socioeconomic and Political Competition."

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Second, both Latinos and blacks comprise numerical minorities in the city. As of the 1990 census, Latinos were approximately 23 percent of the city's 466,000 residents. Blacks were a smaller minority and comprised approximately 13 percent of the city population. Non-Latino whites comprised the remaining 62 percent, and thus white voters predominated at the polls. Given the relatively small overall size of the minority population in Denver, the potential motivation for blacks and Latinos to form multiracial electoral coalitions seems obvious. In a sense, these Denver case studies represent a conservative test of the empowerment hypothesis, because the inherent motivation for Denver minorities to band together out of shared interests is exacerbated by their numerical minority, both individually and cumulatively.

Finally, it is important to consider the relevance of the Denver case to other cities. Obviously, all cities have unique histories that influence the attitudes and behaviors of their electorates. Nonetheless, there are several reasons to think that these results are representative of more general black/Latino behavior. First, while there has been relatively little research conducted on the question of Latino participation in urban politics, the patterns of turnout observed in this case are consistent with black/Latino patterns in recent New York and Houston elections. In both the 1993 New York and 1997 Houston mayoral elections, where black Democrats opposed white Republicans, rates of black turnout exceeded rates of Latino turnout.[15] Second, Denver is a particularly excellent case study because the shift from Latino to black empowerment enables an analysis of both phenomena without having to take into account differences between two or more cities. To study the Latino response to black empowerment in one city while studying the black response to Latino empowerment in another evokes a host of comparisons that do not pertain to Denver. While Denver is still only one city among many, the black empowerment findings from this research are nonetheless consistent with studies conducted on Cleveland, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and New York.[16]

This project thus explores the extent to which Latinos and blacks share the psychological and behavioral by-products of minority empowerment by studying their respective voting behavior, regime approval, and turnout rates over the course of these four mayoral elections. In particular, I focus on three main questions: To what extent do black and Latino voters support each other's candidates in these mayoral contests? How does the change in minority leadership affect Latino and black voter perceptions about the direction of city govern-

[15] James W. Loewen, "Levels of Political Mobilization and Racial Block Voting Among Latinos, Anglos, and African Americans in New York City," *Chicano-Latino Law Review, UCLA Law School* 13 (1993): 38–73; Alan Bernstein, "Brown Makes History in Victory," *Houston Chronicle*, 7 December 1997.

[16] Karen M. Kaufmann, "Racial Conflict and Political Choice: A Study of Mayoral Voting Behavior in Los Angeles and New York," *Urban Affairs Review* 33 (May 1998): 655–685; Gilliam and Kaufmann, "Is There an Empowerment Lifecyle?"

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ment? Does minority empowerment affect the relative rates of voter mobilization among black and Latino voters?

The data for this project come from a variety of sources. To explore the voting behavior and political attitudes of black and Latino voters, I employ public opinion surveys from 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1995. The 1983 survey was conducted by Research Services, Inc., in collaboration with KMGHTV and is a face-to-face exit poll administered in randomly selected election precincts with 1,346 respondents. The 1987, 1991, and 1995 surveys were conducted by Talmey and Drake, a local political consulting firm, on behalf of the *Denver Post.* They are random-digit dialed telephone surveys and include 2,382 respondents in 1987, 1,301 respondents in 1991, and 573 respondents in 1995. The turnout estimates for the four election years are calculated using city council-level registration and election return numbers. A more detailed methodological discussion of the turnout analysis is presented later in the article.

I explore two main hypotheses. The empowerment hypothesis suggests that the psychological boost of empowerment and the subsequent attitudinal and behavioral responses to minority candidates and minority office-holding will be largely restricted to empowered in-groups. Thus during the Peña administration, one should expect to see enhanced approval of the governing administration and enhanced turnout among Latinos particularly. Similarly, blacks should be more enthusiastic about local government and more politically engaged at the polls during the Webb administration. From an empowerment perspective, expectations regarding the voting behavior of blacks and Latinos are that they will overwhelmingly support their own candidates and be less uniformly supportive of the other. But as both Latinos and blacks in Denver are predominantly Democratic, they are largely expected to support minority candidates anyway. Thus, controlling for party identification, the empowerment hypothesis expects a racial or ethnic response above and beyond what would be anticipated by partisanship alone. Furthermore, the empowerment thesis predicts a relatively larger Latino response when Peña is on the ballot and a commensurately larger black response during the Webb elections.

The shared-interest hypothesis proposes an interest-based account of political attitudes and behavior. From this perspective, blacks and Latinos should support minority regimes in a like manner, as they are apt to benefit more from minority leadership than otherwise. In particular, the shared-interest hypothesis expects to find enhanced positive attitudes toward local government and above-normal rates of political participation for both blacks and Latinos during the nineteen-year period of minority empowerment. This perspective also expects to see largely reciprocal electoral support between blacks and Latinos for their respective candidates.

Research Findings

Mayoral runoff candidates in Denver are decided in at-large nonpartisan primaries; and as the partisan balance in the city tilts heavily toward the Demo-

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TABLE 1

Mayoral Voting Behavior, Denver, Colorado, 1983–1995

Percent Who Voted For	*Peña (1983)*	*Peña (1987)*	*Webb (1995)*
Blacks	86	82	96
Latinos	96	92	74
Whites	42	39	44

Source: KMGHTV Exit Poll (June 1983), Denver Post Runoff Polls (May 1987 and June 1995).

crats, it is not uncommon for both of the mayoral candidates to be Democrats. Of the four elections under study, two featured white Democrats running against a minority Democrat (Peña vs. Dale Tooley in 1983 and Webb vs. Mary DeGroot in 1995); one featured two black Democrats (City Auditor Wellington Webb against District Attorney Norm Early in 1991); only the 1987 race featured a Republican candidate, pitting Democrat Peña against Republican Don Bain. The variance in candidate match-ups is quite helpful, for it allows for the comparison of both racial and partisan effects. The first set of analyses explores the group-related patterns of voting behavior in the 1983, 1987, and 1995 elections. The 1991 election is excluded from this analysis, for there were two black candidates in the runoff and thus no racial or minority candidate variance in this election.

Group Voting Behavior, 1983–1995

Table 1 presents a summary of Latino, black, and white support for the minority mayoral candidate in three of the four elections. There are several interesting findings.

Note that blacks and Latinos overwhelmingly support candidates from their own group. Blacks, however, are more generous in their reciprocal support of Peña (86 percent and 82 percent) than Latinos are of Webb (74 percent). There are a number of possible explanations for this disparity. Peña was the first minority mayor (Latino or black) in the city of Denver, and his groundbreaking status may have created an extraordinary impetus among blacks to break the proverbial color barrier. Furthermore, one of Peña's central campaign tenets was a message of inclusiveness targeted at minorities. His promises of diverse minority appointments represented a stark contrast from prior administration policies.[17] Finally, differences in partisanship may also explain black electoral support for Peña. African Americans are typically more Demo-

[17] Rodney Hero, "The Election of Hispanics in City Government: An Analysis of the Election of Federico Peña as Mayor of Denver," *Western Political Quarterly* 40 (March 1987): 93–105; Rodney Hero and Kathleen Beatty, "The Election of Frederico Peña as Mayor of Denver: Analysis and Implications," *Social Science Quarterly* 70 (June 1989): 300–310.

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cratic than Latinos and whites, thus their preference for Peña may reflect these underlying differences in party identification.

Beyond this rationale for Peña's appeal to black voters, there are also several possible explanations for Webb's weaker showing among Latinos. The strongest of these points to the 1991 mayoral election as an incipient power struggle between Latinos and blacks. The candidates in the 1991 election were Norm Early, the black district attorney, and Wellington Webb, the black city auditor. Early was closely aligned with the Peña administration and was preferred by 60 percent of the Latino voters in the runoff. Webb, in this case, was an outsider to the power establishment and received over two-thirds of the black vote. Webb's victory over Early resulted in many of the Peña appointees being displaced, and this may have been interpreted among Latinos as a higher level of disenfranchisement than would have occurred under Early.[18] In addition to this factor, Webb's first administration was tainted with accusations of cronyism. Webb was charged with favoring black insiders on lucrative airport contracts. Since his alleged cronyism appeared to have benefited blacks disproportionately, this too may have dampened support among Latinos. In the absence of more comprehensive survey data, it is difficult to be certain of the factors that precipitate this disparity. Nonetheless, the patterns in electoral support among blacks and Latinos do point to several preliminary conclusions.

First, the high levels of in-group support demonstrated by Latinos and blacks are consistent with other urban election studies[19] and suggest that in-group identification is a powerful electoral cue. In no case, however, does Latino support for the black candidate or black support for the Latino candidate rival levels of in-group voting. Consistent with the empowerment hypothesis, these preliminary findings suggest that the attraction that group members have for their own candidates are not fully shared by other minority groups.

Second, the political conflict between Latinos and blacks in the 1991 election and the weakened Latino support for Webb in 1995 sheds doubt on the premises of the shared-interest hypothesis. Webb's opponent in 1995, Mary DeGroot, ran a racially divisive campaign that generally would have been considered inimical to minority interests. Her positions opposing affirmative action and proposing "maximum harassment" for gang members (including police sweeps through minority neighborhoods) put her commitment to minority interests and civil rights protections in serious doubt. The fact that one in four Latinos voted for DeGroot in spite of this suggests that other factors apart from minority group interests influenced vote choice. Thus the proposition that

[18] Floyd Ciruli, "The Reelection of Mayor Wellington Webb—Urban Liberalism Makes a Stand" (paper presented at the 1996 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco).

[19] For example, see case studies in Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rodgers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds., *Racial Politics in American Cities* (New York: Longman, 1997); also see Yvette Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks, eds., *Black and Multiracial Politics in America* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

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blacks and Latinos have roughly equal incentives to pursue minority empowerment generally appears to be weakened by this finding.

Third, I conducted two logistic regression analyses exploring the extent to which racial voting in these races reflects levels of candidate support in excess of what would have been anticipated by partisanship alone. Logistic regression is a statistical technique often used to estimate the relative influence of given factors on voting behavior. In this case, these analyses were used to estimate respective contribution of race and partisanship on minority voting in the 1987 and 1995 mayoral elections.

In 1987, incumbent Peña ran against a white Republican, Don Bain. In this election, Latinos were 39 percentage points more likely to vote for Peña than were their white counterparts, controlling for differences in party identification. Blacks were 23 percentage points more likely to support Peña than were whites. This pattern, however, is reversed in the 1995 Webb election. Here, with the black incumbent running against a white Democrat, blacks were 38 percentage points more likely than whites to support Webb, while the Latino margin over whites was a lesser 21 percentage points. These findings generally support the empowerment perspective, because minority voters were clearly more attracted to candidates that shared their own ethnic or racial group identity than they were to each other's candidates. The regression results can be found in the Appendix.

Finally, the levels of white support for both Peña and Webb are surprisingly constant over time and seem to suggest a certain minority support threshold among the white electorate. Much of the research on voting behavior in the context of black mayoral candidates demonstrates substantial white resistance to black empowerment, especially in the initial contests.[20] As a general rule, turnout among whites and nonwhites is elevated when blacks first run for office, and white resistance is typically at its most pronounced level. In an absolute sense, 42 percent white support for Peña's first bid would be considered high in the context of a mixed race/ethnicity election. Given that the Denver local economy in 1987 was in a dire condition, the 3 percent drop in white support from 1983 seems quite modest. The most unexpected result from Table 1 is Webb's 44 percent rate of support from white voters, as it was only slightly higher than that received by Peña in 1983. By Webb's election in 1995, the Denver economy was quite robust. A number of high-profile public investment projects such as the Denver International Airport, Coors Field, and a new convention center had recently opened, and the local economy was at its contemporary apex in terms of growth and low unemployment. A theory of retrospective voting most certainly would have predicted a higher share of the white vote for Webb. Nonetheless, his vote share among whites was only slightly higher

[20] Thomas F. Pettigrew, "When a Black Candidate Runs for Mayor: Race and Voting Behavior" in Harlan Hahn, ed., *People and Politics in Urban Society* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 90–105; Kaufmann, "Racial Conflict and Political Choice."

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than it had been in Peña's initial bid for the mayoralty. The stability of white voting behavior over these three different elections is quite extraordinary in light of the enormous economic volatility that characterized this period. This finding appears to suggest a persistent amount of racial and ethnic resistance with regard to electoral choice among white voters.

Perceptions of the City Under Minority Governance

The second analysis looks at the perceptions that groups hold regarding the status of the city generally under different minority administrations. Research conducted on black empowerment indicates that blacks demonstrate increased political efficacy, greater interest in and more positive attitudes toward city government when blacks hold the mayoralty. The focus of this analysis is to determine whether or not this enhanced positive influence extends beyond the empowered group to include minority groups generally. The empowerment hypothesis maintains group specific effects and does not expect blacks and Latinos to experience commensurate levels of positive response during each other's respective administrations. The shared-interest hypothesis, however, would expect to see greater similarity between blacks and Latinos, explained by a common interest in minority empowerment and heightened expectations of policy responsiveness. I explore this hypothesis by comparing Latino and black survey respondents on their relative evaluations of city government at the end of Peña's first term (1987), at the end of Peña's second term (1991), and at the end of Webb's first term (1995). It is quite evident that minority mayors provide a strong symbolic boost to their respective racial and ethnic groups. Under Peña in 1987, 69 percent of Latinos felt the city was on the right track compared to only 56 percent of blacks and 36 percent of whites. Similarly in 1991, prior to Peña's leaving office, 79 percent of Latinos thought the city was on the right track compared to 57 percent of blacks and 66 percent of whites. At the end of Wellington Webb's first term in 1995, however, the pattern was reversed. Blacks became the most optimistic about the direction of the city (a whopping 86 percent), Latinos were still quite approving, albeit less positive than blacks (71 percent), and like in 1987, whites were the least optimistic (55 percent).

The irony in these findings is that while blacks and Latinos were considerably more content with the direction of the city generally, they were also as groups considerably less economically prosperous than whites. According to U.S. Census Bureau data from 1990, the median household incomes of both blacks and Latinos in Denver were approximately 42 percent lower than whites. Thus from an objective standpoint, Latinos and blacks should likely be more aggrieved than whites, at least from an economic perspective. The fact that Latinos and blacks were both significantly more optimistic in 1987 and 1995 than whites clearly indicates a strong symbolic response to minority incorporation. While Peña was leading the city, Latinos were the most optimistic, significantly

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exceeding whites and blacks. During the Webb administration, blacks were the most contented, and the change that occurred between 1991 and 1995 suggests additional support for the empowerment hypothesis.

These findings also provide support for the shared-interest hypothesis, particularly in Peña's and Webb's first terms. During 1987, only 36 percent of whites felt that the city was on the "right track" compared to 56 percent of blacks and 69 percent of Latinos. The low approval number from whites likely reflected the abysmal local economy as well as any discontent with a minority mayor generally. In spite of the flagging local economy, however, blacks were substantially more optimistic about the direction of the city, and their economic position as a group, relative to whites, would not typically predict this response. Rather, the heightened level of approval shown by black voters indicates that many blacks likely saw Latino empowerment as beneficial to their group as well.

Like blacks in 1987, Latinos in 1995 appear to have shared some of the psychological benefits of minority empowerment even though they no longer controlled the mayoralty. Their assessments of the city were largely positive in 1995 (71 percent), although, not as positive as they had been under Peña four years earlier. Finally, white voters in 1995 appeared rather curmudgeonly. The health and prosperity of the local economy were at a contemporary high, and yet only 55 percent of whites approved of the direction of the city.

In conclusion, these findings suggest several things. First, symbolic empowerment effects were clearly evident among Latinos in the case of Peña and among blacks in the case of Webb. While Latinos are considerably more ethnically and politically heterogeneous than blacks, their exceptional approval levels during Peña's two terms constitute strong evidence of a group-centered empowerment response. Second, there is some evidence that the psychological boost of empowerment may be experienced beyond the empowered group. Heightened levels of black approval in 1987 and Latino approval in 1995 indicate a positive response to minority incorporation generally and suggest that shared interests may be a salient consideration for regime approval.

Political Mobilization and Minority Empowerment

I have maintained that minority empowerment in Denver has influenced the voting behavior and political attitudes of minority in-groups. Latinos were nearly uniform in their support of Peña, especially in his initial term. Similarly, blacks were overwhelmingly supportive of Webb in his reelection contest against Mary DeGroot. Latinos were more optimistic than other groups about the status of the city during both Peña administrations, and blacks were similarly buoyed by Webb's election in 1991. Furthermore, these findings point to substantial levels of reciprocal support between African-American and Latino voters, with blacks providing slightly more support for Peña than Latinos did for Webb.

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FIGURE 1
Voter Turnout in Denver Mayoral Elections 1979–1995



Note: Turnout is calculated as a percentage of registered voters.
Source: Denver Board of Elections.

Recent research by Gilliam and Kaufmann finds that black empowerment in Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Atlanta resulted in disproportionately high turnout rates among blacks in mayoral elections.[21] While traditional explanations of turnout propensity would expect blacks in these cities to participate at lower rates than whites given their relatively lower socioeconomic status, this research shows that in all three cases empowerment at the mayoral level corresponded with turnout rates among blacks that were equal to or in many cases substantially higher than that of whites. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that while white turnout was relatively high during initial minority challenges, their turnout rates dropped substantially during periods where they became the out-group in mayoral politics.

Using a similar methodology to that employed by Gilliam and Kaufmann, the following explores the turnout rates of blacks, whites, and Latinos in these four elections. The empowerment hypothesis presumes that Latino turnout will surge during the Peña contests and that black turnout should peak during the 1991 and 1995 elections. If the boost in turnout associated with minority empowerment translates to other groups with similar political interests, as is suggested by the shared-interest hypothesis, Latino and black turnout should both remain high—relative to white turnout—during this period.

Figure 1 represents overall levels of voter turnout from 1979 (the election prior to Peña's election) to 1995. The turnout rate in 1979 was approximately 54 percent and was fairly typical of turnout rates in municipal elections during

[21] Gilliam and Kaufmann, "Is There an Empowerment Lifecyle?"

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FIGURE 2
Denver Municipal Turnout by Race and Ethnicity—1983–1995



Note: Turnout is estimated as a percentage of registered voters.
Source: Denver Board of Elections.

this period.[22] The presence of a minority candidate in 1983 stimulated enhanced turnout among all groups, and turnout in Denver spiked to a very high 72 percent. The turnout increase in 1983 was notably quite high, yet entirely consistent with contests in other cities when minority candidates initially run for office.[23] The subsequent decline in turnout during Peña's reelection campaign is also characteristic of other cities, as both minority group and oppositional mobilization typically wanes after the initial contest.

Figure 2 addresses the question of minority turnout in particular, and displays black, white, and Latino turnout for the four Denver mayoral elections from 1983 to 1995. Ideally, one would like to compare levels of racial and ethnic turnout in 1983 and beyond with benchmark numbers prior to minority empowerment. However, municipal redistricting in 1982 makes pre- and postcomparisons nearly impossible. Prior to 1982, city council districts in Denver were racially heterogeneous so that whites constituted majorities largely in all districts.

[22] Albert Karnig and B. O. Walter, "Municipal Voter Turnout: A Longitudinal View" (paper presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC).

[23] Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough*; Gilliam and Kaufmann, "Is There an Empowerment Lifecyle?"

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As a result of the 1982 redistricting, minorities were clustered to enhance the potential for minority representation on the council for both blacks and Latinos. This redistricting in large part enabled the turnout analysis conducted herein; however, it precludes estimating black and Latino turnout rates from earlier decades.

In each of the four elections, turnout rates are estimated for two predominantly black council districts, three predominantly Latino council districts, and six primarily white council districts. The reported rates represent voter participation as a percentage of registered voters, and overall group turnout rates are calculated by averaging the turnout in each group's respective districts. There are several important findings.

Consistent with expectations from the empowerment thesis, Latino turnout (73 percent) in 1983 is higher than either white (67 percent) or black (66 percent) turnout. And while turnout among all three groups is atypically high for Denver elections generally, the exceptionally robust Latino rate suggests a powerful group-centered response to Peña's candidacy. In 1987, Latinos continued to post the highest relative turnout rates with white turnout slightly lower and black turnout slightly lower still. As research on Latino participation consistently shows, Latinos typically vote in proportions much lower than whites, so that these dramatically high turnout rates speak quite clearly to the strong impact of minority empowerment on Latino voting.[24] The relatively lower turnout rates among blacks during the two Peña elections further suggest that the enhanced engagement associated with empowerment may not translate to other racial and minority groups. While the relative level of black support as a percentage of total black votes was quite substantial, blacks were nonetheless less motivated to turn out than were Latinos.

These patterns in voter turnout become even clearer when one considers Denver's mayoral elections in 1991 and 1995. The candidates in the 1991 mayoral runoff were both black and, not surprisingly, overall turnout in the runoff election was actually lower than it had been in the biracial primary. Blacks, who had the lowest turnout rates in 1983 and 1987, however, now posted the highest rates (53 percent). Latino participation, conversely, declined to 45 percent, the lowest of these three groups. White voters, consistent with the prior two elections, fell in between these minority groups with a rate of 48 percent.

In 1995, Wellington Webb ran for reelection against a white candidate, and blacks continued to turnout at the highest rate (47 percent). Whites voted at slightly higher rates than Latinos, who had an especially low turnout rate of 37 percent. These patterns of participation are consistent with the expectation that white out-group turnout declines during periods of minority electoral dominance. What is interesting, however, is that Latinos do not appear to receive

[24] Daron Shaw, R. de la Garza, and J. Lee, "Estimating Latino Turnout in 1996: A Three State Validated Survey Approach," *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (April 2000): 338–346; Rodney Hero and Anne Campbell, "Understanding Latino Participation: Exploring the Evidence from the Latino National Political Survey," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 18 (May 1996): 129–141.

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any symbolic boost from black empowerment and thus behave similarly to white out-groups in biracial cities. The fact that blacks and Latinos do not appear to mobilize for one another's candidates at enhanced rates provides strong support for the notion that empowerment effects are narrowly group specific. The absence of reciprocal empowerment effects implies a key stumbling block to building and sustaining minority coalitions.

Voter participation research on national elections typically relies on survey data as opposed to aggregate election results. While some may argue that survey data provide more robust estimates of group turnout rates, the limited number of validated surveys and the overreporting of the vote endemic to public opinion polling, render much of this research truly inappropriate for turnout analyses. At the level of city politics, there are no validated surveys available and thus really no way to explore group-specific turnout short of using aggregate returns. Admittedly, the rates reported in this research do not reflect "actual" rates in that black, Latino, and white council districts are not perfectly homogenous. Nonetheless, the rather dramatic flip-flop between black and Latino turnout from the Peña years to the Webb years is not a subtle effect. That blacks go from the lowest rate in 1983 and 1987 to the highest rate in 1991 and 1995, and that Latinos go from the highest rate in the 1980s to the lowest rate in the 1990s, is fully consistent with the empowerment hypothesis and is not subject to a variety of other explanations. Were these data not as clear, nor these movements among groups as large, one might be concerned about drawing too many inferences. Given the clarity of these findings, however, they seem to suggest real changes in the behavior of these groups responding to shifts in minority empowerment.

Conclusion

This article began with an assessment that Latino voters have become increasingly consequential to electoral politics in many large cities. And while considerable attention has been paid to black empowerment and its effect on black voters, commensurately little is known about the behavioral and attitudinal implications of minority empowerment as they pertain to Latinos. Current thinking often assumes that the shared interests of urban minorities—especially blacks and Latinos—will motivate these groups to cooperate politically. Insights from social psychology on the nature of black empowerment, however, point to the power of symbolic in-group attachments and imply that the enhanced political engagement that often results from empowerment is not likely to be shared broadly across different racial and ethnic groups. Data from four mayoral elections in Denver, Colorado are used to explore the voting behavior, regime approval, and mobilization rates of blacks and Latinos under two Latino-led and two black-led mayoral administrations. The findings from this research point to several important conclusions.

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First, strong in-group empowerment effects are seen among both blacks and Latinos. During the two Peña terms, Latinos were more positive toward city government, more likely to vote, and provided higher levels of electoral support than other groups. These findings mirror the results for black voters during the later period of Webb's mayoralty. It thus appears that for Latinos, visible descriptive representation stimulates enhanced engagement in and positive attitudes toward local government, much as would be expected from an empowerment perspective. Black empowerment in Denver stimulates a similar, albeit slightly greater, response from black voters. These findings replicate results from earlier studies on black office-holding and further confirm the powerful symbolic reaction that empowerment engenders.

Second, there is notable reciprocity of electoral support between Latinos and blacks; however, blacks tended to support Peña in greater numbers than Latinos supported Webb. At first blush, the greater partisan homogeneity of black voters seems a likely explanation for this disparity. However, controlling for partisan differences, blacks continued to be more supportive of Peña. The intergroup conflict over power relations that occurred between blacks and Latinos during the 1991 election may have also contributed to Webb's relatively weaker showing among Latinos. These findings may simply reflect an asymmetry between blacks and Latinos in their attraction to each other's candidates. At a minimum, these elections illustrate the potential for conflict to exist between two minority groups vying for power within the same city and suggest that their respective interests may be more group-specific than the shared-interest perspective would have anticipated.

Finally, this analysis highlights a central limitation of minority empowerment with regard to voter turnout. While Latino and black office holding resulted in higher levels of political participation for empowered in-groups, there was no evidence of a more generalized effect. In spite of any mutual material interests that may have been shared by blacks and Latinos, Latinos showed up in much greater proportion when Peña was on the ballot than did blacks when Early and Webb were running for office. These findings clearly support the empowerment hypothesis. Furthermore, to the extent that higher levels of turnout are spurred by enhanced efficacy and engagement, the absence of reciprocal turnout effects sheds doubt on the proposition that blacks and Latinos receive much of a psychological boost from the empowerment of minority groups other than their own.

Of the three main findings in this article, the lack of reciprocal turnout between Latinos and blacks is perhaps the most daunting and suggests a weak foundation for their political alliance. Over thirty years ago, Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichael in their provocative book, *Black Power*, maintained that the true interests of black Americans are not shared by other groups.[25]

[25] Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Random House, 1967).

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They argued that groups and group-members are basically self-interested and that contemporary political coalitions founded on shared ideologies are fundamentally unstable. The findings from this study tend to validate this point of view. It is not that black and Latino voters won't support other minority candidates, it is that their commitments to the general cause of minority empowerment are not as profound as their commitments to their own groups. From this perspective, the notion of rainbow coalitions and the like may be little more than political rhetoric if the hearts and desires of urban minorities are not fully vested in this vision.*

APPENDIX

Peña (D) vs. Bain (R) 1987		*Webb (D) vs. DeGroot (D) 1995*	
Blacks	1.37*	Blacks	2.88*
	(0.20)		(0.69)
Latinos	2.43*	Latinos	1.11*
	(0.23)		(0.37)
Party Identification	−2.27*	Party Identification	−1.25*
	(0.12)		(0.27)
Constant	0.43*	Constant	0.36
Number of Cases	2166	Number of Cases	386
Percent Predicted Correctly	76%	Percent Predicted Correctly	69%

Note: $*p < 0.05$ Cell entries represent logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is vote for minority candidate (Peña in 1987; Webb in 1995).

Source: Denver Post Runoff Polls (May 1987 and June 1995).

* The author owes considerable debt to Floyd Ciruli of Ciruli and Associates, Talmey-Drake Research and Strategy Inc., and Richard Maullin of Fairbank, Bregman and Maullin, Inc. for sharing their insights and polling data for this project. Any errors herein are those solely of the author.

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

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American Secret Intelligence: A Review Essay

JOHN PRADOS

At least two major approaches underly all types of intelligence collection activity. One is the traditional method, the province of the spy. The second is the selective and creative adaptation of scientific method, giving rise to the genus known in the trade as "technical collection." Each of these methods has its uses and each contributes to any comprehensive intelligence program. Both have histories of great interest and possibilities that are quite important in today's world. Each of the methods is dissected in one of these books.[1] Individually and together the volumes offer informed commentary on issues that need to be understood much better, especially given the necessity of defending against terrorism and other contemporary threats.

The analysts here are highly qualified to conduct these studies. In the spirit of disclosure, I acknowledge being well acquainted with both of them. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is an American history specialist at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. In addition to excursions examining violence in America and the peace movement during the Vietnam war, Jeffreys-Jones has written two previous books on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as edited collections and published papers on the subject. Jeffrey T. Richelson has written widely in the field and is today a senior fellow at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. Among his works are books on satellite collection of information, foreign spy services, espionage through the twentieth century, and a guide to the U.S. intelligence community that has appeared in four editions.

[1] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).

JOHN PRADOS is a fellow of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, directing its Vietnam documentation project, and author of eleven books, four of them on intelligence subjects. He has just published *The Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William E. Colby* and a volume on the Dien Bien Phu crisis of 1954 titled *Operation Vulture.*

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Both these authors would argue that the United States stands at a crucial juncture today and both would probably agree that the CIA and other American intelligence organizations, as they presently stand, are not that well adapted to the challenges the United States faces.

Richard Gid Powers on the dust jacket calls *Cloak and Dollar* "scathing and surprising." Scathing it may be, but not so surprising. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has shown talent in the past for imagery that captures the imagination. In his best known work, *The CIA and American Democracy*, Jeffreys-Jones took the bureaucratic notion of "standing" and made it his measure of merit as well as the centerpiece of his analysis. In the present book, the author's image is that of the confidence man. In America, as Jeffreys-Jones puts it in his preface, "there has been a long-standing conspiracy of spies, a great confidence trick designed to boost the fortunes of the spy rather than protect the security of the American people" (p. viii). The "intelligence confidence man" (p. 4) uses smooth talk, salesmanship and spin, hyperbole and deception to further his aims. Efforts to deflate the spies and lies, increasingly prevalent since the 1860s in the author's view, have not retarded the growth of the intelligence community.

Facile? Yes—but as is so often the case in intelligence matters, there is some fire behind the smoke. The very stuff of intelligence has always been information, whether acquired secretly or otherwise, and the problem for any intelligence organization is to convince policy makers that the construction it places on information is the correct one. That certainly involves a degree of salesmanship, as well as trying to get close to the customers in exactly the way a con-man would. Maneuvers to affect information, alongside struggles over roles and missions (such as analysis versus intelligence covert operations) are the main forms that interagency struggle assumes within the intelligence community. This phenomenon is most recently evidenced in the effort by Donald H. Rumsfeld's Department of Defense to create a new in-house unit to supply a different perspective from the CIA's on Iraq. Such maneuvers are endemic to intelligence work. To term this a confidence operation is refreshing, but the connotation is also highly negative. One needs to ask if this is a valid view.

Jeffreys-Jones set out to prove his case through a series of profiles of people interspersed with occasional interludes on organizations. *Cloak and Dollar* is less an integral history than it is a sampling of individuals, offices, and notorious episodes. The individuals begin with George Washington and include Allan Pinkerton, Spanish naval attaché (in 1898) Ramon de Carranza versus Secret Service chief John Wilkie, William J. Burns and J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), codebreaker Herbert O. Yardley, William J. Donovan, Allen Dulles, Senator Frank Church, and William J. Casey. Among the author's more interesting episodes are his accounts of counterespionage during the Spanish-American war and his rendition of U.S. intelligence efforts in World War I and immediately thereafter. More familiar are the accounts of Pinkerton in the Civil War, the Pearl Harbor debate, the 1960s, and Iran-contra. Much of the con-man thesis rests upon the choice of individuals to profile, and

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Jeffreys-Jones chooses good ones; but it would have been possible to select a different group of people and show a different picture. Jeffreys-Jones's account of the last decade, in a chapter titled "The Real American Century?" (pp. 255–288) acknowledges that none of the intelligence agencies has produced a "super-spinner" of late, although "there were plenty of people around who had been versed in the Casey school of discourse" (p. 262). Today's Iraq debate illustrates the reality of maneuvers to affect information, but the jury has to remain out on the notion that the entire intelligence enterprise is a con-man conspiracy.

Jeffreys-Jones's discussion of recent espionage fiascos suggests the continuing difficulties associated with spying, which brings us to the hyper-scientific alternative, ably handled in *The Wizards of Langley*. This book, much more a comprehensive history, focuses on the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). In it Jeffrey Richelson conclusively demonstrates the value of science to intelligence affairs. Richelson, an indefatigable user of the Freedom of Information Act, has uncovered an eighteen-volume organizational history of DS&T, which he couples with more declassified documents, interviews, and the work of other observers to produce a formidable tome. Richelson argues that "the Directorate of Science and Technology has made an enormous contribution to U.S. intelligence capabilities and national security" (p. 286). The evidence bears him out.

When the CIA was established in the late 1940s, it had no major scientific component. There was a group essentially descended from the Alsos mission of World War II fame, which had inherited the files of the Manhattan Project, dedicated to research on foreign nuclear developments. In agency usage, specific subject areas are handled by a constantly shifting constellation of units and desks reporting to branches, which are grouped in offices or ad hoc staffs that form the directorates. That was about it. The CIA soon formed a scientific branch and in early 1949, melded the nuclear group to this to form an Office of Scientific Intelligence. The covert side of the CIA also soon formed a Technical Services Staff to create the mechanisms that would help spies and conduct scientific research in support of secret operations. The great CIA technological development programs of the 1950s—high altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the U-2, then what eventually became the SR-71) and spy satellites (the CORONA program)—were handled by a special assistant working directly for CIA Chief Allen Dulles.

The disparate scientific elements of the agency followed their own leads for a decade. It was not until 1962 that a later director of central intelligence, John McCone, gathered the CIA's science units together in a single entity, which became the Directorate of Research. Other CIA components resisted transferring their assets to the new organization, however, and a new beginning was made in the summer of 1963, when the unit was retitled the Directorate of Science and Technology, the name it retains today. *The Wizards of Langley* recounts these events in some detail and follows the evolution of the DS&T

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through the subsequent decades. Richelson sees the interval as a period of bureaucratic growth, with DS&T attaining the status of a CIA scientific empire by 1972, but he concludes that the agency's scientific component now faces a more uncertain future. The prolonged cold war struggle against the Soviet Union skewed technology programs in a certain way, while the burgeoning developments in science pose new problems. At the same time, the CIA has major (and some new) competitors in the science and technology areas, including the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and, most recently, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Struggles over roles and missions have forced the agency to give up some of its activities and units to other elements of the intelligence community. At one point near the end of the Clinton administration, Richelson notes, CIA officers feared their directorate might be abolished just two weeks later. That did not happen and perhaps the threat was never real, but DS&T's difficulties remain.

The explosion of information technologies poses one key challenge. A certain amount has been made in the press of late regarding CIA initiatives with private industry. Among the most notable is its creation three years ago of the In-Q-Tel Corporation, a nonprofit venture capital firm formed with $28.5 million in CIA money. This is a project of the Directorate of Science and Technology. A number of other CIA efforts to harness public sector companies to cope with specific information technology questions are also DS&T endeavors. Richelson believes that exploiting information technologies will be a key DS&T activity into the future, although "that should not be its only reason for being" (p. 290).

Though *The Wizards of Langley* is more of an institutional and technological history than an account of issues and times, Richelson does not neglect the people of DS&T. He concludes that "people are another vital element in any future directorate successes" (p. 291). Richelson is very good at bringing in the scientific backgrounds of a wide variety of CIA science wizards, often noting papers written, schools attended, areas of expertise, and the like. His profiles of a number of DS&T directors, including "Bud" Wheelon, Carl Duckett, Leslie Dirks, Evans Hineman, and Joanne Isham, while not rising to the level of Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's biographical writing, are competent and illuminating.

Where Richelson shines most, however, is in describing the nuts and bolts of CIA science programs. From spy planes to drug experiments, it is all here. The wizards concocted new means of measuring the capabilities of radars, novel methods of conducting overhead photography, electronic intercept projects customized for CIA's special needs, arcane gadgets for the spies, and plenty more as well. Nor does the author neglect CIA's big scientific gaffes. The notorious mind control drug experiments of the 1950s get several pages, while DS&T's exploration of the use of psychics for intelligence purposes during the 1970s is recounted in some detail over almost a dozen pages. There are outlines of scientific intelligence contributions to a number of crises as well, including material on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, the October War, the Iranian

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Revolution, Somalia, and the Gulf War. Keeping the focus on the intelligence enables Richelson to detail technical collection efforts without delving very deeply into the specifics of the world events through which the wizards are passing.

The Wizards of Langley is also a fine counterpoint to two previous books Jeffrey Richelson has written regarding spy satellites. Most recently he contributed *America's Space Sentinels* (1999), dealing with those satellites that watch for nuclear detonations on the earth. In *America's Secret Eyes in Space* (1990) the author supplied a detailed account of the evolution of a photographic satellite program called KEYHOLE, the mainstay of U.S. overhead photography for several decades and the successor to the CORONA program previously mentioned. The CIA was seen as having a role in determining which objects those satellites should survey and in interpreting the photos that came back from space. The satellites themselves were launched and operated on a daily basis by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). In fact, the wizards of DS&T played a crucial role in the scientific research that enabled the satellite designs to be engineered successfully and in solving the myriad technical problems of the engineering process. The NRO was never comfortable with the CIA contribution and repeatedly sought to gain control of the DS&T elements working in this area. In *The Wizards of Langley*, Richelson outlines this underground interagency struggle, one that had real impact on U.S. intelligence, with the insight of a seasoned observer of these matters. The book performs a similar function on the struggles between the Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency over the U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, and on the differences between CIA and the National Security Agency over electronic intercept capabilities and technological developments.

Ultimately, all the technological wizardry falls short today, when the intelligence target has shifted. Instead of missiles in their silos and warships in their bases, the United States suddenly needs to track large numbers of individuals submerged within a mass population. Technology still helps, since persons can be detected when they make use of modern conveniences susceptible to the techniques of the wizards, but in truth we are back in the realm of Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones's con-man, the spy. These new books provide important insights on a major issue that should be of interest to us all.

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

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Book Reviews

By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action *by Phillip J. Cooper. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002. 320 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

For most of the modern era, presidency scholars have measured presidential power within a strictly bargaining framework. Roll calls and vetoes have defined when and whether presidents influence public policy. Strong presidents effectively guide major legislative pronouncements through Congress, just as weak presidents regularly witness committees ignoring their agendas and floors overriding their vetoes.

Phillip Cooper breaks new ground. In a carefully researched and highly readable volume, *By Order of the President* effectively demonstrates that presidents can influence public policy outside of traditional lawmaking processes without ever proposing a policy initiative to Congress or vetoing an objectionable bill. The core of this important book is an inventory of the tools of direct presidential administration. Cooper devotes whole chapters to executive orders, presidential memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and presidential signing statements, defining these policy mechanisms, differentiating each from the other (as well as can be done), examining historical examples of executive direct action, and noting the attendant dangers for democratic governance that they present.

The sheer number of unilateral policy enactments issued in the modern era is astonishing. From national security directives that launched a cold war, negotiated arms sales and transfers, and set a foundation for a war on drugs; to executive orders that established affirmative action policies, prohibited trade with foreign nations, and created all sorts of administrative agencies; to memoranda that regulated medical research, authorized foreign aid, and implemented large-scale administrative reforms; there are few public policy arenas in which presidents do not unilaterally set public policy. And in many, presidents play a dominant role precisely because they can act without the expressed consent of Congress.

Of course, there are limits to these powers. And Cooper is sensitive to the various ways in which Congress, the courts, interest groups, and state and local governments can raise the political costs of executive direct action, and occa-

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sionally thwart the president's intentions. At the end of each chapter, Cooper outlines the strengths and weaknesses of each of the president's "power tools."

Missing from Cooper's account is a sustained analysis of the political forces that dictate when presidents will act administratively, when they will pursue legislation, when they entertain both strategies simultaneously, and when they forego action entirely. Insights abound, but no single theory holds them together. No matter. This volume sets unilateral policy making front and center, showing how and when presidents find loopholes in budgetary accounts and take advantage of vague statutory authorizations in order to make "end runs around Congress" (p. 55).

Cooper's book, along with Kenneth Mayer's *With the Stroke of a Pen*, sets the foundation for a new wave of research on presidential power, one that recognizes that presidents make public policy without Congress, often instituting reforms that would never survive the legislative process. "The idea that the president could move to govern in no small part by decree is a concept of which most Americans are blissfully unaware. If they were alert to the practice, many would most likely be aghast that the president could, in effect, write law without benefit of the normal constitutional processes or even the requirements for administrative rulemaking mandated by statute" (p. 15). Cooper has put the public and scholars of the presidency on due notice.

As scholars turn to theory-building, examining the logic of unilateral action within systems of separated powers and assessing the trade-offs of legislation and administrative directives, the presidency literature may advance beyond bargaining, negotiating, and persuasion—the staples of presidential success that Richard Neustadt identified some forty years ago, and presidency scholars have been repeating ever since.

WILLIAM G. HOWELL
Harvard University

The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers *by Ryan C. Hendrickson. Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 2002. 224 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $24.95.*

Since 1950, the War Clause of the Constitution, which grants to Congress the sole and exclusive authority to choose between war and peace, has been repeatedly ignored and violated, the victim of presidential usurpation as well as congressional abdication of its constitutional powers and responsibilities. If there might have been a time in recent memory when Congress might have chosen to assert its control over the war power, Ryan Hendrickson writes in a probing and thoughtful analysis of the use of military force during President William Jefferson Clinton's tenure, "it would have occurred with the Republican revolution after the 1994 midterm elections, when the presidency was in a weakened

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state" (p. 173). The putative assertiveness, however, never materialized. For a variety of political and policy considerations, members of Congress have been content to acquiesce in the face of unilateral presidential warmaking.

Hendrickson's book involves a series of six case studies that examine the principal military deployments and engagements during the Clinton presidency. Hendrickson offers valuable analysis and commentary on the deployment of troops to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia; military strikes in 1998 against Usama (Hendrickson uses the FBI's spelling) Bin Laden; the United States-NATO action in Kosovo; and the ongoing missile strikes in Iraq. What emerges from Hendrickson's study is a disturbingly familiar pattern of presidential usurpation of the war power that is indulged and, one may dare say, encouraged by an obsequious legislature. As Hendrickson rightly notes, members of Congress, for reasons of domestic political concerns and partisan considerations, acquiesced in President Clinton's assumption of the war power. Democrats sought to protect their president for blatantly partisan reasons; and for what might be characterized as cynical political tactics, Republicans deliberately avoided confrontations with Clinton over military action in Bosnia and Kosovo. "By keeping all military responsibility with the president," Hendrickson observed, "the Republicans could not be blamed for a failed operation" (p. 165). So much for the Madisonian maintenance of institutional integrity.

The abdication by Congress of its own constitutional powers makes it difficult to offer corrective measures. Hendrickson proposes a statute that would require the president to win the approval of a joint committee of thirteen members, drawn from the leadership of both chambers, before initiating hostilities. He hopes this proposal would produce greater deliberation between the two branches but concedes that it "seems unlikely that it would deter a determined White House from acting unilaterally" (p. 171). The principal objection to his proposal, however, is that it would subvert the constitutional requirement that a majority of both houses must vote to go to war, just as a majority of both chambers must vote to appropriate funds from the Treasury.

Hendrickson's fine, comprehensive treatment of the war power under President Clinton has only a few blemishes. There is the puzzling statement that, since the founding, Congress has "passed only five declarations of war" (p. 1). Congress passed six declarations of war in World War II alone and dozens of conditional declarations of war and statutes authorizing acts of war on other occasions. In his chapter on Kosovo, Hendrickson inexplicably downplays a crucial vote on 28 April 1999, in which the House defeated by a tie vote a measure that would have authorized Clinton to order military strikes to halt Slobodan Milosevic's attacks against ethnic Albanians. By refusing to pass the measure, the House denied Clinton the constitutional authority he needed to wage war. But he defied the House and waged war anyway. Nevertheless, this book deserves a wide reading and careful study.

DAVID GRAY ADLER
Idaho State University

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Multiparty Politics in America: Prospects and Performance, 2nd ed. *edited by Paul S. Herrnson and John C. Green. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 208 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $22.95.*

Any book about multiparty politics in the United States must address three questions: Why are there no strong third parties in the United States? When can third parties attract support? What do third parties hope to achieve? In addition, a book published after the 2000 elections should examine Ralph Nader's role in the presidential election. In these tasks, *Multiparty Politics in America* generally succeeds, albeit unevenly.

The first half, which explores the possibilities of third parties in America, reflects this unevenness. After Paul S. Herrnson's second chapter ably answers the Why, When, and What questions, there are two chapters opposing and advocating a two-party system, written by Kay Lawson and John F. Bibby, respectively, and a third chapter by John Green, which suggests the public is receptive to third parties. The book stumbles slightly in these three chapters, because many of the arguments are insufficiently persuasive.

Lawson argues that "bi-hegemonic" party systems often ignore significant blocs of the population and prevent true majority rule. Bibby contends, however, that the American two-party system encourages the major parties to unite the interests of most of the population, a point Herrnson also discusses. If as Bibby points out there are significant groups of voters willing to support extremists like David Duke, which the major parties run away from, then perhaps Lawson does have a point. These chapters cover many well-established and valid points, but fail to provide strong, new arguments to persuade skeptics.

Green presents recent data to argue that potential third-party support has risen in recent years, but one is left unsure how much question wording influences Green's findings. For one thing, if a 2000 Gallup poll shows 67 percent support for a strong third party, why do the 1992–1998 National Election Studies show only 23–31 percent support? Bibby cites yet another poll from 1995 that can be read as saying that third-party support is only 12 percent. And if Green's data are conclusive, why does Lawson write, "the evidence does not suggest that Americans look favorably on minor parties"? Voters probably do want more choice in the abstract, but this response variability calls into question their commitment to the likely alternatives.

The chapters in the second half of the book look at third-party activity in recent years and provide the freshest perspectives. Among these, Peter L. Francia and Paul S. Herrnson's chapter on third-party candidate resources in legislative elections is particularly interesting. Most literature on third parties focuses on presidential elections and ignores the local foundation upon which, as Francia and Herrnson note, successful third parties will have to build. Similarly, chapters by John Green and William Binning, Christian Collet and Jerrold Hansen, and Robert Spitzer provide case studies of the Reform party, the Green party,

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and fusion parties in New York State, respectively, that usefully illustrate arguments from the first half of the book.

The book concludes with a chapter by Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny. Their summary discusses third parties' prospects and notes pessimistically how the major parties, courts, and voters could, but are unlikely to, aid third-party growth. If parties, courts, and even the third parties themselves have erected barriers to growth, is voting for ineffectual third parties the voters' only option? An obvious avenue that Dwyre and Kolodny overlook is the citizen initiative, which was used in California as an instrument of party reform in creating the blanket primary. A novel question would be whether there is sufficient support in such states to pass the institutional reforms that would help third parties.

PHILIP PAOLINO
The University of North Texas

A User's Guide to Campaign Finance Reform *edited by Gerald C. Lubenow. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 156 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

Written just as Congress began its debate on the McCain-Feingold bill for the last time, this book remains useful now that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) has become law. While the authors in this volume do not always agree with each other, their well-argued essays encourage serious thought on the subject. Overall, the volume offers a sober approach to an issue that has been waged in emotional and ideological terms by those on either side of the debate.

Robert Mutch reveals that corruption has been with us since George Washington's first election in 1758. He argues that the campaign finance laws before 1897 "were accepted because they fell within the area of overlap among competing notions of democracy," while today the debate "does not fit neatly into that overlapping area" (pp. 23–24). In Chapter 4, Kenneth Mayer notes that the problem is exacerbated by inadequate media coverage of the issue and the simplistic arguments made by reformers: "[t]oo often, reform arguments reduce complicated political processes to a simplistic money-equals-votes relationship" (p. 72). Thus it is not surprising that in Chapter 3 William Mayer shows just how cynical citizens are about the campaign finance system and how little they know about current campaign finance laws.

Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber, and James Snyder argue that campaign spending has not increased: if spending is normalized over time using the gross domestic product rather than the consumer price index, campaign spending has remained steady since 1912. Thus society is not losing income because of corruption: "[f]avor selling and corruption . . . amounts to a trivial part of our economy . . ." (p. 41). The authors do concede that favors for contributors

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may cause negative external social consequences. Yet they trust that a "well-functioning system of representation, in which a critical media and other democratic institutions expose the external costs of the campaign contributions, and voters will punish politicians" (p. 45). I was not convinced.

There are real inequalities in the campaign finance system. William Mayer shows that citizens believe interest groups have more influence than voters, that contributions influence policies, and that both parties engage in unethical campaign finance practices. Clyde Wilcox reports that contributors are overwhelmingly wealthy, white, and male. He suggests that expanding the donor pool will encourage more, and different, citizens to participate by contributing, giving those now left out of the donor pool a greater voice in politics.

Ray La Raja gives us a look at how state parties actually spend soft money. He cautions against an outright ban, for it is clear that parties spend a good deal of their soft money on party building and voter mobilization, activities that most observers would consider positive. He recommends allowing a $100,000 limit on soft money, similar to the $10,000 state party soft money limit in the BCRA. La Raja's research is the kind that E. Joshua Rosencranz challenges political scientists to produce to help judges make informed decisions in campaign finance cases. He warns that judges need solid, empirical research results on which to base their decisions or we may end up with more "botched judicial forays into the political thicket" (p. 130). Rosencranz's chapter is an excellent, concise review of how campaign finance laws have been interpreted and altered by the courts.

The book closes with eight reform proposals offered by Norman Ornstein. Many of these, developed by a small group of campaign finance scholars including Ornstein, were incorporated into the McCain-Feingold bill. His chapter shows how the work of political scientists can have an important impact on policy making.

DIANA DWYRE
California State University, Chico

What Government Can Do: Dealing with Poverty and Inequality *by Benjamin I. Page and James R. Simmons. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000. 409 pp. $29.00.*

Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails *by Amihai Glazer and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001. 204 pp. $35.00.*

Given disciplinary partitions in the academic mind, it is not surprising that books often appear on the same subject without any cumulative increase in knowledge from their common concern. This is unfortunate, especially when

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the topic is important. In the two books under review, the common and important topic is what citizens can reasonably expect government to be able to do in advancing their domestic welfare. While both pairs of authors claim to be addressing this question from a political economy perspective, their approaches have little in common, the promises implied by their declarative titles remain unfulfilled, and their conclusions bear only a superficial resemblance to each other. Each book is a solid, workmanlike academic tome. However, for the lay reader the result is likely to be confusion or even a net loss of understanding, assuming there can be such a thing as negative serendipity from reading two incommensurate books on the same subject.

Political scientists Benjamin Page and James Simmons offer a straightforward account of federal social policies that is designed to show both that redistributive programs do work and that they could do much more to combat poverty and economic inequality. Of course, there is a tension, though not necessarily a contradiction, between these two lines of argument. As the authors point out at the outset, economic inequality and poverty remain at disturbingly high levels. At the same time, the book argues that citizens would be mistaken to draw negative conclusions about the capacities of government to deal with these problems. Four informative chapters at the center of the book offer an account of the successes that have been achieved in the areas of social insurance, tax policy, education, and labor market programs. One also learns much about the gaps that remain, particularly in the availability of good jobs paying decent wages.

Ultimately, the authors thread the line between complacency and discouragement by putting the main blame on the current political system for failing to pursue more far-reaching social policies. Rather than pressures of the global economy, the undemocratic features of the American political process have prevented the nation from doing more about poverty and economic inequality. The power and privilege of moneyed interests in politics stand athwart this path to a fairer society. Page and Simmons conclude that through political reforms to equalize citizens' power, the way will be opened for more ambitious policies to guarantee all Americans the right to basic standards of food, housing, medical care, and possibly even (the authors waver here) guaranteed incomes. In essence, *What Government Can Do* restates a standard case for defending and expanding the American welfare state through a recommitment to progressive politics.

By contrast, *Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails* proposes to look beyond "conventional political explanations" (p. 2) and show why some policy problems are inherently more solvable than others. The economist Amihai Glazer and University of Rochester political scientist Lawrence Rothenberg seek to understand the difference between policy success and failure in terms of the variable economic constraints associated with different policies (versus the motivations of politicians and influence of special interests that they claim political scientists are wont to study).

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Readers will need to recognize that the economic constraints the authors have in mind have nothing to do with budgets and funding difficulties. The economic analysis in question refers to the way policy outcomes are shaped by the calculations of rational economic actors in certain generic contexts of public choice. Four particular economic constraints are considered in chapters devoted to four broad policy realms (macroeconomic policy, economic redistribution programs, government regulation, and public production of goods and services).

The first economic constraint is termed "credibility," the conviction that government will follow through on its promised actions. The second is "rational expectations . . . the collection of, and the sophisticated response to, information by decisionmakers" (p. 6). In the authors' view, failure is likely to attend policies that economic agents can readily anticipate and manipulate. The third economic constraint is the tendency for a policy to augment or displace the corresponding activity of other actors, or what is termed "crowding in and crowding out." Finally, "multiple equilibria" refers to the fact that different outcomes can be produced by the same circumstances. In such cases, government may have a greater chance of pushing outcomes from an undesirable to a more favorable equilibrium point.

If one imagines that all this sounds too abstract and slippery to offer very firm conclusions about "why government succeeds and why it fails," he or she would be correct. The constraints often point both ways at once for a given policy domain, thus producing something of a credibility problem for the analysis itself. The authors conclude that on the whole, when compared with popular views on the matter, macroeconomic and regulatory policies tend to be more difficult than assumed, government production is as tough as imagined, and redistributive policies have a greater chance of succeeding than commonly assumed. On the latter point at least, the two books would seem to agree. If government policies are not producing major redistributive reductions in economic inequality, it is not for lack of knowing how but for lack of political will to do it.

HUGH HECLO
George Mason University

Welfare Policymaking in the States: The Devil in Devolution *by Pamela Winston. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2002. 352 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $24.95.*

Devolution, the shifting of policy responsibility down the federalist food chain from the national governments to states, was the hallmark of the 1996 welfare reform legislation in the United States. Arguments in favor of devolution centered around three themes: that states are laboratories where policy innovations can be tried on a small scale; that policy can be tailored to local needs; and that state policy making is inherently more democratic because smaller

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units are more conducive to broad citizen involvement in politics. In this meticulously researched and elegantly constructed book, Pamela Winston convincingly shows that the last of these propositions is false, and in doing so she casts serious doubt on the first two as well.

The book compares the involvement of citizens through interest groups in the making of welfare policy both at the federal level (the 1996 welfare reform act) and at the state level (through parallel case studies of Maryland, Texas, and North Dakota). The theory of devolution, Winston argues, holds that citizen influence—particularly the influence of poor people and their advocates, who are at a well-documented disadvantage in the policy-making arena—should be greater in the states than in the federal government.

Winston shows that precisely the reverse is true. Somewhat surprisingly, given the partisan and ideological climate in Washington in 1996, a wide range of groups was actively involved in the construction and adoption of welfare reform. She measures involvement by charting testimony in legislative hearings, a reasonable approach although not without limitations. Even more surprisingly, several child advocacy groups, many of whom were quite critical of the emerging Republican approach to welfare reform, seem to have been quite influential in shaping the policy.

In the states, by contrast, group involvement was severely limited, especially in tiny North Dakota, where the issue seems barely to have registered in the state's political consciousness. More to the point, welfare recipients and the poor more generally were less well represented and wielded less influence over policy making in the states. Devolution, Winston concludes, has shifted welfare policy making into an arena where the poor are systematically even less powerful than they are in national politics.

In making this argument, Winston revives an important tradition in political science that has fallen into disuse, if not disfavor. She calls it neo-Madisonianism, following James Madison's argument in *The Federalist*, No. 10 that an extensive republic is best equipped to prevent factions from capturing the machinery of government and to preserve broad citizen influence over government. More recently, this tradition is associated with Grant McConnell, Theodore Lowi, and Paul Peterson, who have shown in various ways why small, decentralized political units are particularly susceptible to constrained democracy, limited citizen involvement (particularly by the poor), and factional capture. Building on this estimable tradition, Winston shows that welfare devolution—the revenge of the antifederalists who sought (contra Madison) to preserve the supposed political intimacy of the states—makes all of these consequences more likely. Thus, not only does state policy making fail to amplify the voices of poor Americans in policy debates that affect them directly, it also seems unlikely to produce either policies that are precisely matched to local needs or true problem-solving innovations.

The book is not without its shortcomings. Although its exposition of the varieties of neo-Madisonian theory is clear enough, it does not marshal this the-

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oretical material into clear, testable propositions about interest-group participation and influence that might clarify the mechanisms at work in shaping state policy making and refine neo-Madisonian theory. Consequently, its potential theoretical impact is rather limited. Nevertheless, this remains an important corrective both to the triumphalism that has overwhelmingly greeted welfare reform and to the suspect theory that lies behind it.

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN
Columbia University

On Equal Terms: The Constitutional Politics of Educational Opportunity *by Douglas S. Reed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. 256 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $17.95.*

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has chosen to provide it, is a right which must be made available on equal terms." (*Brown v. Board of Education.*) Chief Justice Earl Warren's stirring language directly addressed the problem of racial segregation in American public schools. As Douglas Reed's new book points out, however, race and class inequalities intersect as white flight to the suburbs deprives cities of both a diverse student body and a growing tax base. "Resource segregation . . . can circumscribe learning and life opportunities just as efficiently and cruelly as racial segregation" (p. xiv). Reed's project is to outline both the similarities and differences between racial and financial inequity in public education, and to analyze the role of courts and constitutionalism in shaping and remedying both sets of disparities.

The first chapter of *On Equal Terms* describes the shift of civil rights lawyers from fighting battles over desegregation to challenging resource disparities between wealthy and poor public school districts. These inequities are usually created through reliance on local property taxes to fund education, supplemented by state aid. Wealthy districts can fund their schools much better, even while taxing at a lower rate, than poorer districts. The education finance battles, unlike federal court contests over desegregation, generally are taking place at the state level, relying on state constitutions instead of the U.S. Constitution.

Reed analyzes the success of the state supreme courts (now nearly twenty) that have declared their state's public school funding mechanism unconstitutional. Using statistical analysis of eight states, he finds that going to court made a positive difference for the poor district plaintiffs in terms of equity, as well as increased resources. States without a winning suit held steady or even widened the equity gap. Reed then hypothesizes a number of reasons why state courts might enjoy more success with fiscal equity than federal courts dealing with de-

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segregation, including the statewide target (that is, flight from equity was harder), one legislative body, not multiple school boards, the divisible nature of money, and greater trust in elected state judges than in unelected federal judges. Regarding both issues, though, courts must deal with the problem of altering "broader hierarchies of power" (p. 48).

In later chapters of the book, Reed uses a concept he calls "constitutional ordering" to discuss how constitutions shape and are shaped by not only judges but politicians and nonlegal actors such as the general public. All of us are engaged in a project to find constitutional meaning. Specifically, Reed analyzes public opinion surveys regarding school finance equity. He finds strong general support for equal educational opportunity, but that support drops dramatically if the public believes local control of schools is threatened. The merging of the public opinion data on school finance equity in one work, coupled with Reed's analysis of it, is one of the strongest contributions of this book.

Finally, Reed discusses case studies of inequity in New Jersey and Connecticut, and closes with two proposals for remedying both racial and class inequity through the use of "magnet neighborhoods," granting property tax credits for those who send their kids to predominantly poor and minority schools. This idea, although well-intentioned, may be unrealistic; however, it is worth a try.

Overall, *On Equal Terms* is a solid, well-written book on unquestionably important issues. Reed almost takes on too much, occasionally sacrificing depth for breadth; however, there is plenty of food for thought here, making for a worthwhile read.

MATTHEW H. BOSWORTH
Winona State University

Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era *by Taeku Lee. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002. 272 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.00.*

The research of this assistant professor at the Kennedy School boldly undertakes several serious challenges. The author questions both what he identifies as the "orthodox" view that only elite actions shape public opinion and the way in which public opinion has come to be measured. This is done in the course of determining what changed the public's opinion on civil rights. Attitudes about civil rights held by African Americans, southern whites, and northern whites are examined over seventeen years that include the activation of the civil rights movement and continue through the mid-1960s, when Congress passed major policy initiatives.

The primary objective of this research is testing how attitudes about race relations are shaped. Are they exclusively the product of actions taken by political elites such as the courts and presidents, or can they be mobilized by actions at the grassroots level? Put simply, which came first, an active public or elite

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actions? In building his case, Taeku Lee challenges two significant works written from an elitist perspective—John Zaller's *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* and Edward Carmines and James Stimson's *Issue Evolution.* The first sets forth the receive-accept-sample theory of opinion formation, while the latter examines the role of civil rights in party realignment.

In contrast to elite-based claims, Lee contends that African-American mass protests changed public opinion as it related to civil rights before the elite actions of the mid-1960s cited by Carmines and Stimson. Some of the early stands taken by elites, according to Lee, came in reaction to demands coming from a black counter elite. Using American National Election Study survey items on school desegregation and fair employment and housing from 1956–1964, the author shows that prior to 1964—the critical date in the Carmines and Stimson presentation—public support for change was already linked to attitudes about civil rights groups and party identification. Ultimately, distinctions between elites and masses eroded, leading the author to characterize the later relationship as "movement-initiated, movement-elite interactive" influences on public opinion.

In building his case, Lee challenges today's heavy reliance on surveys, the technique that has almost become synonymous with public opinion. He criticizes surveys for often failing to tap emerging public concerns, since topics may not be included until they have already been propelled onto the public agenda. Lee returns to an earlier tradition that saw public opinion manifest in multiple ways and turns to letters to the U.S. presidents who served from 1948–1965 to determine public concerns about civil rights. He tracks the issues raised in these letters to see whether they come in response to elite activities, which Lee defines as actions of political institutions (the president, Congress) or in reaction to mass activities such as the Montgomery bus boycott and a riot at a Paul Robeson concert.

In tracing public opinion, Lee identifies three strains—African Americans, southern whites, and nonsouthern whites. He shows that these were mobilized at different times and by different factors and that the nature of the appeals made by these groups changed over time. Lee poses provocative questions to what had become accepted wisdom concerning the mobilization of public opinion and the ways in which it has been operationalized. He does not reject the influence of elites on public opinion but rather contends that the elite orientation misses grassroots activism, which at times plays a critical role.

CHARLES S. BULLOCK III
University of Georgia

Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field *edited by Donald J. Puchala. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 2002. 192 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Several seminars in the autumn of 1998 were the setting for the presentation of the essays comprising this book by eight scholars with varied but distinguished

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careers as students of international relations (IR). Sponsored by the Walker Institute of the University of South Carolina, the authors were asked to articulate their visions for IR by expounding answers to three questions: What ought the student of IR study? How should the study of IR be conducted? Why is it meaningful in contemporary contexts to study IR within your prescribed paradigm and in the ways you prescribed? Unlike most symposia and to the credit of the editor, the authors confined their analyses to these questions as they interpreted them; but like most symposia, the results do not add up to a coherent volume in which the essays speak to each other or even converge upon comparable visions for the future.

Such an outcome is hardly surprising. All three of the questions designed to infuse coherence into the volume invited the authors to go their separate ways and expound upon the substantive foci, methods, epistemological premises, and literatures that inform their own work. To be sure, they do agree, each in their own way, that IR is not a discipline and, in some cases cannot even be regarded as a field, so disparate are the phenomena, paradigms, and interests that sustain their inquiries. Otherwise, however, there is little overlap among the eight essays, which may have the advantage of introducing the reader to diverse approaches to the organizing questions but which is disappointing for those who aspire to the evolution of at least minimally shared perspectives on the key problems of studying IR.

I found two of the essays especially instructive. One, by Margaret G. Hermann, outlines various concepts of psychology and social psychology—stereotypes, focused interaction, dilution, subtyping, positive affective ties, deprovincialization, and norm reframing—that inhibit interaction among communications and bridge-building among IR scholars. She argues persuasively that greater attention to these phenomena can go a long way toward moving the study of IR from debate to dialogue. The second essay is by Richard Mansbach, who alone among the authors focuses on the current condition of world politics and its prime underpinnings and central processes that may unfold in the future. Put briefly, he anticipates changes in the nature of political space and worries that colleagues in IR are so blinded to territory that they cannot meaningfully recognize the transformations that lie ahead.

Five of the remaining essays by Yosef Lapid, Harvey Starr, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, and Nicholas Onuf focus mainly on the problems of analyzing IR phenomenon and their own particular way of going about the task, plus not a little criticism of those who employ alternative approaches. The final essay by the editor takes a different approach and explores the works of Karl Deutsch and Harold Lasswell with a view to indicating how their conceptions may have relevance for the emerging world of the future. Taken together, these six essays provide good insights into the state of international studies, both in terms of the welter of ideas and concepts it encompasses and the tensions and conflicts it harbors.

Still, with the exception of the Hermann and Mansbach chapters, the book does not live up to the promise of its title, which to me suggests the necessity

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of envisioning what international relations are likely to become. Our collective enterprise needs less concern about how to probe IR and more attention paid to elaborating competing visions of how IR is likely to be shaped by the present forces at work in the world.

JAMES N. ROSENAU
The George Washington University

The New Russian Diplomacy *by Igor S. Ivanov. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 203 pp. $22.95.*

Generally one can expect that a book by a sitting foreign minister will offer a distinctly discrete and less than frank account of both government policy and personal views. Such books typically amount to summaries and justifications of official policy rather than objective political analysis or historically valuable insider accounts of policy debates and policy making. Igor Ivanov's book largely fits this mold. Ivanov does present important aspects of Moscow's assessment of post-cold war international relations. Reiterating official policy lines, he rebukes Washington for acting as if the international system were unipolar, for its readiness to use force in disregard of international law, for its conduct of "virtual undeclared war" against "so-called rogue states" (p. 50), and for potentially stimulating nuclear proliferation by abandoning the ABM Treaty. Echoing views held by many in the Russian government, Ivanov charges that the United States seeks "to force Russia out of territories that formed part of the Soviet Union (such as the Caspian Sea Basin)" (p. 112). He outlines in reasoned tones Moscow's position regarding the desirability of a multipolar international system, which accords a central role to "collective mechanisms" for promoting international peace and security (p. 45). This commitment to multipolarity and collective mechanisms is not simply a product of a high-minded internationalism. Though Ivanov may wish to leave this impression, he makes clear in an interesting, albeit selective, look at continuity in Russian foreign policy that campaigning against isolation has long been central to Russian diplomacy. The current danger, he notes with some justification, is that the nation "will be relegated to Europe's backyard" (p. 115).

Though not by intention, Ivanov's account illustrates the ambivalent character of the new Russia's diplomacy. In an introduction written for American readers he notes that Russia and America "are united by shared democratic values and by joint responsibility for maintaining world peace" (p. 2). Subsequently, however, Ivanov stresses the need for Russia to pursue a pragmatic "multi-vectored foreign policy that [takes] advantage of anything that might produce real returns for domestic development" (p. 14). Reflecting a view widely shared in the Russian government, Ivanov makes clear his disapproval of the idealistic pro-Western policy pursued in the early 1990s. His disdain for

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the conduct of Russia's foreign policy in this period is apparently so complete that he makes no mention of Andrei Kozyrev, the new Russia's first foreign minister (1991–1996). NATO's eastward expansion and subsequent military campaign against Yugoslavia discredited the accommodating policy toward the West associated with Kozyrev's tenure, and this disillusionment is reflected by Ivanov. In line with official policy, Ivanov refers to the enhanced consultative status Russia gained in NATO in 2001 as a turning point in Russia-NATO relations—a view not fully shared in Russia's policy establishment.

While Ivanov's summary of Russia's general outlook on international relations and U.S. policies will be informative for general readers, his survey of many aspects of Russia's contemporary diplomacy is superficial and unenlightening. Though his book was completed after the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, he provides no new details regarding Russia's policy of cooperating with Washington's campaign against al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. There is little discussion of Russia's relations with the Central Asian Republics, its troubled relations with Georgia, and the dilemmas Moscow faces in its relations with Belarus. Moscow's relations with China are disposed of in a few paragraphs of diplomatic boilerplate, and after grandiloquently telling the reader that "the historic partnership between Russia and India cannot be overestimated" (p. 122), Ivanov dispenses with the subject in a few unnoteworthy sentences. An appendix containing the most recent official statement of basic principles guiding foreign policy adds to the value of a volume that otherwise is likely to be of limited interest to more specialized readers.

WILLIAM D. JACKSON
Miami University

Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force From Korea to Kosovo *by Jeffrey Record. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2002. 216 pp. $28.95.*

We might like to believe that political leaders in general and U.S. presidents in particular make their decisions to go to war or to employ military force carefully, rationally, and with all available information. In reality, the decision to use force—to go to war—is made in an environment of tremendous uncertainty. In other policy situations, where time is not of the essence, or at least not thought to be, leaders may feel free to wait until reliable estimates of costs and benefits associated with all policy options become available. Decisions to go to war or to employ military force are frequently made during crises, situations where time or secrecy is of the essence or believed to be so. In these situations, political leaders must find some way to cleave the proverbial Gordian knot. They have to find a way to anticipate the outcomes and costs associated with likely future events, even though they do not have available the information they would like to have in order to best serve the national interest.

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Jeffery Record, writing in a long tradition of psychological models of foreign policy decision making, points out that American presidents in the post-World War II era typically used historical analogies to solve this information problem. Record demonstrates that the American presidents' decision-making processes follow the lines of the following: Today's crisis is the moral or functional equivalent to crisis X that occurred in the past. The best policy today will be either similar to, or the opposite of what we observed happening in the past. The quality of the decisions that follow will be powerfully affected by the appropriateness of the analogy the president chooses. Record points out that since World War II, American presidents have been guided by analogizing the policy dilemma of the day with two historical events—the Munich crisis of 1938 and the U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. Record carefully demonstrates how these two events and American presidents' perception of them have shaped powerfully both the decision of whether or not to employ military force and also the means by which force is used. Record reviews the nature of the decisions leading to military force employment in these two wars and how presidents' subsequent analogizing to these two salient events affected, for better or worse, U.S. foreign policy in every major military crisis from Korea to Kosovo.

In his analysis, Record accomplishes several useful tasks. Most importantly, he introduces readers to a thoughtful way of evaluating the importance and power of historical analogies—that is, how presidents use them and the potential pitfalls associated with picking the wrong lessons from history. Second, with a brief but careful review of numerous force employments that might have otherwise been avoided, Record illustrates the common themes in U.S. foreign policy from 1950–2000. This is a valuable and timely book. Its brevity is one of its greatest assets as well as a source of its few weaknesses. Much historical controversy has been swept aside in order to sustain an often compelling narrative. But what may frustrate academics may prove of more use to those with limited time for reading but who also desire a careful and nuanced précis of a series of important historical events. In short, this is a valuable guide to thinking about presidential uses of force; it is useful for both better understanding the past and the future as well, a rare accomplishment to be sure.

ALLAN C. STAM
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Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options *by Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters. Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001. 310 pp. $35.00.*

Any study on homeland security runs the risk of being out of date by the time it leaves the publishing house. Compared to other defense topics, this is a rapidly moving field. Key definitions have changed several times; and officials at local,

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state, and federal levels have taken numerous measures, especially since September 11, 2001, to resolve previous issues or address earlier weaknesses. RAND analysts Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters have nonetheless published a study on homeland security that has something of value for the newcomer as well as the expert.

The book is well organized, with chapters centering on the critical mission areas for homeland security: protecting Americans at home; ensuring constitutional authority; ensuring military capability; and protecting sovereignty. The study also includes a chapter on illustrative planning vignettes and one on an analysis of army DOTLMS (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Leadership, Materiel, and Soldier Systems). The newcomer will find the book's framework and topic areas useful for getting a handle on the major issues.

The expert will quickly notice that the book was written with a specific focus in mind—the role of the U.S. Army in homeland security. And that many of the authors' recommendations—that the Army must explain its role better to the American public, for example—have already been taken up. Others—such as establishing "realistic" performance goals for preventing, managing, and responding to various types of threats—do not lie entirely within the army's purview. Thus, there is little new for the expert to chew on, though he or she will likely find the appendices, which contain a wealth of information, useful.

Overall, Larson and Peters appear to recommend a fiscally cautious approach to preparing the U.S. Army for homeland security. In brief, they advocate a three-step process. The first is to identify the event magnitudes to include in homeland-security planning. The next is to balance those magnitudes against desired levels of performance. The final step is to evaluate all feasible program options for cost effectiveness. At first glance this approach seems sound. However, when considered in light of the events of September 11, some problems emerge. When compared to real events of that nature and magnitude, any attempt to calculate objectively event magnitude, level of performance, and cost effectiveness inevitably comes across as facile. In addition to thousands of dead and injured in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, for example, there were also billions of dollars in physical damage, loss of business revenues, and inestimable psychological trauma. How much should the army spend to prevent a similarly devastating incident from occurring, particularly when its involvement in both the crisis and consequence management aspects of the incident were not as extensive as one might expect? The answer should not be as little as necessary, as Larson and Peters seem to suggest, but as much as necessary. This is not to say that the U.S. Army is the right tool for all aspects of homeland security, but that the Larson-Peters's equations are flawed because they fail to account for the magnitude of second- and third-order effects.

Even though many of its recommendations have been overcome by events and its fically conservative approach may be too facile, the book nonetheless offers a useful starting point for the homeland-security newcomer. The five mis-

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sion areas provide a cogent framework for understanding the threats the nation faces and how it should think about defending against them; and the approaches provide easy access to a great deal of useful information.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II
U.S. Army War College

Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism *by J. Paul de B. Taillon. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. 248 pp. $64.95.*

Taillon focuses on government responses to counterterrorism through the lens of two terrorist tactics—hostage taking and hijacking—that necessitate international cooperation in order to facilitate a successful resolution. The strength of Taillon's research lies in his three case studies of hostage rescue situations in Entebbe, Mogadishu, and Malta, which are all detailed examinations of the various steps necessary to achieve success in a counterterrorist operation both on the military and diplomatic fronts. This study is framed as a "lessons learned" of what to do and what not to do when confronting a complex terrorist situation that involves the rescue of innocent civilians.

Taillon highlights several key themes that governments can and should take away from studying these historical cases and apply to the current security environment where terrorism is once again a premier security concern. He emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in sharing intelligence, forward basing military personnel, accessing secure communications, training military forces, and exchanging expertise. Taillon acknowledges the political challenges inherent in forging these alliances and contends that counterterrorism cooperation is most likely to occur when countries share the same threat perception.

Taillon's expertise in the specific operational requirements that are necessary in a counterterrorism hijacking and hostage-rescue situation, what he calls the "final option," are impressive and underscore the complexity involved in these highly specialized and sensitive military operations where time is of the essence. However, it would have been useful to see an expansion of these ideas to focus on more timely applications in the post-September 11, 2001 security environment. One suggestion would be a survey of how well international military cooperation has worked in rooting out al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, an examination of the problems that occurred, and a suggestion of possible remedies, although the reviewer acknowledges this is a substantial topic that merits its own separate study. Future scenarios that are of increasing concern to military strategists and policy makers alike both in the United States and abroad would also be germane. For example, it would be useful to examine how

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international cooperation would be actualized in a situation where terrorists are developing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or have obtained these weapons, a situation which would certainly bring its own unique problems to the table. Of particular interest would be how elite counterterrorism teams would be deployed, what specific requirements they would have, and what pitfalls they would face. A discussion of this type of operation in the abstract may help current planners and military strategists construct a roadmap of how a scenario such as this would need to be designed.

Moreover, Taillon makes the argument that terrorists are evolving and consistently upping the ante to ensure increasingly spectacular and devastating attacks against their adversaries. He says, ". . . nations who must deal with this style of warfare are re-evaluating . . . the present and future regarding the nature and intensity of the threat" (p. 58). Since the "final option" is one that an increasing number of nations will have to consider in the ongoing war on terrorism, a discussion of how this option might be implemented in such an environment would have been a useful application of Taillon's operational expertise. He is absolutely correct to point out that countries subject to persistent terrorism cannot go it alone; they will be defeated by its violence without the help of cooperative nations, a robust sharing of intelligence, and by placing a premium on military professionalism and expertise. One only has to return to lessons of Mogadishu, Entebbe, and Malta to remind us.

SARA A. DALY
The RAND Corporation

Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years *by Athan Theoharis. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2002. 320 pp. $27.50.*

A decade of revelations of the espionage activities of American Communist party members has reshaped how scholars view the postwar period. This research into the Rosenberg case, the Hiss case, the Venona intercepts, and documents from Soviet archives has given glimpses, however incomplete, into the workings of an extensive Soviet espionage network in America.

In his new work, *Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War*, historian Athan Theoharis critically examines these espionage revelations and asks some hard questions about both Soviet spying and the response of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to it. His analysis is fundamentally political, examining how the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover was not a neutral law-enforcement agency, but a political operation seeking power and influence by any means necessary.

Chasing Spies is both a work of synthesis and investigation. It summarizes and critiques a sprawling literature on espionage in postwar America, and ar-

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gues that the U.S. response to Soviet espionage was hampered by the FBI's illegal methods of investigation and its bureaucratic agenda. Thus, the FBI spent thousands of man-hours watching and hounding legal trade-unionists, but missed many opportunities to close down the Soviet espionage network in America. Theoharis's descriptions and analyses of espionage cases are thorough and fair, though at times tedious in detail.

The freshest material in *Chasing Spies* examines the history of illegal operations at the Bureau, including wire-tapping, break-ins, interference with court proceedings, and politically-motivated surveillance. Theoharis's chapter on "The Politics of Morality," coming over two-thirds into the book, is a revelation; it describes the FBI's campaign against "sex deviates," a politically motivated operation designed to build files for political blackmail, not to enhance U.S. security.

Theoharis manages to reconstruct how the FBI used information and rumors about sexual matters to destroy careers when it suited the Bureau, and to let such information languish even when it might be a legitimate security issue. The Bureau might claim that it was protecting the nation from blackmail of American individuals by the Soviets for espionage purposes, but the agency itself helped create the climate of fear that would make such blackmail possible.

While Soviet archives have yielded treasures for scholars, the Bureau's records preservation record is Orwellian. Theoharis provides case after case of destroyed FBI files, purged filing systems, misleading documentary procedures, and resistance to public accountability at the Bureau. In spite of this, Theoharis finds enough evidence to tell his story and present his case, though as he points out about Soviet archives, partial releases of information can be more misleading than no information at all.

Does Theoharis make the case promised by the subtitle of the book? It would take more investigation to sustain his charge that the FBI simply failed to stop Soviet espionage in America. While Theoharis's research and argumentation is provocative and well-substantiated, given the lack of evidence available to historians in many cases, guessing at the motivations and political calculations of the Bureau's counter-intelligence operation is just a shot in the dark. On the second charge, Theoharis has far more evidence available and is able to make and sustain stronger arguments about the Bureau's role in domestic politics and its use of political weapons to destroy and silence its opponents.

In many ways, Theoharis's second charge is timely, as the Bush administration's embrace of secrecy as a tool of domestic and international politics is an echo of cold war security policy. No one reading Theoharis's work should feel comfortable about trusting any FBI director, attorney general, or president with the power of absolute secrecy, as the historical record reveals a mixed record of effectiveness and an unmixed record of abuse of such power.

RUSSELL OLWELL
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The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO
by Elinor C. Sloan. Quebec, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002. 188 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.

This book examines a critical question in the contemporary defense debate: Are military capabilities in a period of revolutionary change? The issue is central to understanding current developments, because since the Gulf War the suggestion that there is currently a revolution in military affairs (RMA)—defined as a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies—has become widely accepted, especially in the United States.

The author, a former analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND), brings an extensive knowledge of the subject to the book and examines many of the major issues associated with the RMA debate. Thus, chapters focus on the nature of military change, how U.S. armed forces are adapting to the altered strategic environment, and how allies of the United States are faring as well. It is this last aspect where the book is weak, as Sloan attempts to examine how four U.S. allies—Britain, France, Australia, and Germany—have each approached the RMA in one rather brief chapter. While some interesting information is offered, I'm not sure that the four to five page summaries of each country are very useful.

However, the various allied reactions set the stage for a more detailed look at how Canada has approached the RMA. In this chapter Sloan's prior work experience comes in most handy, as she reveals a detailed knowledge of how the Canadian military has dealt with advanced defense technology. Having noted that, though, she also demonstrates a common failing of government employees; she is too gentle on her former employer. Thus, while Sloan notes the array of modernization programs the Canadian military has recently undertaken, she largely overlooks the fact that Canada has been one of the slowest countries in the Western world to develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the RMA. That tardiness has been compounded by Canada's laughably low defense spending (at 1.1 percent of GNP, Canadian spending is the third lowest in NATO and is well below the alliance average of 2.1 percent). While Canada's delayed and uncertain RMA reaction is not entirely surprising, it certainly deserves more attention than it receives here. After all, Canada has been a defense freeloader for about thirty years now.

The book also presents some questionable findings and conclusions. For example, it suggests that the RMA offers the United States the possibility of increasing its military effectiveness, while at the same time requiring less in the way of financial resources. While this notion was widespread in the early days of the RMA debate, it is now generally recognized that developing and fielding an advanced defense force will require a high financial cost. Similarly, Sloan's conclusion that RMA technologies are useful for peace support and humanitar-

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ian operations is open to challenge, as the emphasis on sensing equipment and precision-guided munitions may not transfer well for engagements at the low end of the conflict scale.

These misgivings, however, detract little from what is an important book. The study is well written and well argued, and the author tells the tale in an engaging, easy-to-read manner. It is a valuable introduction to what is becoming one of the most critical defense issues of the day, and as such it deserves to be widely read by members of the defense policy community in the United States, Canada, and other Western countries, as well as by interested observers everywhere.

ANDREW RICHTER
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The United States and Venezuela: Rethinking a Relationship *by Janet Kelly and Carlos A. Romero. New York, Routledge, 2002. 168 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

In a very readable and engaging introduction, Janet Kelly and Carlos Romero emphasize the prolonged peaceful relations between Venezuela and the United States. They create an image of a relationship bonded by oil and democracy that has mostly been taken for granted. Unfortunately, while the depiction accurately reflects most of the last several decades and still represents the dominant trend when the book was written, the authors definitely suffered from their timing. After the U.S. government openly supported a short-lived coup in early 2002, the character of the U.S.–Venezuelan relations changed substantially. Kelly and Romero foreshadow this tension, but underestimate the true depth of the crisis.

Since the 1950s, Venezuela and the United States have maintained a close relationship, according to Kelly and Romero. Venezuela became a democracy in 1958 and until the 1990s stood out in Latin America as a bastion of stability within a notoriously unstable region. At the same time, oil—Venezuela's major source of foreign revenue—created a strong economic bond between the two countries. The United States came to rely heavily on Venezuelan oil, just as Venezuela came to rely on U.S. purchases.

Given this strong base, Kelly and Romero propose that tensions emerged mostly at the margins of the relationship, rather than at its core. U.S. actors may not have been pleased when Venezuela nationalized oil in 1976, but Venezuela negotiated with sufficient care that no true rupture occurred in the relationship. Perhaps most differences between the countries have emanated from the simple power differential. For example, the U.S. intervention in the region—something Venezuela has consistently opposed—stems partly from the former's greater power. The disparity has also meant relatively more Venezuelan attention to the relationship and frustratingly limited Venezuelan input into bilateral agreements.

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Yet the events of 2002 cannot be similarly seen as a mere blip in an otherwise deep friendship. In 1998, Venezuelans elected a former coup-leader, Hugo Chávez, as president. In April 2002, a civil-military coalition briefly ousted Chávez from power. While Venezuela's Latin American neighbors leapt to condemn the coup, demonstrating zero tolerance for constitutional interruptions, the United States immediately recognized the usurpers, criticizing Chávez instead of the insurgents.

Kelly and Romero appear not to have anticipated such a dire twist, despite their deep understanding of U.S.–Venezuelan relations. They acknowledge that Chávez challenged the United States with his visits to Iraq and Cuba and with his ambiguous relationship to Colombia's guerrillas. They chronicle the growing U.S. antagonism. Nevertheless, they argue that: "The nineties were no departure from the pattern of friendship that had always existed, and not even President Chávez, despite his revolutionary rhetoric, questioned that the United States was and would continue to be a firm friend" (p. 50), predicting that "the two countries would continue to share common interests" (p. 101).

So, what explains Kelly and Romero's failure to comprehend the extent of U.S. animosity toward Chávez? Their optimism may be deliberate, an effort to convince readers and policy makers that the United States should recognize that Chávez's challenges were more show than substance, and that the United States should "tolerate more variety in the Latin American region" following the end of the cold war (p. 52). Beyond this, however, the authors could not anticipate that within a few months of the book's completion (May 2001), U.S. foreign policy would shift dramatically. After September 11, counter-terrorism became the linchpin of U.S. policies. Thus, Chávez's apparent support for Saddam Hussein (defined by Bush as a terrorist backer) and suspected sympathies for the Colombian guerrillas, also defined as terrorists, now looked more ominous to the United States. At the same time, the United States' increasingly aggressive posture in the Mideast meant an even greater motivation to ensure friendly leaders in oil-producing states like Venezuela. "Tolerance" no longer seemed a likely characteristic of U.S. foreign policy.

In sum, Kelly and Romero aptly identify democracy and oil as the key issues in U.S.–Venezuelan relations, but do not anticipate that these sources of convergence would soon divide the two countries. With respect to democracy, the United States criticized Chávez as nondemocratic, while proving quite willing to support more desirable nondemocratic alternatives. At the same time, oil—historically a very practical link between the countries—possibly helped provoke U.S. aggression toward an apparently unreliable provider. The U.S.–Venezuelan friendship may resume, but the fundamental inequality that Kelly and Romero underscore in the relationship now seems more glaring than ever.

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Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts *by Daniel Byman. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 280 pp. Paper, $22.95.*

Byman's book surveys five major approaches to management of severe ethnic conflicts, which he calls "control," "co-optation," "manipulating ethnic identities," "participatory systems," and "partition." The core of the book consists of chapters on each of the five, surveying their advantages and disadvantages, and evaluating their records in Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria. Certain cases, in which multiple approaches were tried at different times or at the same time, appear in more than one chapter. Israel, for instance, appears in the chapters on control, participatory systems, and partition.

Byman's menu corresponds roughly to the standard one, with two improvements and one loss that was probably inevitable given his regional interests. There are two broad categories of solutions that have been proposed for severe ethnic conflicts: integrative solutions, which aim to build or rebuild the intergroup trust to a level where strong central state institutions can operate without provoking further conflicts; and disintegrative solutions, which aim to dampen conflict despite an absence of such trust by intentionally weakening central state authority in order to provide each community the means to secure its own interests.

The two main integrative solutions are identity reconstruction and power sharing. Identity reconstruction seeks to make ethnic identity irrelevant in politics by persuading members of hostile communities to adopt an overarching identity that spans the ethnic divide (that is, "Yugoslav" instead of "Croat" or "Serb") or at least to shift the foci of their attention from politics to nonethnic issues such as class divisions or economic performance. Power sharing aims to satisfy all groups or at least their elites by guaranteeing shares of government decision-making power and of government-controlled economic rewards such as jobs and development funding. Byman's three chapters on manipulating ethnic identities, participatory systems, and cooptation correspond to these two broad approaches, with one improvement: in the latter two chapters he breaks out the components of power sharing—bribery and empowerment—more clearly than is usually done.

The two main disintegrative approaches are regional autonomy and partition. Both aim to satisfy or at least secure all communities by giving each control of regions where they are in the majority, while weakening (or in the case of partition, eliminating) the power of a central government that could be captured by one group and used against others. Byman treats partition but not autonomy. This choice is perhaps forced, given his regional focus. None of Byman's cases have, or have had, working regional autonomy agreements. There is a degree of de facto regional autonomy in Lebanon. Autonomy for the Palestinians has been considered, but it is certainly a weaker candidate than partition. The situation of the Kurds in Northern Iraq since 1991 could be described as de facto regional autonomy, but as Baghdad's writ does not run there

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at all it is probably more justifiable to treat it, as Byman does, as a de facto partition. Thus the loss of the autonomy approach is not serious to Byman's evaluation of his cases. It is, however, a serious loss to an attempt at a broadly applicable competitive evaluation of ethnic conflict solutions. Certainly there are prominent cases where regional autonomy agreements were probably more successful than any other approach could have been (Belgium, Canada, Switzerland) as well as cases where autonomy might have averted a worse outcome (perhaps colonial India?).

Byman's fifth solution, control, does not appear in most catalogues of ethnic conflict solutions. Managing ethnic conflicts by suppression of weaker groups by a stronger group that controls the state is not something that Western publics can in good conscience encourage. As Ian Lustick pointed out years ago, however, in certain cases control may cost less, even to the oppressed minorities, than any other approach likely to be applied to those cases. We ought to at least develop the capacity to evaluate this approach so that we can recognize cases toward which our best choice may be to hold our noses and leave them alone. Byman is quite negative on the record of control in Israel and in Iraq, but he has certainly done the right thing in bringing the ugliest candidate into the contest anyway.

Byman's bottom line is nuanced. Although he is clearly more sympathetic to power-sharing than to other approaches, in the end he does not come down clearly in favor of any one solution. He argues instead that solutions must be matched to cases. For instance, hegemonic groups that will not compromise will either have to resort to control or accept partition. The case treatments in support of the claims are lucid, persuasive, and, with today's policy focus on the Middle East, exceptionally topical.

Byman's single strongest recommendation is that effort to coopt elites (and some of the masses) of disenfranchised communities never hurts, whether employed as a main strategy in itself or as a support to strategies of control, identity reconstruction, or power-sharing. This alone is such a good point as to be worth the book.

This book will serve extremely well as undergraduate text and should be read by scholars working in any area related to nationalism. Most important, it should be read by policy makers; those with short attention spans should read the chapter on cooptation first.

CHAIM KAUFMANN
Lehigh University

Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict *by Patrick M. Regan. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002. 172 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

Debates about intervening in civil conflicts in foreign nations have so far dominated discussions of U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war period. The Clinton administration agonized endlessly over possible major interventions in Bos-

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nia, Haiti, Iraq, and Kosovo. While Bill Clinton's platform emphasized the need to reduce such foreign involvements, the terrorist attacks on September 11 changed President George W. Bush's views on such matters radically, leading the United States to intervene in internal conflicts in Afghanistan, Georgia, Indonesia, and the Philippines during the past year alone.

Patrick Regan's rigorous analyses of such decisions and their consequences—not only U.S. interventions but those of all nations—are reported systematically in this book. It is an admirable report. Written extremely clearly, Regan is very careful to define his terms, to make clear his assumptions and the manner in which he operationalized the analysis, and to report the results and implications in an even-handed manner. Regan's care to explain repeatedly and in detail exactly what he has done and how he has done it is sometimes maddening. I found myself wishing at times for literary flights of fancy just to break the pace. But the results merit the care in Regan's exposition, and the information provided is well worth the rigor required to follow the author's style. In a very welcome addition to the usual pattern of such quantitative analyses, throughout the volume Reagan goes out of his way to draw the implications of his work for policy makers, carefully making clear both the implications of the analysis for real-world decisions and their limitations. This attempt to bridge the academic and policy worlds was gratefully appreciated by this reviewer and multiplies the value of the analysis.

One cautionary note: Reagan's analysis focuses on external determinants of nations' decisions to intervene, necessarily neglecting possible internal (and usually hidden) connections. Take the French intervention in Rwanda at the end of the genocide there in 1994. Neglected in Regan's explanation is the quieter reason: the so-called humanitarian intervention provided cover for the removal of physical and human assets that had carried out a secret role for France in the Rwandan conflict for many years. Absent this motive, it is doubtful the French would have undertaken their cynical humanitarian mission. Uncovering such internal motivations would require detailed inquiries into each intervention—a task obviously not possible in the aggregate methodology employed in this study. But to the degree they exist and dominate decisions, they no doubt skew the results of the analysis.

Two extensions of the work would be useful. In testament to the difficulties and timelines of academic research and publication, Regan's data end in 1994. Yet, anecdotally at least, interventionist sentiment and motivation seem to have gained greater momentum with the passing years since the end of the cold war and the appearance of U.S. military dominance. An update and extension of the work would be useful. Also, Regan ignores diplomatic interventions, stating, "Conceptual differences exist that warrant the exclusion of diplomacy . . ." (p. 6). Perhaps this is true for this first study. But often the key choice for policy makers and interested voters is between diplomatic and military interventions. Diplomatic interventions clearly have lower risk, as Regan notes, and therefore different decision calculus; but if the results of diplomacy do not differ signifi-

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cantly from the higher-risk military interventions, perhaps they should be considered more favorably as effective alternatives. Given the excellent job he has done on this first volume, one can only hope that Regan will turn to the conceptually more complex case of diplomatic interventions in future work.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
DFI International

NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment *by Benjamin S. Lambeth. Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001. 276 pp. Paper, $20.00.*

The debate over the efficacy of air power is one of the most prominent in strategic studies. For air power proponents, strategic air power enables coercive success at relatively low cost and with minimal risk. For critics, coercion is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without boots on the ground. After every major military engagement, strategic theorists revisit this debate, and military officers from various services continuously justify their budgets by either praising or denigrating air power.

Benjamin Lambeth's superb *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* is a valuable contribution to this debate. The book offers both a narrative review of the conflict and analytical chapters that examine Slobodan Milosevic's eventual decision to concede defeat, the effectiveness of the air power employed in the campaign, operational problems that arose during the war, and strategic missteps that hindered the mission. In the end, Lambeth persuasively demonstrates that strategic air power played an essential role in the ultimate coercive success of the Allied Force, but that the lack of a credible ground threat and a poorly designed strategy made air power less effective than it could otherwise have been.

Lambeth's analysis is objective and even-handed. While he praises the performance of particular military systems such as the B-2 bomber, he is also comprehensive in his enumeration of the flaws in the operation, ranging from poor allied coordination to the bungled Task Force Hawk effort to deploy U.S. Army Apache helicopters.

The author's harshest criticisms, however, are directed at two key actors. First, he is repeatedly critical of the early civilian decision to take a ground invasion off the table. By doing so, the civilian leadership unnecessarily revealed its strategic intentions, which enabled the Yugoslav army effectively to hide itself from allied air power. Certain that NATO tanks were not going to be flowing over its borders, the Yugoslav army did not have to deploy to defend against a ground invasion. Had a ground invasion been credibly threatened, the air effort to destroy the Yugoslav army would have been considerably more effective.

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Second, Lambeth criticizes the military leadership for its failure to design a better strategy for defeating Yugoslavia. Among other strategic missteps were an initial misguided belief that the war would be over in a matter of days, stringent rules of engagement intended to limit civilian casualties, and a highly inefficient process for approving targets. Both of these central criticisms are insightful and offer useful lessons as the United States and its allies contemplate future operations.

The book is not without its weaknesses. For those unfamiliar with the debate over air power, this book is not the best introduction. Lambeth could have done more to place his analysis within the context of larger debates over how best to achieve coercive success. In addition, although the domestic and international political contexts form an important backdrop to the story, the book could have more explicitly discussed the political decision making in both Washington and Brussels that influenced the conduct of the war.

These are relatively minor criticisms, however. In the end, Lambeth demonstrates that while strategic air power was clearly successful in Operation Allied Force, it would have been even more effective if it had been combined with the credible threat of a ground invasion and implemented with a better-designed strategy. Neither the newest stealth bomber nor the latest artillery system is inherently the perfect weapon, for even the most technologically advanced weapon system will not achieve its potential unless a wise strategy guides its employment. In almost all cases, this strategy will call for neither strategic air power nor ground power alone, but rather the integration of both.

DAVID M. EDELSTEIN
Georgetown University

To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941 *by Shoshana Keller. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2001. 384 pp. $64.95.*

Shoshana Keller's important new book is particularly timely. As the world has suddenly focused on Central Asia in the wake of September 11, governments and universities have been dismayed to find how little serious scholarship on this region exists, whether historical, political, anthropological, or sociological. Keller's book is one of the first to explore the Soviet treatment of Islam in Central Asia in this period, the revolutionary first decades of Soviet rule. In intensive work in new archival materials made available since 1991 in both Moscow and Tashkent, Keller uncovers a wealth of material to enhance our understanding of the first twenty-four years of Soviet rule in Central Asia.

From the perspective of a political scientist, the Soviet failure in transforming traditional identities is the main argument of Keller's book. Until recently, most scholarship has assumed that the Soviets were successful in chang-

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ing and creating identities across the Soviet empire. The communist system created a Soviet identity, which still engenders loyalty and nostalgia today, according to recent public opinion polls. The Soviets also created ethnonationality identities, which have been the focus of most research. The successes of Soviet nationalities policy ironically came back to haunt the Communist party when nationalists from Latvia to Armenia and Georgia mobilized for independence. Far less research has been done on Islamic identity. According to Keller, despite the imposition of new identities, and in spite of the massive destruction and transformation of Central Asian society, Islamic identity survives.

Keller argues that the Soviet campaign against Islam and Islamic identity went through several stages, which largely paralleled the broader Soviet campaign for control. In the early years, the Soviet takeover of Central Asia was extraordinarily destructive. After a few years of back-stepping, in line with the New Economic Policy, the leaders of the atheist campaign initiated a new phase of destruction. By the mid 1920s, the party was waging a campaign against the Islamic courts, establishing secular courts, and closing mosques. From 1927 through 1929, the party dramatically stepped up its efforts to shut and destroy mosques. In the 1930s, the party sought to eliminate the clergy.

Keller details the massive devastation of Islamic holy places and persecution of the clergy. In addition to these powerful negative incentives, there were positive incentives to become a "scientific atheist" as well—the perks of party membership. And yet, Keller provides ample evidence of the reemergence of Islamic clergy in the mid-1930s, and the unofficial operation or even the reopening of mosques that were officially closed or destroyed. Furthermore, those Muslim clerics who were coopted into the regime in fact helped to preserve Islam by adapting and modernizing it. Even under the most truly totalitarian periods of its regime, the Soviet Union could not eradicate Muslim identities and create an atheist proletariat. Even with brutal force at its disposal, there are clear limits to a state's power.

Keller's book can be faulted for asking more questions than it answers. For example, Keller demonstrates that hostility and mistrust between Europeans and Russians were extremely high in the 1920s and 1930s, in large part because of Russian support for the atheist campaign. Yet, one is left to wonder how and why interethnic relations improved over time. One would also like to see more acknowledgment of the variation in Central Asian Islam. Keller's evidence has a strong Uzbek focus; Soviet atheist policy may have had more success in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz republics.

Nonetheless, the conclusions are powerful and surprising, as exemplified by the irony of the book's title. The intentions of the Soviet cultural, linguistic, political, and institutional policies were to make Central Asians loyal to Moscow, not Mecca. They did not entirely fail. By the 1960s the Central Asian communist elites were loyal to Moscow's patronage and did not support independence. Yet when one looks at this region today, just a decade after the Soviet

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collapse, Keller's conclusions about the survival of Islam and traditional Central Asian identities are particularly perspicacious. Keller's book is an important contribution to the literature.

KATHLEEN COLLINS
University of Notre Dame

The European Monetary Union in a Public Choice Perspective *by Jennifer C. Martin-Das. Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002. 320 pp. $110.00.*

EMU—the European Union's Economic and Monetary Union—is an unprecedented experiment in joint monetary sovereignty. Yet four years after its launch, both the reasons for and significance of EMU remain opaque. The process leading to monetary unification included intergovernmental negotiations, political maneuvering in national parliaments, several national referenda, and even the intervention of the German Constitutional Court. The final decision was taken by national governments, acting within the European Union's framework of highly institutionalized cooperation. But the path to EMU was also deeply influenced by Europe's national central banks, sometimes acting independently of their governments. Further complicating the picture was the development over the course of the 1990s of a prototype supranational monetary authority in Frankfurt, the European Monetary Institute, whose very existence altered the terms of debate.

How best to render these complexities analytically tractable? On the face of it, a public choice analysis has great promise. The two hallmarks of the approach, emphasis on individual rationality and attention to the incentive structures created by varying institutional designs, suggest useful guidelines for assessing both the origins and consequences of EMU.

The public choice approach is sometimes characterized as excessively narrow and pessimistic, but neither criticism is a valid generalization. True, some of the most famous applications of the public choice approach have had at their core very strong theoretical assumptions. But properly understood, public choice is a broad approach to theorizing, not a specific theory or model of the political economy. Thus, while public choice research is indeed committed to some general conception of individual rationality, this commitment can be understood broadly enough to include attention to cognitive limitations—that is, the costs of acquiring and evaluating information about complex situations. And contrary to the claims of some of its critics, public choice research can also address the pursuit of nonmaterial goals (for example, prestige within one's peer group) by economic and political actors. The real value of the approach lies in its ability to assess how different institutional settings are likely to affect the behavior of rational agents, understood in these broad terms.

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All these characteristics are likely to be of use in any study aiming to provide "a comprehensive examination of the historical, economic, and institutional foundations of the European Monetary Union" (page 280). Unfortunately, the volume under review does not live up to this promise. The book does survey the history and institutions of monetary union, as well as aspects of the optimum currency area literature. But its flaws are many.

The book is poorly edited; despite the publication date of 2002, the bulk of the text was apparently completed no later than 1998 and then superficially updated more recently. Thus the Treaty of Nice is mentioned by name on p. 194, but p. 59 refers only to an "upcoming Inter-governmental Conference" of indeterminate content; likewise EMU itself is sometimes a future event (as on pp. 2, 33, and 146) and sometimes a *fait accompli* (as on pp. 57–58 and in the conclusion, pp. 280–283). The book is also far too long: most of the text serves as an extended literature review while the original analysis begins on p. 255 and lasts just 20-odd pages. And those core arguments, once enumerated, are excessively narrow and pessimistic, failing to live up to the rich promise of the public choice tradition.

In all, the author would have been better advised to publish the results as a short monograph or article and to have done so several years ago. Readers waiting for a definitive public choice analysis of EMU will find themselves still waiting.

DAVID M. ANDREWS
European University Institute

The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization *by Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 152 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $18.95.*

Why does a country with a strong economy, a worldwide economic presence, and a culture that attracts more visitors than any other make a hero of a farmer who smashed up a McDonald's restaurant in the name of antiglobalization? Answering this question systematically and insightfully is the particular "French challenge" that Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier have set and met. The result is a clear, concise, sophisticated little book that is as well suited to the general reader as to the specialist.

By most standard measures, such as levels of trade, investment, travel, and openness to information from abroad, French society has adapted to globalization with a high degree of success. Yet large majorities of French citizens—more than in Germany or Britain—say that globalization is a threat to French identity, a cause of social inequality, a danger to French jobs and community,

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and, last but by no means least, a vehicle for unhealthful and bad-tasting food. Frequently identified with "U.S. domination," globalization is something that should be "tamed" or "managed" (*mondialisation maitrisee*).

Gordon and Meunier are sympathetic to French concerns even when they do not share them. They cite five reasons why globalization is a particular challenge to France. These are the statist tradition, attachment to culture and identity, the disruption of a rational order, the threat to France's global stature, and the high standard of living. The first two will serve as examples.

France's statist, *dirigiste* tradition (the first reason) gives political leaders a vested interest in the globalization debate. The French maintain one of the largest state sectors in Europe, and the idea that the state should supervise and guide economic development remains deeply embedded in the French psyche. But the combination of globalization, European integration, and privatization has steadily eroded the power of the state. Not surprisingly, politicians find this situation threatening. Gordon and Meunier observe sagely that "France is actually adapting to the globalized world economy to a far greater degree than French leaders—who must maintain the notion that the French state is still in control—are prepared to admit" (p. 9).

This erosion of state power helps to explain why protectionism in France has shifted from economics to culture (the second reason), which increasingly includes "European" culture. At the end of their excellent chapter on "Trade, Culture, and Identity," they cite Jean-Francois Revel's comment: "For French culture to be squashed by Mickey Mouse . . . it would have to be disturbingly fragile" (p. 64). Here and elsewhere, the authors' faith in a resilient, attractive, and adaptable French culture shines through.

The French Challenge is refreshingly free of jargon. It makes no attempt to drag French society through the thicket of deconstructionism, Marxism, or any other "ism." Gordon and Meunier believe that it is perfectly possible to understand French attitudes toward globalization by looking at basic economic statistics and opinion polls, reading widely in the literature on globalization, and simply listening.

The title of the book echoes Jacques Servan-Schreiber's 1967 wake-up call, *The American Challenge*, which spoke admiringly of the United States but warned of American "domination." It also suggests that globalization presents not only a challenge to France but also a challenge from France. Referring to the French preference for "managed" globalization, the authors end by asserting that "France's case for *mondialisation maitrisee* should be welcomed rather than condemned" (p. 117). By the end of the book, the reader is likely to agree.

ELLEN L. FROST
Institute for International Economics

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The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Movement *by Dingxin Zhao. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001. 456 pp. $35.00.*

The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan *by Teresa Wright. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 192 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.95.*

In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Chinese student movement and its brutal repression, a series of articles and books appeared in quick succession seeking to explain what had happened, why it had happened, and what it meant for the future of China. There were translations of movement documents, discussions of civil society development (or the lack of it), and analyses of struggles between moderates and hardliners in the leadership. Much of this work was useful and some of it—including memoirs from participants—was essential to our understanding of this complex series of events. Although a number of valuable books on the subject have appeared in the intervening years, it has taken more than a decade for important doctoral dissertations to be completed and to appear in print. Dingxin Zhao became so emotionally caught up in these events that he decided in 1990, after completing his Ph.D. in entomology, to enter a second Ph.D. program in sociology so that he might comprehend the movement in less emotional terms.

While the two books under consideration share obvious similarities, including the use of interviews with participants to supplement analysis of documents, their different emphases and approaches make them quite complementary. In the end, both authors appear to see the 1989 movement's failure as "inevitable," but they reach their conclusions by following different paths. Teresa Wright sees her book as part of the new wave of scholarship that extends social movement theory from its origins in cases of popular protest in Western countries to examine the success and failure of protest in more overtly illiberal and repressive political systems. She argues that the strikingly similar behavior of Beijing students in 1989 and Taiwan students in March 1990 led to almost diametrically opposed outcomes. The Taiwan student action ended peacefully, voluntarily, and successfully, having all its demands addressed by the government. Wright undertakes her comparative case study to examine the reasons for this divergence. Her key variable is the political environment, particularly the political opportunity structure. She suggests that in both places student behavior was both predictable and rational, but the more oppressive political environment in Beijing made any effective reform-oriented political protest close to impossible. Thus, she notes the Catch-22 faced by protestors in the most oppressive and exclusive regimes. To have a chance of success, they would need to forge strong links across varied social groups, such as workers. Yet the attempted mobilization of such groups that the regime finds threatening will provoke a rapid crackdown.

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Dingxin Zhao's book, although it focuses only on the 1989 movement, is nevertheless theoretically more ambitious. As does Wright, he takes issue with previous analyses of the movement. But whereas Wright's criticism focuses on those who blame the students for isolating themselves from other groups, which she feels was essential to avoid repression and may even have prolonged the movement, Zhao's critique is broader. He takes issue with those who see the movement in terms of reformer-hardliner factional struggle within the government, those who stress the rise or lack of civil society development in China, and those who emphasize Chinese culture. Wright's political opportunity approach, a common one in the social movement literature, is rejected because of its unfalsifiability; one cannot form alternative hypotheses to test the theory's validity. Zhao instead suggests that a state-society relations model offers the greatest explanatory power. He models the development of the 1989 movement as a "structured contingency" (p. 350). He emphasizes how social structures patterned people's activities and how these activities gradually closed off other possible outcomes, making the final confrontation between the people and the state increasingly inevitable.

His analysis focuses on three sets of embedded structural factors, including the nature of the state (encompassing state behavior, its strong repressive capacity, and the decline in control over students), the nature of society (the weakness of intermediate associations and the spatial layout of university campuses), and the linkages between the state and society (differing conceptions of state legitimation). In effect, the state was authoritarian, society was poorly organized, and state legitimation was based on its moral and economic performance.

More specifically, Zhao notes three prominent features of the 1989 movement: frequent government policy changes; quick and successful participant mobilizations; and dominance of traditional forms of language and action. Each of these phenomena is explained using his state-society model. Thus, government policies were ineffective and required repeated alteration because top state elites and the general public, including movement activists, had different understandings of state legitimation. Student mobilization was greatly facilitated by the physical environment of the campuses, which placed a large number of students in a small area with a unique spatial distribution. Campus ecology was able to offset organizational weaknesses. In one of many insights that appear in the book, Zhao notes how the 1950s policy of concentrating students in the Haidian district of Beijing as a means of social control had been successful, because the public at that time shared a belief in the state's ideological legitimation. When this was replaced in the 1980s by legitimation based on economic performance and moral conduct, other avenues of status attainment outside the realm of the state opened up; this concentration of students became damaging to regime interests. Thus, social pressure, so effective in the Maoist era in motivating activism in support of the regime, could now be used to mobilize antiregime activism. Finally, in noting, counter-intuitively, that movement

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activities in 1989 had a more traditional outlook than the most prominent pre-1949 student movements (4 May 1919 and 9 December 1935–1936), he suggests that cultural forms of activity dominated the movement because the students judged their government on the basis of moral conduct and were outraged. At the same time, culturally accepted forms of collective action were seen as less likely to lead to immediate repression.

STANLEY ROSEN
University of Southern California

Gender and the Political Economy of Development *by Shirin M. Rai. Oxford, UK, Polity Press, 2002. 264 pp. Paper, $32.95.*

Shirin Rai's complex and comprehensive book threads gender throughout an analysis of nationalism, globalization, global restructuring, and government in the twentieth century. With breathtaking scope, her analysis will appeal to specialists in international political economy, comparative politics, and gender studies. Rai spans from global to local simultaneously, moving women/gender and development approaches into mainstream and core conceptions of political science and international relations. She has grounded experience in, from, and with voices and field research from the South, where global restructuring has made a larger imprint on analysis than abstractions from the North, heretofore more insulated from the consequences of privatization and global corporate power over states.

Consider the following scenario. A giant energy corporation negotiated with a party in power to assure high profits. The arrangements seemed to foster "growth" and "development," always loaded terminology. The heavy-handed corporation manufactured shortages in a public utility. Did this crisis occur recently in the United States through Enron and other corporate giants implicated in California's electricity shortages and skyrocketing prices before it declared bankruptcy, displaced workers, and lost pension funds to executives' compensation schemes? Midway through Rai's book, readers encounter the section, "ENRON and Electricity." India's trade liberalization policies attracted considerable foreign investments in the power sector. In 1992, Enron secured a contract to "manage the world's largest—though nonviable—electricity-generating plant in Dabhol, near Bombay" and in so doing affects the "lives of people in rural communities by shaping and reshaping, privatizing and destabilizing local environments . . . " (pp. 104–05).

Rai's ambitious book grounds debates in the lives of men and women in places wherein both class and North-South divides perpetuate obscene inequalities. The bibliography alone, with readings far beyond U.S. authors, is valuable: Rai includes in more than 600 citations. Those inequalities, Rai argues,

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bode ill for the current century unless development paradigms alter drastically. She makes the best case yet for transformative policy agendas.

Rai divides the book into five key themes. She begins with a chapter on nationalism and nation-building, "imaged" and "imagined" to render women invisible with discourses of citizen and development. Following that, Chapter 2 critically analyzes both the women in development and gender and development literatures as caught, she says, within neoliberal frameworks. In Chapter 3, Rai considers various meanings of globalization, after which she analyzes gendered marketplaces (such as distortions in financial markets) and gendered labor markets. Power and power relations are at the center of how she defines problems, both between men and women and the "disempowered state" vis-à-vis global restructuring and the restructuring of gender relations, covered in Chapter 4.

In a particularly fascinating and frightening discussion about "privatizing 'the natural,' commodifying the social," (p. 139), Rai discusses genetically modified "terminator" seeds and the neem tree in India. Indian farmers, women and men alike, typically keep seeds from harvested crops for next year's planting; and neem trees have been used for several thousand years for medicine, agricultural inputs, and other purposes. But in 1971, a U.S. timber exporter claimed to have "discovered" the tree for the Western market and patents have been taken out on its modern extraction and use.

In Chapter 5, Rai compares what she calls politics of the possible and transformative politics. On the former, she warns about the dangers of normalizing existing discourses of power. The more challenging transformative politics tugs and pulls at paradigmatic shifts, such as debt reduction. In the end, Rai calls for taking politics seriously for engagement from national to global levels.

Shirin Rai has produced nothing short of a gendered account of the twentieth century, using a theoretical frame with implications for practice: political engagement with a gendered lens.

KATHLEEN STAUDT
University of Texas at El Paso

Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism *by Sarah Babb. New York, Routledge, 2001. 295 pp. $35.00.*

Studies abound of the macroeconomic policy trajectories followed in Mexico and their consequences for individuals, firms, and the economy as a whole. Sarah Babb is one of the first to analyze the professionals who made these policies. Through historical examination of the institutions that trained Mexico's economists and the social networks in which they were embedded, she shows how and why Mexico shifted from a protectionist enclave to a highly liberalized economy, open to the free market mantra of the Chicago School and the neo-

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liberal economic ideas of other "foreign" experts. The story she tells is insightful, important, and necessary reading for scholars interested in Mexico and the political economy of development more generally.

The book begins in the postrevolutionary period, when those charged with economic policy making were most likely to be National University-trained bureaucrats who shared a commitment to revolutionary ideals, and when the profession of economics was still largely undeveloped. The narrative proceeds through the 1940s and 1950s, when Mexican business interests founded new private academic institutions devoted to creating professional economists who would take a different perspective than those trained at the public university. It continues through the period of the Mexican "miracle," the 1960s and into the early 1970s, when these privately-trained economists entered government service in greater numbers, leading to a polarization within the profession and the state itself, primarily between those located in the Finance Ministry and the rest of the bureaucracy. The book ends with an institutional accounting of the shift to more liberalized policies over the 1980s, identifying as a key element in this transition the strengthened personal and professional connections between Mexican economists (mainly in the Finance Ministry and Central Bank) and neoconservative free marketers in U.S. economics departments where many Mexican economic students and professors were trained. Along the way, we learn about the organization of economics curriculum in public and private universities in Mexico, about the growing internal divisions within the Mexican state, about the path-dependent historical specificities that pushed Mexican economists to look northward for ideas, and how this led to their nation's adoption of neoliberal ideas.

One of the novel features of this study is its framing within the literature on professions and organizations. This allows for a close reading of the ways that ideas about economic policy are deeply embedded in the institutions that train professional economists, as well as the reasons why Mexican economics students become both policy makers and professors (and sometimes both). The constant interaction between these two institutional worlds, the university and the state, drives much of Mexico's macroeconomic policy making. This choice of framing also allows the author to explain why institutional and ideological divisions emerged within the state, as well as how they both derived from and produced a greater schism between the Finance Ministry and Central Bank, on one hand, and the rest of the bureaucracy on the other. Such insights have been lacking in most of the literature on economic policy making or state formation in Mexico. The only cost to the reader is the limited attention paid to the more traditional political economy dimensions of the story.

Much more could have been said about the market interests of the private sector firms that supported the founding of alternative economics institutions, and how their macroeconomic priorities also factored into the push for new economics institutions, the professional inculcation of more neoliberal ideas among their students, and the receptivity of the state to these alternatively-

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trained economists in the first place. One also gets the sense that more should have been said about the unique economic trajectories associated with Mexico's status as a late industrializer, another key aspect of this story getting short shift. With a better understanding of the ways that sectoral and regional splits between domestic and foreign-linked firms emerged in the process of late industrialization, pitting Mexico City-based import-substituting industrialization firms whose owners and political patrons were more likely to be linked to the National University against northern firms more involved in finance, banking, and industrial exporting, we would have better understood the intraprivate sector dynamics that motivated some businesses to push for new economics training programs in the first place and why they initially located in or were funded by firms in northern Mexico. Last, the book suffers from some mild red-baiting, evident in the routine invocation of terms like Marxists and Marxist economics to discuss the content of economics training in the decades between 1920 and 1970. Such terminology is not really necessary to the argument as a whole and caricatures the complexity of the developmental (and professional economics) task facing Mexico's revolutionary leaders as they sought in vain to turn a truncated and undercapitalized industrial economy into a self-generating, prosperous, and vibrant one, all while keeping sight of the political and social aims of the revolution. Mild editing errors (Mexico's president from 1946–1952 was Miguel Alemán not Lucas Alemán) also mar this otherwise exceptional piece of work from a promising young sociologist.

DIANE E. DAVIS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil *by Craig L. Arceneaux. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 282 pp. $35.00.*

Many studies of democratization in South America have argued that the outcome of transitions to democracy are highly uncertain, shaped by strategic choices made during the transition itself. Other explanations are more deterministic, highlighting the role of societal factors like the strength of the opposition or external events like the debt crisis in shaping the nature of the transition. Craig Arceneaux challenges both camps, arguing that "transition control is determined long before the actual transition from military rule to democracy occurs" (p. 13). But he points to the institutions of the military regime itself as determinants of the level of control. He backs up his argument with chapter-length discussions of five cases of military rule in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay from the 1960s to 1980s, each based on a thorough and thoughtful review of individual country case studies and journalistic accounts of military rule.

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Arceneaux argues that regime institutions shape levels of military unity and strategy coordination, which in turn determine the level of military control over a transition. Military unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for strategy coordination—the ability to reach out to society and the military to implement a coherent economic and political program. A combination of unity and strategy coordination in Pinochet's Chile (1973–1989) and the Brazilian military regime (1964–1985) resulted in transitions controlled by the military; a lack of both under the Argentine military regime of 1976–1983 led to "transition by collapse" and little military influence. Military unity but a lack of strategy coordination in Uruguay (1973–1985) and the Argentine *Revolución* (1966–1973) led to "balanced transitions," in which the outgoing military regime exercised some control but had to make concessions to the opposition.

Arceneaux's framework works best to account for extreme cases of regime success and failure that in turn explain "controlled transitions" and "transitions by collapse." The emphasis on the importance of linkages to society for regime success echoes the findings of some of the better country studies of military regimes and counters the widely-held belief that the autonomy of military governments is the key to policy success.

The framework works less well in explaining the level of military control over transitions in the in-between cases—the less than successful but not utterly disastrous regimes—which arguably characterize the majority of military governments in Latin America. While Arceneaux admits that Argentina in 1973 "looks like a transition by collapse" (p. 68), negotiations with the opposition failed and the "*cinco puntos*" document issued by the outgoing regime to safeguard military interests was ignored completely by the new democratic government. He nonetheless characterizes it as a balanced transition on the grounds that the military was eventually able to regain some political influence in subsequent years. Although this is true, all scholars, including Arceneaux, make a distinction between control over the transition and the subsequent influence of the military. It is the former that his framework seeks and ultimately fails to explain for the Argentine case.

The inability of the Argentine military to exercise any influence over the 1973 transition suggests that military unity does not play the determining role in balanced transitions that Arceneaux assigns to it. To the contrary, an examination of transitions from the military regimes that most closely resemble the Argentine case—the Colombian and Venezuelan regimes of the 1950s, which, Arceneaux argues, represent the pattern that future military regimes are likely to follow, reveal that civilian strategies are the most important factor in explaining the level of concessions offered to the military during transitions to democracy, at least in the in-between cases described above. Furthermore, these civilian strategies were fundamentally unaffected by the level of military unity: divided militaries in both countries were granted concessions based on civilian understandings of the requirements of democratic consolidation, formulated long before the actual transition took place.

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Despite these shortcomings in Arceneaux's overall framework, the nuanced and insightful discussion of the individual cases offers multiple insights into the operation of and levels of success engineered by military regimes. The systematic discussion and comparison of five of the most-studied military regimes in South America makes this a valuable addition to the libraries of area specialists.

JEANNE K. GIRALDO
Naval Postgraduate School

Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States *by Duane Swank. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 334 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $23.00.*

Many scholarly and casual observers contend that the dramatic post-1970s rise in international capital mobility and upward postwar trend in trade integration, by sharpening capital's threat against domestic governments to flee purportedly excessive and inefficient welfare systems, has forced and will continue to force welfare-state retrenchment. Several important recent studies of the comparative and international political economy of policy change over this period, now including Duane Swank's impressive theoretical and empirical study, challenge these claims. His argument that the institutional structure of the polity and of the welfare system itself shapes the domestic policy response to capital (and trade) integration represents a basis for challenging the globalization-induces-retrenchment argument.

Swank's argument does not fundamentally challenge claims of the exclusive or superior macroeconomic efficiency of neoliberal minimalism but rather stresses the primacy of domestic political conditions—the policy-making access, cohesion and organization, and the relative power of contending pro- and anti-welfare interests—in determining the direction and magnitude of welfare-policy reactions to international economic integration. Specifically, he argues and finds that inclusive electoral institutions, social-corporatist interest-representation and policy making, centralized political authority, and universal welfare systems relatively favor the political access and capacity for pro-welfare interests and bolster supportive social norms in the domestic political struggle over the response to integration. He does this by means of cross-national, cross-temporal statistical analysis supplemented by thorough qualitative case explorations of generous welfare states and briefer explorations of less-generous systems. The opposite conditions favor antiwelfare interests and norms in this struggle. Globalization thus induces increased welfare largesse in generous states and retrenchment in tight ones, that is, divergence not convergence.

This book offers the most directly and thoroughly political approach of its genre. It is also the most thoroughly explored empirically, offering compara-

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tive-historical statistical analyses of the argument against six alternative interpretations of the globalization-induces-retrenchment thesis: the simple version (a regression including one of five capital-openness measures), and five others he terms the run-to-the-bottom (capital openness times lagged welfare-policy), convergence (capital openness times gap from own to cross-country mean welfare-policy), nonlinear (capital openness and its square), trade-and-capital-openness (their product), capital-openness-times-fiscal-stress (deficits times capital openness), and capital-flight (net foreign direct investment) versions. He finds little support for any globalization-induces-retrenchment argument. He gives some indications that capital mobility tends on average to enhance welfare effort, perhaps supporting those emphasizing its effect in increasing popular demand for social insurance against global risks.

The reader might wish for the following:

- Further theoretical development of why inclusive institutions necessarily favor pro- over antiwelfare interests' access; but, contrarily, decentralization favors anti- over pro-welfare forces.
- Separate theoretical elaboration and empirical evaluation of the individual components of the amalgamated concepts of electoral inclusiveness—proportionality and fractionalization—and authority dispersion—presidentialism, federalism, bicameralism, referendum-usage.
- Theoretical and empirical comparison of the argument to alternatives from the political-economy literature rather than or in addition to the comparison with the six conventional-wisdom hypotheses.
- More thorough exposition of the exact empirical models estimated and their results and/or simpler structures of those models (as examples: complicated tables of regression results appear without previous mathematical statement of the estimated equation(s); the models contain dummies for unspecified series breaks and for unnamed subsets of countries, which severely complicate interpretation especially for near-time-invariant indices like authority dispersion and for time-trended measures; and interactive effects are discussed without tables, graphs, or information on the value-ranges of the component variables, which would greatly aid their interpretation.

Swank's central argument that domestic political conditions—electoral inclusiveness, social corporatism, authority centralization, and existing welfare-system structure—shape democratic governments' responses to economic integration, spurring divergence more than convergence, is logically persuasive, theoretically satisfying, and empirically supported.

ROBERT J. FRANZESE, JR.
The University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

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Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change *by Jane E. Fountain. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 251 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $18.95.*

Not long ago, some analysts predicted that the state would wither away. The rise of the internet, with its ability to connect anyone with anyone, anywhere about anything, seemed only to ensure that prediction would come true. If citizens could bypass government by linking with each other, what would they need government for?

Of course, that argument always seemed a bit exaggerated. Citizens need government to redistribute income and provide for the national defense, among other things. But in the argument lay a powerful critique of government and especially of public bureaucracy. The internet, along with the rise of other network-based forces, seemed poised to drive a stake through the heart of authority and hierarchy-driven public organizations.

In this fascinating book, Jane E. Fountain contends that the argument misses the mark. The state is certainly not fading away, she shows, but it certainly is being reconstructed. New technologies are building a new version of government—what Fountain calls "the virtual state"—and those technologies are fundamentally changing what government does. For Fountain, a virtual state is "a government that is organized increasingly in terms of virtual agencies, cross-agency and public-private networks whose structure and capacity depend on the Internet and web" (p. 4). From the efforts of government agencies to provide citizens "one-stop shopping" to new strategies for command-and-control of military operations in cyberspace, the book is a searching examination of the trends reshaping the very nature of government.

Building the Virtual State elegantly weaves together two different threads. One is the state of organization theory. Fountain takes on the two most important competing approaches—traditional bureaucratic theory, captured by Max Weber, and newer network-based theory, developed by Oliver Williamson and others. Fountain convincingly shows that the rise of the network-based internet may actually increase the importance of bureaucracy-based rules. The difference is that "The rules might not be visible because most of them will be hidden in software and hardware. But they will remain and may increase in power" (p. 62). That argument points to how technology might change life for everyone who deals with government agencies.

The other thread is the application of internet-based technology inside government. Fountain develops three detailed case studies on international trade, government help for small businesses, and command and control in cyberspace. These case studies provide strong support for her theoretical arguments and paint intriguing portraits of what the information revolution actually looks like in the public sector.

These two threads, Fountain concludes, have become interwoven in a new kind of approach to government that disrupts the existing patterns of power

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and relationships. Government managers—and those who work with them—have had to devise new "rules of the game" (p. 199) to shape their alliances and partnerships. As a result, the rise of the virtual state has not so much supplanted hierarchies with networks as it has forced all the key players to rethink their roles and behaviors.

The transition has come with significant costs. Fountain raises briefly the issue of the "digital divide" and the prospect that government's experts might find themselves frozen out on issues where the government needs their expertise. Most of her evidence comes from the Clinton administration's "reinventing government" campaign, which has since fallen out of favor. Nevertheless, there's no sign that the basic forces have changed in the intervening years. The basic argument Fountain makes—that the rise of the internet poses enormous issues for the conduct of government and the role of bureaucracy—has become even more important. Her book is an invaluable map for understanding the sweeping and inescapable changes.

DONALD F. KETTL
University of Wisconsin–Madison

The Capacity to Govern *by Yehezkel Dror. Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. 264 pp. $49.50.*

The main thesis of this book is that all prevailing forms of governance in democracies and nondemocracies are increasingly "dead ends." According to the author, radical redesign of governance is required, otherwise increasing social costs and even existence-threatening failures are unavoidable. The author questions seriously whether institutions such as markets can, if left to their own devices, overcome or compensate for these inadequacies. At best, markets are well suited for delivery service functions. They are not suited for being in charge of and shaping critical future choices.

Examining the history of theory and practice of governance, no overall progress can be discerned in the range of statecraft qualities. Claims of ungovernability are largely defensive routines that cover up our capacity to govern. Governmental passivity constitutes a denial of responsibility that reinforces the outcomes that are considered undesirable.

The author proposes a political philosophy that he calls *raison d'humanité* upon which to base his radical and not-so-radical recommendations to begin to engage the problem. The author recognizes that contrary views exist. Moreover, he makes explicit how his and others' recommendations can, when implemented, exhibit inner contradictions. The author shows how in many cases, inner contradictions are used as a basis for tolerance of beliefs that may lead to dangerous fanaticism. He also illustrates how inner contradictions, gaps, and inconsistencies can become the basis for scholarly inquiry and practitioner learning.

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The book describes many trends and many challenges that face all nations: for example, rapid and nonlinear change, increasing uncertainty and inconceivability, globalization, trauma, despondency, and unrest, and all the changes leading to mutation. Each challenge is examined critically. The author makes his recommendations explicit. Upgrading governance requires changes in underlying political culture that are unlikely to come about on their own. This requires governance to be moral, knowledge-intensive, future-committed, content-based, deep-thinking, holistic, learning, pluralistic, and decisive.

Critical in implementing these features are elites or rulers who are educated and skillful in overcoming root corruption. They champion new courses in citizenship. They challenge taboos and encourage unconventional measures. Elites are skilled at fuzzy gambling, that is gambles that cannot be reduced to probabilities, event chains with fixed distribution rules, and known categories of results. They are schooled at thinking, deep policy reflection, long time evolutionary processes, weaving the future, thinking in historical terms without being bound by the past, being creative, learning, and changing their minds.

There are two questions that I should like to raise in the spirit of "what's next." First, for those of us who see much validity in the recommendations for educating leaders and societies to value nontrivial change, we seek more on how the skills required can be taught and implemented. Without specifying requirements, governance being consent-based, deep thinking, holistic, and overcoming root corruption, will all remain espoused abstractions that eventually fade away.

The second question is related to the author's claim (documented with historical and present examples) that little progress has been made in solving the issues of effective governance. Research is needed in specifying the processes that inhibit this progress. After all, many of them may exist presently and will become barriers to learning. Conducting such inquiries requires that social scientists reexamine their fundamental assumption that progress is made by producing knowledge that inhibits "internal validity" (evidence that the causal claims are valid) and "external validity" (logic and evidence that the findings are relevant in contexts beyond those in which they are established).

It is possible for studies to exhibit high internal and external validity, yet exhibit low implementable validity. Implementable validity specifies in the form of causal actions (designs-in-use) how to bring about intended consequences. I suggest that the next step to build upon Dror's thoughtful analysis is to conduct scholarly efforts to increase their implementable validity. Unless there is an in-depth focus on implementable validity, there is the danger that the elites, their staffs, and their oversight boards will produce behavioral worlds that inhibit the very features of the high-quality governance Dror recommends.

Dror specifies the *enablers* of effective governance. The next step is to specify how to produce the enablers in everyday life. Without this, I predict that a new book will someday be written that begins with the same laments docu-

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mented in this book. The problem is not that the laments are invalid. The problem is that the recommendations intended to reduce the laments have low implementable validity.

CHRIS ARGYRIS
Harvard University

The President's Cabinet: Gender, Power, and Representation *by Mary Anne Borrelli. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 282 pp. $26.50.*

Years ago as I was leaving the presidency of Hunter College in New York to take a similar position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, a New York friend called to say I was "nuts." "Don't go, you're going to be a cabinet member in the Dukakis administration," he assured me. I told him grown-ups do not plan their lives around being a cabinet member. If it happens it happens.

Mary Anne Borrelli carefully documents background differences between men and women designated by presidents. This is a solid contribution to political science and presidential politics. There is a dearth of serious scholarship on the cabinet. She reviews presidency research and gender studies, including how presidents choose their cabinets, media coverage, the confirmation process, and the representational role of individual cabinet members. I do have some concerns. First, her use of "insider" and "outsider" definitions might be too crude. To qualify as an insider, a secretary-designate had to have had a primary career in the national government or to have entered the cabinet directly from the cabinet, or to have transferred directly from another cabinet post. Any nominee that did not meet this criteria was labeled an outsider. In providing such an inflexible measure, the book misses the connections between cabinet members who had served in previous administrations and knew each other and the president or vice president and party leaders, and the White House senior staff for years. All but one of the women in the first and second Clinton cabinets fit that criteria.

The author might underestimate the importance of these earlier experiences and political skills and party connections of the candidates in the selection process. Most of the members of the presidents' cabinets know each other and how Washington works through earlier service, and/or campaign experience, or sitting on national nonprofit boards—including foundations or national commissions. They are much more insiders than the definition and book suggests.

A second weakness is in the analysis of the media—using the *New York Times* as opposed to the Associated Press, Reuters, and the *Washington Post. Wall Street Journal* stories give a more limited view of differential reactions to appointments of men and women.

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Borrelli's chapter on confirmation hearings takes them more seriously than is necessary. Any memory of tough confirmation hearing questions is wiped away after one budget cycle. While extensive preparation is important, years of investment in responding to legislators' calls and whims have erased any early rough patches.

Finally, it is not clear what all this means. Do gender differences, differencial treatment by the press and Congress (during confirmation), and outsider vs. insider status help or hurt effectiveness as a cabinet member? That of course is another book. I hope she writes it.

DONNA E. SHALALA
University of Miami

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents *edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos M. Rainer. New York, Central European University Press, 2003. 598 pp. $67.95.*

The Middle East Military Balance, 2001–2002 *edited by Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2002. 470 pp. $37.95.*

Terrorism 1996–2001: A Chronology, Volumes One and Two *by Edward F. Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2002. 592 pp. $175.00 (set).*

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

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

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

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
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


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

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

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

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

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

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

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Brigitte L. Nacos is adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University.

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